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Abstract 
 
This interdisciplinary research examines the ability of gold mining multinationals to 
fulfil their human rights obligations and investigates how local communities in Ghana 
attempt to hold these corporations accountable with respect to human rights. The 
Canadian mid-tier gold mining company Golden Star Resources (GSR) and its host 
community in Dumasi were used to carry out an intensive case study which explored 
the relationship between business and human rights and its implications for sustainable 
community development in a Global South context. Adopting a mixed-method 
approach, I collected data during a three-month fieldwork in Ghana.  Findings from the 
study suggest that GSR is not meeting its human rights obligations in Dumasi largely 
due to the complex interaction between internal organisational factors and the nature of 
the external socio-political environment in which GSR operates. In response to 
prevailing corporate human rights abuses, Dumasi community members have adopted 
accountability strategies that are moderately effective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedication 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to the people of Dumasi who continue to demonstrate 
resilience, determination and courage in their long-standing struggle for their 
amansa fahowdie (English translation: human rights) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
iv 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
Every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of the 
heavenly lights, who does not change like shifting shadows. (James 1:17) 
 
In all things, I must give thanks to God first for being my refuge, my strength and my 
comforter in times of need. A few years ago, doing a master’s seemed like an 
impossibility. The barriers were plenty, but God made a way.  
 I would also like to express my utmost gratitude to my excellent supervisors 
(Prof. Uwafiokun Idemudia, Prof. Obiora Okafor and Prof. Joseph Mensah) who 
pushed me, offered words of encouragement and helped me grow intellectually. I am 
very fortunate to have had the opportunity to work and learn from all three of you. I 
admire how you strive for excellence in your work and do not relent. Thank you for 
challenging me to seek perfection and thank you for believing in me!     
 My master’s studies would have not been possible without the generous 
financial contribution from York University and Sylff Association. I am very grateful to 
have received the Fellowship for Academic Distinction, the York U Graduate 
Scholarship as well as funding for academic conferences.  
 Prof. van Daalen-Smith, you are an angel sent from above. You were so positive, 
supportive and eager to see me succeed. I will never forget what you did for me. Fiona, 
I don’t know how many times I bothered you for letters. I must have significantly 
added to your workload. So, thank you for your patience and for being so kind to 
answer my various requests.  
 Muna Ali, my Somali sister, I cannot thank you enough for telling me about the 
IS program. You may not know and understand what a game-changing moment it was 
for me.  
 Nombuso, I probably need a whole chapter to fully explain how grateful I am to 
you. When nobody wanted to hire me, you took a chance with me. When others 
thought I wasn’t ready to publish, you took a chance with me again. You always saw 
what other people couldn’t see. I’m going to miss your jokes. (I think you could have 
had a successful career as a comedian). I greatly admire your zeal and never give up 
attitude. I love how you taught me and other women to always support and empower 
each other. (#Womanism #FemaleEmpowerment #GirlsRock #PowerToWomen). Thank 
you for being a rock in my professional and personal life.  
I also have to thank Prof. Teye, Emmanuel and Diana from the Centre for 
Migration Studies at the University of Ghana for offering me a space to study and for 
connecting me with important stakeholder within the mining industry. 
 Mr Taylor, I could tell you were cheering for me when I started my masters and 
eager to help me. Thanks for connecting me to your friends in Ghana and thanks for the 
many conversations about the Akan human rights conception.  
   
 
v 
 
 Nana, my love, you came in at the 11th hour, as you always do. I remember the 
day you stayed until morning to help me finish input my surveys. You are such a 
sweetheart. It is wonderful to see you grow into a beautiful, intelligent and kind 
woman.   
 Franklin, I lack the words to fully capture what I feel inside. You have always 
been there through the highs and lows, times of laughter and times of tears. I thank God 
for bringing you into my life. You are extraordinarily kind. I am privileged to know you 
and learn from you. I appreciate all the wonderful moments we’ve shared together, and 
I know there are more to come.  Thanks for the love and support you have shown 
consistently. Thanks for always being there. You are forever going to be part of my life.  
Shawnee, mi chile, we clicked right from the start. It’s amazing how close we have 
become over the years. I love how I can talk to you about anything and how we support 
each other (#WomenSupportingWomen). You are such a loving and caring person and 
your honesty is refreshing. Thank you for motivating me, for proof-reading some 
chapters, for helping me prepare for oral defense and for being a good friend.  
I must also thank Father Patrick Amonu and Father Stephen S. Ackah (Bogoso) who 
helped me gain access to community members.  Needless to say, none of this would 
have been possible without the willingness of the Dumasi community. Many felt that I 
was yet another researcher coming to ask them about their plight and then leave. So I’m 
very grateful to those who nevertheless agreed to talk to me and help me tell their 
stories.  To my two field assistants (Emmanuel Quaicoe and Kwame Manu), thank you 
for helping me navigate the village. Through your participation, I was able to gain the 
trust of other community members. Sister Awura-Ama, you were so helpful during 
fieldwork. I think in the near future, you might want to become a researcher yourself. 
Aunty Abu, I know I am not supposed to have favourites, but you are my favourite 
aunty. You made my stay in Ghana such a wonderful experience. Uncle Jack, thank you 
for being a positive male figure in our family. You are always seeking to do what is 
right. I appreciate your wise counsel and your willingness to listen to us, young people. 
Thanks for the financial support during my field work in Ghana.  
Last but not least, I must thank the best parents there is: Gladys Kwakyewah 
Marfo and Victor Dabankah Marfo. I’m sure you don’t always understand what I am 
doing and why I do what I do; yet you always rally behind me. I know this is an 
important milestone for our family. I have hope that the future generation of 
Kwakyewahs and Marfos will achieve beyond what I was able to do. Thank you for 
providing me with the necessary support so that I can pave the way for those that are 
yet to come.  To my beloved sisters, Sarah Natascha Feyerabend, Emanuela Dabankah 
Marfo and Felicia Kwakyewah Marfo, I love you to death.  You bring so much joy to my 
heart. Because of you, I keep pressing forward and will never accept defeat! Yes, we did 
it! 
 
 
   
 
vi 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract..........................................................................................................................   ii  
Dedication.....................................................................................................................  iii          
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................  iv 
Table of Contents......................................................................................................... vi                        
List of Tables.................................................................................................................  ix  
List of Figures...............................................................................................................   x                             
List of Acronyms..........................................................................................................  xi  
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ......................................................................... 1 
1.1 Problem Statement .......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Research Objectives ......................................................................................................................... 4 
1.3 Significance of the Study ................................................................................................................ 6 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................ 9 
2.1. What are Human Rights? .............................................................................................................. 9 
2.2 Human Rights and Culture: Western versus Akan Conception of Human Rights ............... 14 
2.3 The Right to Development: A Brief Overview ........................................................................... 19 
2.4 What is the Relationship between Business and Human Rights? .......................................... 25 
2.5 What is the History of Business and Human Rights? .............................................................. 29 
2.6 Business and Human Rights in Developing Countries: Gaps in the Literature ................... 38 
2.7 How does the Corporate Duty to respect Human Rights relate to CSR? .............................. 41 
2.8 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................................. 47 
2.8.1 Areas of limited statehood: What does it mean to govern with(out) the state? ......... 48 
2.8.2 Social license to operate (SLO) and stakeholder theory. ................................................ 53 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY................................................................................... 60 
3.1 Justification for selected Methodology ...................................................................................... 60 
3.2 Justification for selected Study Area .......................................................................................... 63 
3.3 Collection of Qualitative Data ................................................................................................... 65 
3.4 Qualitative Data Analysis ........................................................................................................... 67 
3.5 Collection of Quantitative Data ................................................................................................. 68 
   
 
vii 
 
3.6 Quantitative Data Analysis ........................................................................................................ 71 
3.7 Critical Reflection on Fieldwork ................................................................................................. 72 
3.7.1 The limits to language. .......................................................................................................... 72 
3.7.2 Meeting the community gatekeepers. ................................................................................ 74 
3.7.3 ‘So, how does your research benefit us?’: Over-researching a community. ................ 75 
3.8 Research Limitations .................................................................................................................... 77 
CHAPTER 4: CONTEXTS AND STUDY AREA ............................................................................... 80 
4.1. A Historical and Contemporary Account of Ghana’s Mining Industry ............................... 80 
4.2 Governing the Mining Industry through Global Standards: VPs & Ruggie’s Framework . 85 
4.3. Study Area ...................................................................................................................................... 94 
4.3.1 Socio-demographic characteristics of Dumasi.................................................................. 94 
4.3.2 Background on project-induced resettlement in Dumasi. ............................................. 98 
4.4. Golden Star Resources and Community Relations in Dumasi ............................................ 101 
CHAPTER 5: CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN DUMASI: 
EXPECTATIONS & EXPERIENCES.................................................................................................. 106 
5.1 Drivers of Conflict and Corporate Human Rights Abuses .................................................... 106 
5.2 Living in a Limbo: Resettlement, Development and Human Rights .................................... 115 
5.3 “We don’t always know what happens behind closed doors”:  Intra-Community 
Dynamics & Representation in Dumasi ......................................................................................... 126 
CHAPTER 6: FROM GLOBAL TO LOCAL: AN ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICES, COMMUNITY-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY STRATEGIES AND 
GP’S ON THE GROUND .................................................................................................................... 131 
6.1 Golden Star Resources and Community Relations in Dumasi: (Re)negotiating a Social 
License to Operate (SLO) .................................................................................................................. 131 
6.2 Accountability Strategies from Below: What works and what doesn’t? ............................ 136 
6.3 Ruggie’s Framework in Practice: Empirical Insights from Ghana ....................................... 144 
CHAPTER 7: EMERGING ISSUES AND CONCLUSION ........................................................... 151 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................... 156 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................................ 173 
Appendix A: Survey questionnaire .................................................................................................. 173 
Appendix B: Interview guide for company ..................................................................................... 178 
   
 
viii 
 
Appendix C: Interview guide for NGOs .......................................................................................... 180 
Appendix D: Interview guide for government officials ................................................................ 181 
Appendix E: Written informed consent ........................................................................................... 182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
ix 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1: List of some Canadian mining companies operating in Ghana ………………….………2  
Table 2: Key UN milestones in the development of international human rights legal 
 framework ……………...…………………………………………………………………………...…22 
Table 3: Human Rights impacted by businesses …………………………………….……………..36 
Table 4: Overview of institutes that were interviewed ……………………………………………61 
Table 5: Field activities and methodological tools …………………………………………………63 
Table 6: Mining fiscal regime in Ghana 2006-2014 ………….…………………………….………..83 
Table 7: Laws, policies and global standards governing the human rights responsibilities  
of businesses in Ghana’s mining industry ……………………………………………….………….84 
Table 8: Socio-Demographic background of respondents ………………………………….…….. 97 
Table 9: Selected CSR project sponsored by Golden Star Resources ……………………..….….104 
Table 10: Reasons for corporate-community conflicts in Dumasi …………………………….…114 
Table 11: Overall impact of mining activities by gender …………………………………………119 
Table 12: Positive and negative contributions of mining activities ……………………….……..120 
Table 13: Disbursement of Minerals Development Fund in Ghana ………………………….….127 
Table 14: Meeting community expectations ……………………………………………………….133 
Table 15: Rating the relationship between GSR and community …………….………………….134 
Table 16: State protection of community rights ……………………………………….…….…… 140 
Table 17: Community-based accountability strategies in Dumasi ……………….……...………141 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
x 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Dumasi village …………………………………………………………………....…..….…..95 
Figure 2: Contaminated Water in Dumasi …………….…………………………….………..……....96 
Figure 3: Golden Star Resources open-pit and underground mines ……………..………...…….100 
Figure 4: Map of district and study area …………………………………………………....……….101 
Figure 5: Golden Star Resources Gold Mines ……………………………………….….……...……102  
Figure 6:  School building Dumasi sponsored by Golden Star Resources ……………....……….104 
Figure 7: Root cause analysis of corporate-community conflicts in Ghana’s mining 
communities…………………………………………………………………………………….………107 
Figure 8: Cracked and collapsed or unfinished houses in Dumasi ……………………………....111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
xi 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
BHR   Business and Human Rights 
 
CHRAJ Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (Ghana) 
 
CSR  Corporate Social Responsibility  
 
ESC  Extractive Sector Companies  
 
GPs  Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights 
 
GSR  Golden Star Resources  
 
IFC PS5 IFC Performance Standard 5 Land Acquisition and Involuntary  
 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
 
PRR  Protect, Respect & Remedy (Framework) 
 
RBD  Right-Based approach to Development 
 
TNC  Transnational Corporation  
 
SAP  Structural Adjustment Programme  
 
SLO  Social Licence to Operate  
 
VPs  Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights  
 
WACAM Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining (NGO) 
 
WUSC  World University Services of Canada (NGO)
   
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
“We all [business, government and civil society] have to do more to protect and promote the 
human rights of mining communities” – An employee from Ghana’s Mining & Minerals 
Commission  
 
“Mining is a power game. It goes beyond economic activities. People wield power in mining.” – 
An employee from WACAM Ghana (NGO) 
 
Corporate-community conflicts regarding the use of land and control over 
natural resources have persisted since the inception of commercial gold mine 
production in Ghana (Hilson & Nyame, 2006). Unfortunately, existing laws (i.e. 
Minerals and Mining Act of 2006) and policies (e.g. Minerals and Mining Policy of 
Ghana etc.) have done little to ameliorate the antagonistic relationship between mining 
multinationals and their host communities. In part, this is due to the fact that local 
communities continue to bear the burden of resource extraction in the form of human 
rights abuses and environmental degradation while gaining very little socio-economic 
benefits (Garvin, McGee, Smoyer-Tomic & Aubynn, 2009).   
Considering the near absence of the government in these communities and 
limited legal instruments to protect community rights, foreign multinationals, including 
Canadian mining companies (see Table 1) are expected to fulfil a quasi-governmental 
role (Crane, 2011) by contributing to sustainable development in the host community 
where they do business (Garvin et al., 2009). Generally, host communities commonly 
anticipate that these companies are profitable, protect the environment (Idemudia, 2014) 
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and respect human rights (Ruggie, 2008). In practice, transnational corporations (TNCs) 
operating in areas of limited statehood are faced with numerous institutional challenges 
and do not always manage to meet their socio-environmental responsibilities and 
human rights obligations.  
Table 1: List of some Canadian mining companies operating in Ghana 
 
Company Metal Headquarter Area of 
operation(s) 
 Stock Exchange 
African Gold Group, 
Inc. 
Gold Toronto, Ontario Asankrangwa & 
Nyankumasi 
Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
African Queen Mines 
Ltd. 
Gold  Vancouver, British 
Columbia 
No information TSX Venture 
Exchange 
AMI Resources Inc. Gold Vancouver, British 
Columbia 
Beposo TSX Venture 
Exchange 
Asanko Gold Inc.* Gold Vancouver, British 
Columbia 
Asankragwa & 
Asumura 
Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
New York Stock 
Exchange 
Asante Gold 
Corporation* 
Gold Vancouver, British 
Columbia 
Betanase & 
Fahiakoba 
Athens Stock 
Exchange 
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Ashanti Gold Corp. Gold Vancouver, British 
Columbia 
Anunso & 
Kossanto 
Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
Birim Goldfields Inc. Gold Montreal, Quebec Bui District No information 
provided 
Buccaneer Gold Inc.  Toronto, Ontario No information  Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
Castle Peak Mining 
Ltd. 
Gold Port Coquitlam, 
British Columbia 
Apankrah Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
Golden Star Resources 
Ltd. 
Gold Toronto, Ontario Wassa & 
Bogoso/Prestea 
NYSE MKT Stock 
Exchange 
Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
Ghana Stock 
Exchange  
Kinross Gold 
Corporation 
Gold Toronto, Ontario Chirano Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
Mindland Minerals 
Ghana Ltd. (a 
subsidiary of Rosita 
Mining Corporation) 
Gold  Toronto, Ontario Kaniogo & 
Kwahu Praso 
TSX Venture 
Exchange 
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Moydow Mines 
International 
Gold Toronto, Ontario Hwidiem & 
Agyakusu 
No information 
provided 
Pelangio Exploration 
Inc. 
Gold Toronto, Ontario Obuasi, Manfo, 
Akroma 
TSX Venture 
Exchange 
Xtra Gold Resources 
Corp. 
Gold Toronto, Ontario Kyebi/ Kibi Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
Source: Author’s compilation from different sources 
 
* These are two distinct mining companies despite the similarities in the name. 
 
For example, Hilson & Nyame (2006) inform us that thousands of Ghanaian 
subsistence farmers and small-scale miners have been forcefully displaced in the quest 
to expand the operation of large-scale gold mining without having received adequate 
compensation. In and around the town of Tarkwa, for example, a foreign mining 
company unlawfully destroyed houses, schools, and religious institutions so as to 
commence mine production (Mensah-Pah, 2008).  Additionally, the NGOs FIAN 
International and Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining (WACAM) 
documented several cases of human rights violations between 2004 and 2008. Among 
other things, private security personnel of mining companies with the help of armed 
police and soldiers used extreme violence in stopping illegal miners which sometimes 
resulted in severe injuries and in other instances in the deaths of community members 
(Ellimah, 2015). In fact, these human rights violations have culminated in a number of 
official complaints by various human rights organisations against the Ghanaian 
government to respond to the rule governing the operations of mining companies 
(Amevor, 2008). 
   
 
4 
 
 1.2 Research Objectives 
 
Notwithstanding these incidences of corporate human rights abuse, scholars 
writing about the Ghanaian extractive industry in particular, often phrase them as 
environmental and socioeconomic problems (e.g. Akabzaa, 2009; Garvin et al., 2009, 
Mensah et al., 2015, Tschakert & Singha, 2007; Hilson & Nyame, 2006 etc.), that 
companies can potentially address via their corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
programs. Because these scholarly works tend to neglect the legal dimension of 
corporate-community conflicts, not enough attention has so far been given to mining 
companies’ direct legal obligations to respect and when possible, also protect the 
human rights of their host communities under international law.  
 Yet an emphasis on human rights is important for three reasons: First, human 
rights matters do not only encompass socioeconomic and environmental problems but 
also involve questions surrounding the expropriation of farm land for extractive 
activities, adequate compensation for resettlements, citizen’s rights to participate in 
decision making process and governance of natural resources (e.g. Free Prior Informed 
Consent), as well as their right to freedom of peaceful assembly (see Table 3 for a list of 
human rights that business can impact). As such, by not discussing these human rights 
concerns, important issues are being left out the debate regarding the impact of gold 
mining in Ghana.  
 Second, corporate human rights obligations transcend voluntary initiatives (e.g. 
CSR) as the violations of human rights can have concrete legal implications for a 
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company (e.g. The Gap lawsuit regarding sweatshop condition in factories, Nestle 
lawsuit regarding their alleged complicity in the murder of a trade unionist, Coca Cola 
lawsuit regarding racial discrimination etc.), as well as result in far-reaching 
reputational damage and the loss of social license to operate.  Besides, Avery (2006) 
maintains that unlike the business case for CSR, companies are obliged to respect 
human rights at all times regardless of whether there is a business case or not. Thus, in 
contrast to CSR, corporate human rights obligations are located in the realm of justice 
and cannot be defended on strategic grounds exclusively (i.e. upholding human rights is 
allegedly good for business) largely due to the moral nature of human rights (Wettstein, 
2012). 
Finally, Giuliani et al. (2016) highlighted that within the broader literature, 
business and human rights (BHR) in developing countries is still an underexplored 
terrain. In part, this is because business responsibilities continue to be discussed within 
the western and non-western binary and as such the complex contextual conditions in 
Global South countries containing areas of limited statehood are often not sufficiently 
captured in the CSR and BHR literature. It follows that more research that interrogates 
the interwoven dynamics of the state, private entities and local power struggles 
regarding resource extraction-related human rights abuses are needed. In fact, Giuliani 
et al. (2016) have called for studies that can provide more insight into the human rights 
conduct of multinationals operating in Global South countries. Of particular interest is 
the question of whether multinationals adopt corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
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other international initiatives for symbolic purposes or whether these initiatives are 
used to conduct ethical business in line with human rights principles (Giuliani, 2016; 
Marquis & Qian, 2014; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In an attempt to fill some of these gaps in 
the literature, this research uses the Canadian mining company Golden Star Resources  
(GSR) and its host community in  Dumasi as a case study to address the following 
related objectives: 
1. To critically examine the extent to which Golden Star Resources meets its human 
rights obligations in its host communities in Dumasi  
2. To investigate community-based strategies for securing corporate accountability 
in the host communities of Golden Star Resources;  
3. To discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the findings for business, 
human rights, and sustainable community development in areas of limited 
statehood.  
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
  
Although businesses have been directly and indirectly implicated in human 
rights-related issues via their actions or inactions for decades, the BHR literature is still 
relatively rudimentary. Changing global geopolitics which has, on one hand, created a 
state accountability void and, on the other hand, increased the sphere of influence of 
large corporations have impelled a debate over the direct human rights obligations of 
multinationals (Cragg et al., 2012). Indeed, using Fuchs (2007) typology, Reggie’s (2017) 
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discusses the political power of contemporary multinational enterprises by revealing 
the ways in which large businesses wield instrumental, structural and discursive 
power.  Thus, the demand to extend human rights responsibilities to non-state actors 
including commercial enterprises was born out the realisation that the capacity and 
power of the state in a globalised world was diminishing (Chapham, 2006). Against this 
background, different scholars started raising questions about the effectiveness of 
having the state as the sole protector of its citizens’ fundamental rights (Clapham, 2006; 
Alston, 2005; Andreopoulos, Arat & Juviler, 2006; Oliver & Fedtke, 2007).  
At the same time, the regulation and oversight of corporations’ environmental 
and social conduct or lack thereof in the global economy were becoming another 
important concerns. For instance, Obara (2017) pointed out that most allegations of 
human rights violations are made against companies in the extractive sector and as such 
the industry has faced tremendous public scrutiny and critique.  
While the endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (GPs) has significantly moved the debate on corporate human rights 
responsibility forward, the extent to which the “Protect, Respect & Remedy” (PRR) 
framework has translated into better human rights outcome on a community-level 
remains unclear (Kwakyewah & Idemudia, 2017). Accordingly, this research is relevant 
as it will make a valuable theoretical contribution to this debate by investigating some 
of the community-based strategies and governmental policy initiatives (i.e. national and 
global) that have been adopted to regulate businesses with respect to human rights. 
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Moreover, this research will provide empirical insight into the strengths and limitations 
of the GPs in a Global South context. Analytically, the research will offer an integrative 
explanation to corporate-community conflicts in the extractive industry. Finally, 
findings from the study can have practical implication as it could potentially inform 
public policy and regulation for Canadian extractive companies operating abroad. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
2.1. What are Human Rights?  
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) defines 
human rights as those fundamental rights inherent to all human beings regardless of 
nationality, place of residence, national or ethnic origin, sex, religion, language or other 
status (OHCHR, 1996-2018). Generally, these rights are said to derive from commonly 
shared values intended to guarantee human dignity and fulfilment of basic human 
needs. Under international law, human rights are regarded as universal, inalienable, 
interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. A landmark document adopted in 1984 by 
the UN General Assembly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights articulates these 
universal rights and freedoms that all humans are equally entitled to, through a 
preamble and 30 articles. Although the OHCHR offers a widely used definition of 
human rights for practical affairs, attempts to define the concept of human rights can 
nonetheless prove to be a challenging undertaking.  Until today, there are still 
disagreements about the existence, justification, affordability, universality and benefits 
of human rights (Orend, 2002). Thus, as a contested, changing and historically specific 
and contingent concept (Donnelly, 2013), the idea of human rights and what constitute 
rights, for that matter, lack a consensual definition.   
For instance, in considering their broader moral foundation or ethical 
justification, Wettstein (2012) sees human rights as moral concepts and hence moral 
rights. Because moral rights are said to be pre-positive and pre-political rights, their 
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legitimacy and relevance do not depend on their codification into positive law 
(Wettstein, 2012). Indeed, Feinberg (1973) explained that moral rights “exist prior to, or 
independently of, any legal or institution rules (p. 84).  
Similarly, for Donnelly (2013), the term “right”, has a moral and a political 
meaning, namely, rectitude (righteousness) and entitlement. When we speak of 
rectitude, we are typically concerned with questions about “doing the right thing”. 
Conversely, “entitlement”, in a simplistic sense, means “having the right to something”. 
This right to something belongs to someone and when it is being threatened or denied 
rights-holders have the authority to make claims that usually surpass utility, social 
policy and other moral or political grounds for action (Dworkin, 1978). Despite its 
natural attractiveness and moral appeal, the idea that human beings everywhere have 
rights on the mere basis of their humanity and regardless of citizenship or territorial 
legislation, has been heavily critiqued by some as “foundationally dubious and lacking 
in cogency” (Sen, 2004, p. 315). These critics frequently ask where these rights 
originated from and take issue with natural rights claims that are not rooted in specific 
qualifications like citizenship or legal entitlements. For instance, in his work Anarchical 
Fallacies published in 1792, Jeremy Bentham completely dismisses the notion of human 
rights and even calls natural rights “simple nonsense” (p. 501). Then, there are those 
who generally embrace the idea of human rights but reject specific classes of rights, 
especially the so-called second-generation rights (i.e. Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights) (Sen, 2004). Some of these critics include scholars like Cranston (1983) and 
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O’Neill (1996) who stress the feasibility challenge of human rights and their reliance on 
certain social institutions that may or may not exist.  
 Furthermore, Nussbaum (1997) pointed out that some scholars have also 
questioned whether rights are correlated with duties and whether all duties are 
correlated with rights. These questions about the foundation of rights, as well as duty-
bearers and rights-holders, are particularly relevant when considering rights in the 
international arena.  
 In discussing the notion of human rights, Nussbaum (1997) outlined the various 
ways in which a right and human rights have been conceptualised and defined over 
time. For instance, Woodwiss (2005) makes mention of the debate between advocates of 
natural law theory and legal positivists about the nature of rights. Natural rights 
theorists see rights as entitlements belonging to a human by virtue of being a human 
that deserves protection. Within this school of thought, there are those who interpret 
rights on the basis of "possession of rationality and language" and in so doing imply 
that non- human animals and individuals with mental health disabilities do not have 
such rights (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 273). In contrast, some philosophers within the natural 
rights theory ground rights in sentience and thus consider animals, rights-bearers. 
Besides the natural law theory, there is another tradition with thinkers who view all 
rights as a product of state action. For instance, Woodwiss stated that rights are “neither 
self-generating nor self-enforcing” (p.3). Notably, Immanuel Kant is an influential 
exemplar of such understanding of the nature of rights (see Kant, 1798). This view 
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appears to denote that rights can only exist when the state recognises them. In line with 
this thinking Galtung (1994) argued that before any society can speak of human rights 
claims, that society must have first constructed a conception of persons as individuals 
and/or member of groups, a state, and legal instruments and mechanisms for enforcing 
any applicable limitations or requirements.  Not surprisingly, proponents of the natural 
law theory strongly oppose this idea and rather maintain that human beings are entitled 
to certain rights irrespective of whether the state recognises these rights or not 
(Nussbaum, 1997). 
 Another point of divergence relates to the question of rights-bearer. For 
Woodwiss (2005), rights denote a set of legally enforceable expectations about how 
others ought to behave towards rights-bearers.  Legally, right-bearers must be 
autonomous moral agents or entities possessing “personality” that are capable of taking 
decisions and able to accept responsibilities (e.g. the state, corporations, trade unions or 
an adult).  While more controversial, there are also those who classify members of 
groups as rights bearers with legal entitlements to make claims to protection and/ or 
support on the basis of the principles of reciprocity. Typically members of these groups 
have been deprived of their autonomy due to their age (i.e. children), race, gender, 
sexuality, socio-economic status, mental and physical disability or indigenousness 
(Woodwiss, 2005). 
 A different complex theoretical question has been what rights are to be seen as 
rights to. For example, when we discuss rights are we referring to rights to be treated a 
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particular way, rights to a certain level of well-being, right to resources or rights to 
opportunities and capacities (Nussbaum, 1997)?  
 In addition to these intricate unresolved theoretical questions about rights, Sarat 
and Kearns (2002) also draw our attention to the disagreement about the meaning of 
human rights and what they entail. As Renteln (1988, 1990) explains, disagreements 
over the specific rights claim and how different cultures interpret the content of rights 
have not ceased.  Recognising the challenges related to providing a conceptual 
investigation of human rights, Michael (2002) suggested that the analysis of human 
rights should be coupled with a compassionate understanding of human experiences. 
Indeed, the foreign minister of Singapore echoed similar sentiments at the Vienne 
Conference on Human Rights when he stated “[T]he extent and exercise of rights … 
varies greatly from one culture and political community to another … because [rights] 
are the products of historical experience of particular peoples.”1  
 Understandably, human rights practitioners, primarily concerned with 
addressing severe oppression and human sufferings across the globe, tend to be less 
interested in offering a conceptual justification.  That said, we cannot deny the 
importance of pursuing conceptual clarity of human rights.  Yet as Sen (2004) noted, 
legal and political theorists can learn a great deal from the reasoning of human rights 
activists and the variety of practical actions they take to promote and safeguard the 
human rights of marginalised people around the world.    
                                                          
1 Statement by Wong Kan Seng, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Singapore, Vienne, June 16, 
1993, entitled “The Real World of Human Rights, “ in Tang, Human Rights, 234 
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2.2 Human Rights and Culture: Western versus Akan Conception of Human Rights 
International human rights instruments are grounded on the idea that there are 
fundamental universal human rights that are relevant to every human being across the 
globe irrespective of differences in values and cultural practices (Potter et al., 2012). In 
this regard, human rights are said to be entitlements of all persons rooted in human 
nature, thus making them inalienable. Notwithstanding this widely held view among 
mainstream human rights institutions, a number of researchers have heavily critiqued 
this “universalist” approach to human rights which have over time accumulated into a 
set of scholarly work, captured under the umbrella of cultural relativism in human 
rights.  
Using the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a starting point, critics of 
human rights universalism argue that rights and freedoms are culturally, ideologically 
and politically nonuniversal and often underscore the “Western” or “Judeo-Christian” 
predisposition within present global human rights standards (Preis, 1996). For instance, 
Ake (1987) believes, the Western idea of human rights or legal rights ascribes abstract 
rights to abstract beings and carry values that are foreign to traditional African societies.  
As far as he is concerned, these rights, particularly civil and political rights, are 
sociologically specific and “appeal to people with a full stomach who can now afford to 
pursue the more esoteric aspects of self-fulfilment” (p. 5).  
 Others like Pollis and Schwab (1979) also draw our attention to the cultural and 
ideological ethnocentrism in the domain of human rights and human dignity. In their 
   
 
15 
 
view, the Universal Declaration is underpinned by democratic and libertarian values 
“based on the notion of an atomized individual who possesses certain inalienable rights 
in nature” (p. 1 &8). Yet in many cultures, the notion of group is significantly more 
prevalent than the Western idea of individualism. For instance, Ugochukwu, Badaru & 
Okafor (2012) discussed the concept of group rights and analysed how groups rights 
provision within the African Charter of Human People’s Rights has been interpreted 
and applied. Perhaps not surprisingly, Pollis and Schwab (1979) consider the Anglo-
European construct of human rights "inapplicable" and "of limited validity" at best and 
"meaningless" in Global South contexts at worst. Similarly, Legesse (1980) observed 
how different cultures conceptualise human rights in varying cultural idioms.  
By way of example, Wiredu (1990) delved into the philosophical tradition of the 
Akan ethic group (of post-colonial Ghana) to provide a justificatory basis for human 
rights claims.  Specifically, he accentuated the descriptive and normative aspects of 
Akan conception of a person to demonstrate the existence and the nature of human 
rights in Akan culture. To begin with, there are three foundations within the Akan 
conception of a person: (1) the life principle (okra, English translation: soul) which 
originates directly from God, (2) the blood principle (mogya, English translation: blood) 
which is said to come from the mother and forms the basis of lineage or ethnic identity 
and (3) the personality principle (sunsum, English translation: spirit) which is 
associated with the father. As we learn from Wiredu (1990), the okra is believed to be a 
speck from God (nyame or nyankopon) given by him as a gift of life along with a unique 
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destiny. Through the possession of an okra, every person has an intrinsic value born out 
of this divine element from God as opposed to some earthly circumstances. In fact, the 
concept of human dignity is derived from the life principle. A common saying within 
the Akan culture is “everyone is the offspring of God, no one the offspring of the earth.” 
Implied in the principle of life or the dogma of okra is the right of each person to pursue 
that specific destiny given by God. By virtue of being an onipa (English translation: 
person) who possesses an okra, mogya and sunsum one is simultaneously placed in a web 
of kinship relations which entail rights and obligations.  
As a matrilineal society, the grandmother, the mother, the mother’s siblings, her 
own children and the children of her sisters traditionally formed the most important 
kinship group.  This group is assigned the duty to nurse the Akan newborn who 
possesses a right to receive help. Overtime, this right is transformed dialectically into a 
duty for a person to nurse one’s mother in her old age. According to an Akan proverb, 
“if your mother nurses you to grow your teeth, you nurse her to loose hers”. Overall, 
Wiredu (1990) brilliantly shows how the Akan conception of a person is directly link to 
the idea of human rights and what those rights are (i.e. the right to political participation, 
the right to trial, the right to land, and religious freedom).  
Importantly, these rights and obligations are intertwined and emanate from their 
particular understanding of personhood as well as, the social, economic and political 
structure of the traditional Akan society. For example, within the pre-colonial Akan 
agricultural society, the possession of land was essential for earning a livelihood. 
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Considering the centrality of this basic resource, it is not surprising that the right to land 
represented one of an Akan person’s most valued positive right (Wiredu, 1990).  In 
more specific terms, the Akan person by virtue of his blood principle (mogya) was 
entitled to lineage land which he could cultivate and build on during his life time.  
Based on Wiredu’s account of Akan philosophical thought then, the notion of 
human rights is certainly not alien to the Akan ethnic group of post-colonial Ghana.   
Indeed, in contemporary Ghanaian society, the term onipa biara kyefa (English 
translation: your share of/your possession bestowed upon you by nature or that which 
is due to each human being) or onipa biara fawohodie (English translation: the freedom, 
independence, liberty of human beings) are expressions used to encapsulate what we 
generally understand as human rights.  
Contrary to writers who believe in taking a cross-cultural approach to human 
rights (e.g. Wiredu, 1990; Legesse, 1980; An-Naim, 1990, Mutua, 2013) as a way of 
highlighting the diverse cultural values underlying the concept, Donnelly (1982)2 (in his 
early works) speaks of a lack of conceptual grasp and practice of human rights in non-
Western cultures and sees a tremendous distinction between Western and non-Western 
approach to human dignity. However, Baxi (2007) severely problematizes this historical 
claim that human rights traditions are some form of “gift of the west to the rest” and 
that non-Western countries lack an understanding of human rights.  As Baxi (2007) 
                                                          
2 In his later works, Donnelly highlights the limits of universality of human rights and acknowledges the 
need for space that allows for claims of relativism. For full discussion see Donnelly, J. (2007). The relative 
universality of human rights. Human rights quarterly, 281-306. 
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explains, non-Western societies and cultures employed different language in 
articulating what it means to be a human being and what it means to have rights.  
Furthermore, unlike many non-Western nations where the rights of the 
community or group are put on a pedestal, Western democratic societies are 
preoccupied with the dignity of the individual, his/her worth, personal autonomy and 
property (Legesse, 1980). This view is also shared by Ake (1987) who believes that 
Africans tend to think of their obligations to the community as opposed to their claims 
against them.  But from Donnelly vantage point, cultural views where collectivity is 
valued over the individual represent a significant threat to the very character of human 
rights. Hence, like Donnelly, Howard (1992, 1993) regards the cultural relativism 
perspective as confusion between human rights and human dignity and between rights 
and duties.  
In spite of numerous attempts to discard arguments from cultural relativists as a 
confusion of human rights, and human dignity, questions regarding “transferability” 
and “cross-cultural validity” of human rights remain a battlefield of intense debate with 
no end in sight. In response to this ongoing discussion, Preis (1996) problematize how 
both universality and relativist repeatedly borrow and use the notion of culture in a 
manner that does not fully capture the complexity of the concept. Rather than treating 
culture as static, homogenous, bounded unit or some quantitatively measureable unit,   
Preis (1996) proposes a more dynamic approach where culture is viewed as a practice 
rooted in the everyday life experiences and understanding of local people.  
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 In thinking about how to move the universalist-relativist debate forward, Preis 
turns to the theoretical and methodological advances in development research. In 
particular, she sees the idea of human agency and actor oriented approach (Long & 
Long, 1992) as a useful way to inform and promote the practice of human rights. This is 
because an actor-oriented approach recognises social actors as knowledgeable 
individuals with the capacity to cope with harsh life conditions, devise appropriate 
solutions for various problems, and learn how to encroach on the stream of social 
events happening around them (Long & Long, 1992).  Preis concludes by stating that if 
we are to take issues about culture and contextual differentiation seriously in the area of 
human rights theory and practice, we must begin by viewing “human worlds as 
constructed through historical and political processes and not as brute timeless facts of 
nature” (Rosaldo, 1989,p.39). 
 
2.3 The Right to Development: A Brief Overview 
With the UN’s official endorsement of the Declaration of the Right to 
Development (UNDRD) in 1986, human rights received soaring prominence within 
development policies and practice. Simultaneously, this marked the evolution of the 
rights-based approach to development (RBD). The UNDRD characterises the right to 
development as ‘an inalienable human right’ (Article 1) and positions ‘the human 
person’ (rather than the nation) as the central subject of the development process 
(Article 2).  Prior to 1986, much of the human rights literature centred on the civil and 
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political rights of individuals (i.e., personal and private rights) or what Mohan and 
Holland (2001) describe as the first generation of human rights which are 
generally/arguably regarded as the product of the American and French revolutions in 
the 18th century and the Enlightenment era. As Shivji (1989) rightly remarked, demands 
for rights arose from socio-political struggles within a specific historical setting.   
The historical context in which RBD emerged was that of neoliberal structural 
adjustment policies in Africa and its perceived failings (Mohan & Holland, 2001). Faced 
with four central issues: (1) globalisation and uneven development, (2)capability and good 
governance, (3)human rights and development and (4)the role of NGOs in development policy, 
the development industry sought for new ways of fighting inequality and poverty in 
the global South (Manzo, 2003). It is within this global political set of circumstances that 
the rights agenda found appeal as an alternative to decades of abortive market-driven 
development. For some, RBD’s foundation in human rights law makes it unique, 
partially due to its potential to re-politicise mainstream development practice and its 
associated powerful actors like the World Bank (Nyamu-Musembi & Cornwall, 2004). 
In fact, some believe that, since the late 1990s, the language of human rights has come to 
embody the new norm within mainstream development thinking and work (Potter et 
al., 2012). Furthermore, the legal groundings of RBD have been traced to international 
and regional human rights instruments (see Table 2) that have, overtime, effected a shift 
towards rights-based discourse in international development (Potter et al., 2012).   
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Mohan and Holand (2001) explain that the right to development agenda is a 
state-centric approach in that it endows the government with the obligation to ascertain 
the basic welfare of its citizens. Moreover, RBD is considered empowering and people-
centred as the beneficiaries are called upon to define their needs and participate in the 
formulation of appropriate policies and programmes (OUNHCHR, 2006). Similarly, 
Tsikata (2007) argued that RBD is predicated on the shared consensus of the following 
fundamentals: (1) the relationship between development and human rights, (2) more 
accountability of state and international actors, (3) highlighting empowerment, (4) participation, 
non-discrimination and consideration of marginalised groups (e.g. women, children, indigenous 
people etc.).  Some have argued that there are distinct advantages to RBD. For instance, 
Potter et al (2012) pointed out that RBD can foster accountability and legitimacy as 
governments sign international human rights instruments and have duties to respect, 
protect and fulfil their citizens’ rights.  
For Tsikata (2007), another advantage of RBD relates to its emphasis on all 
human rights including economic, social and cultural rights as well as political and civil 
rights. The rise of RBD is often viewed as a move from a ‘needs-based’ charity approach 
to a model that strives to redress injustices and can spur institutional changes (Potter et 
al, 2012). For instance, RBD has proven valuable in mobilising towards anti-colonial 
struggles, social movements and human rights instruments for marginalised social 
groups (e.g. women, children, indigenous people) as it has provided a foundation for 
making legal arguments and demanding for social justice (Potter et al, 2012).  
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In spite of these strides in the rights arena, the controversy surrounding the 
concept of rights-based development (RBD) has not ceased. Indeed, Schech and Haggis 
(2000) pointed out that the question of whether the realisation of economic rights (i.e. 
the right to material well-being) should be prioritised over other human rights (i.e. civil 
and political rights) continues to be debated.  Not surprisingly, writers are polarised 
across spectrums, offering varying perspectives. On the one hand, some Third World 
governments have argued that socio-economic development and their corresponding 
human rights constitute their paramount concern (Uvin, 2007 and Schech & Haggis, 
2000), yet, on the other hand, some academics have highlighted the interdependence of 
all human rights and have consequently disputed the idea of ascribing precedence to 
certain human rights (Sengupta, 2000; Weinstein, 1983).   
 Another point of divergence has been the very definition of rights-based 
development or more so the relationship between human rights and development.  For 
the World Bank, the enjoyment of human rights is a goal to be achieved through 
development, or differently put a developmental outcome (World Bank, 1998). In 
contrast, the UN Development Programme asserts that human rights must be seen as a 
requirement for attaining development rather than a goal in itself (UNDP, 2000). 
Perhaps, Manzo (2003) is right to speculate that “RBD is destined to remain a contested 
political concept” (p.438).  
In addition to these ongoing debates, RBD has also faced numerous other 
critiques. Among others, RBD is said to be a nebulous concept that is difficult to 
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distinguish from other development alternatives like participatory development, 
gender and development etc. (Tskikata, 2007). In contrast, Okafor (1995) argues that the 
formulation of developmental right is not more ambiguous than other formulation of 
international legal frameworks. As he sees it, global norms are generally couched in a 
vague and extensible fashion to allow for the needed flexibility to respond to a wide 
variety of contexts.  
Secondly, while RBD implicitly gives citizens the legal right to potentially make 
claims against their government to fulfil their economic, social and cultural rights, it 
also appears to ignore the declining power of governments in the global South. Indeed, 
within the context of a neoliberal global order, decisions relating to public sector 
spending is often outside the sphere of influence of global South states.  Hence, from 
Tshikata (2007) point of view, the privatisation of public goods like water, education 
and healthcare under Structural Adjustment Programmes (i.e. conditional loans from 
IMF & World Bank) impedes access to essential services for poor people and can 
consequently be understood as a violation of their economic and social rights. In fact, it 
was not uncommon for governments that accepted these conditional loans and 
underwent structural adjustment to experience challenges in realising their citizens’ 
economic and social rights.     
 Because RBD was largely interpreted as a state and people-driven development 
approach; initially non-state actors were not gaining extensive attention among rights 
scholars. More recently, however, thinkers like Clapham (2006) have provoked us to 
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move beyond the conventional attention on states to direct our lens on the human right 
obligations of non-state actors like multinational corporations. Particularly, Clapham 
(2006) discusses the legal obligations of non-state actors in international law by 
examining the political debate about the suitability of extending human rights 
obligations to non-state actors.  By pointing to the implications of changes in 
international responsibility and international criminal law on how human rights are 
implemented in national law, Clapham (2006) advocates for the need for a framework 
for the human rights obligations of non-state actors in international law.  
In line with Clapham argumentation, we can understand the right to 
development as being part of the range of human rights, corporations must uphold 
within the context of their corporate duty to respect human rights. Truly, one could 
argue that local communities' demand for companies to engage in sustainable 
development projects constitute an implicit articulation of their right to development. In 
a basic sense, these community stakeholders often perceive non-state actors like 
businesses as agents of development alongside governments (Blowfield, 2015).  
But, Tskikata (2007) also pointed out that even though international financial 
institutions, multinationals, multilateral and bilateral agencies, civil society 
organisations and Western governments are often considered the key actors and drivers 
of development practice, there are challenges in holding them accountable. 
Consequently, Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwell (2004) advocated for an interpretation of 
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RBD that can transmogrify the unequal power relations and interactions between 
various development agencies and the most vulnerable social groups.                                                                                                                                                                
Table 2: Key UN milestones in the development of international human rights legal 
framework                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
▪ Declaration on Human Rights (1948) 
▪ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
▪ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 
▪ Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1979) 
▪ Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) 
▪ Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
▪ Convention on the Rights of Disabled Persons (2006) 
▪ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) 
Source: Office of the United Nations High Commision for Human Rights, 2012 
 
2.4 What is the Relationship between Business and Human Rights?  
For decades, it was a common practice for scholars to treat business and human 
rights as two distinct entities.  This was partly because states were considered the main 
violator and protector of human rights (Obara, 2017).  Cragg, Arnold and Muchlinski 
(2012) noted that discussions on corporations’ human rights duties were generally 
confined to their indirect legal responsibilities. However, with the rising social and 
economic influence of multinational corporations, and the subsequent disempowerment 
of governments caused by neoliberal globalisation (Kinley & Tadaki, 2004), there has 
been a shift towards increasing companies’ direct human rights obligations. At the 
international level, there is a growing recognition among diplomats, policymakers, 
business strategists, and social activists of the need for mechanisms to pursue remedies 
for victims of corporate-related human rights abuses, particularly for transnational 
claims that cannot or will not be processed by local legal institutions. At the national 
   
 
26 
 
level, we are witnessing varying degrees of effort to implement the 2011 United Nations 
(UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights among states, with a number 
of states yet to produce a National Action Plan and commence the implementation 
process (Ford, 2015). Central to these debates and recent developments in the BHR 
rights arena is the quest for greater corporate accountability (Ramasastry, 2015).  
 Since the late 1990s, a number of civil society groups have been at the forefront of 
drawing attention to issues of corporate misconduct with the goal of holding businesses 
to account for their actions (Cragg et al, 2012).  For example, Utting (2008) pointed out 
that grave human rights violations by transnational corporations, including the issues 
of sweatshops and child labour (such as in the case of Nike), sent a wave of shock 
among Western citizens and consumers and provoked different forms of activism (e.g. 
protests, campaigns etc.). Extractive companies like Eron in India, Unocal in Burma, and 
ExxonMobile in Indonesia have been implicated in human rights violations committed 
by hired security forces and accused of colluding with governments to violently stifle 
protests (Wettstein, 2012).  
With the most allegations of human rights violations made against companies in 
the extractive sector, it is not surprising that the industry has faced tremendous public 
scrutiny and critique (Obara, 2017). However, it was events like Shell’s alleged 
complicity in turning a blind eye to the arbitrary execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight 
other Ogonis by the Nigerian government in November 1995 that partly catalysed calls 
for change in corporate human rights obligations and gave rise to the emergence of a 
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number of voluntary codes of conducts among key transnational businesses and 
industry associations (Cragg et al, 2012; Idemudia & Ite, 2006). These kinds of 
incidences have meant that global businesses have faced social pressure aimed at 
regulating business social responsibility and their human rights obligations. 
Whilst these corporate-related human rights violations were unfolding in the 
public worldwide, theoretical interest in the field was also growing. A number of 
scholars have devoted themselves to writing about the relationship between business 
and human rights since the late 1990s. As a “new” field of inquiry, human rights legal 
scholars were among the first to publish edited volumes and law review articles 
(Ramasastry, 2015). Connolly and Kaisershot (2015) classify BHR as an interdisciplinary 
field given that no single academic discipline can convene an adequately wide array of 
theoretical constructs to provide answers and potential solutions to the challenges and 
debates pertaining to corporate human rights obligations. Naturally, it follows that the 
business human rights landscape spans scholarships in economics, sociology, 
psychology, law, human rights and political science. Based on Obara’s (2017) analysis, 
overall, the debate within the literature can be divided into five thematic areas:  
The first being why should companies respect human rights? Of interest to writers 
here are the various normative groundings and moral arguments in favour or against 
the allocation of human rights to private entities (see for example Campbell, 2004; 
Wettstein 2009; Cragg, 2012 etc.).  
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The second topic asks whether companies can or should be held directly responsible for 
human rights under international law. Specifically, academics investigate what legal 
instruments, mechanisms and frameworks could govern business with respect to 
human rights.  
The third branch of scholarly works is concerned with understanding what 
human rights companies are responsible for? In particular, intellectuals are interested in 
examining the range of human rights responsibilities for businesses and what practical 
tools, frameworks and mechanisms can help businesses in determining these 
responsibilities (see, for example, Santoro, 2000; Kolstad, 2009; Macdonald, 2009).  
The fourth strand within the literature comprises works from Campbell, 2007; 
Wettsein, 2009, 2012 and Ramasastry, 2015 which explore how the human rights 
concept relates to corporate social responsibility. Some of the key questions are: what is 
the nature of the relationship? How can the two concepts be better integrated? How can 
the language of human rights contribute to our knowledge of CSR theory and practice?   
Lastly, researchers are increasing looking at the impact of the UN Guiding 
Principles as well as its strengths and limitations.  Within this line of work, scholars 
engage with the question of how the introduction of the GPs has moulded corporate behaviour 
in relations to human rights. For instance, in their editorial, Ruggie and Sherman III (2015) 
discuss the impact of the GPs on the commercial legal practices and conclude that the 
GPs have come to be seen as the authoritative universal standard on BHR. Arguably the 
first subject area is the most developed whereas there is still a dearth of studies needed 
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in the last strand. In light of this, the thesis concentrates on and seeks to make a 
contribution to the existing vein of work on the strengths, weaknesses and impact of the 
GPs from a community perspective.   
 
2.5 What is the History of Business and Human Rights?  
Few would deny that transnational corporations constitute influential actors in 
the global economy with the capacity to create employment, generate wealth, and 
contribute to poverty alleviation (Ruggie, 2008). In fact, whereas Berle and Means (2007) 
maintain that the economic power of today’s multinational corporation is at a level 
equivalent to the political power of the modern state, David Korten (2001) in his book 
When Corporations Rule the World, go as far as arguing that some multinationals 
companies are more powerful than nation states.   Nevertheless, as Arnold (2010) 
observed, transnational corporations (TNCs) are also known to commit human rights 
infringements such as paying low wages to workers, providing inhumane working 
environment, contributing to environmental degradation and disregarding host 
communities’ rights. These cases of corporate human rights harm have been publicised 
in the media through the advocacy work of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
(Muchlinski, 2001) like Amenstry International and Human Rights Watch. In particular 
companies in the oil, gas, and mining industries have been reported to be the most 
complicit in business-related human rights violations, followed by the food and 
beverage industry, apparel and footwear industry, and information technology 
   
 
30 
 
industry (Arnold, 2010).  While egregious corporate misconducts are not new, the 
context in which these business-related human rights violations are being debated has 
evolved. According to Ochoa (2009), the issue of BHR can be categorized into three eras: 
the era of impunity, the era of civil society and self-regulation and the era of law and 
legal institutions. As with many categorisations in the social sciences, there are often 
limitations since they can oversimplify complex real-world phenomenon. Accordingly, 
Ochoa’s interpretation of the history of BHR should not be read as a strictly linear 
progression. Rather, the three eras should be viewed as non-linear and having 
geographic variations. This is because these eras consist of a series of dynamic and 
overlapping events that occur in different cultural, social and political settings. By way 
of example, Ghana may simultaneously be in the era of civil society and self-regulation 
as well as in the era of legal institutions. While the country has some legal provisions 
(see Table 7) and institutions like the Commission on Human Rights & Administrative 
Justice, civil society organisations are avidly engaged in activism given that corporate 
misconduct continue to happen.  
 
Starting with the era of impunity, Ochoa (2009) pointed out that, businesses 
committed human rights encroachment in different jurisdictions, causing much harm to 
several individuals and communities across the globe. While victims of corporate 
human rights abuses documented their experiences, no institution was willing to 
consider their business-related rights claims.  The geopolitical context of this era is 
underpinned by a debate as to whether universally recognized human rights principles 
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embodied in international legal instruments (e.g. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights) were historically applicable to the private sector. This debate is partly due to the 
fact that international law is traditionally made by states and for states (e.g. drafting, 
adopting, signing and ratifying treaties).  Even with the evolution of the role of non-
state actors, states are still seen as the primary actors in international law (International 
Council on Human Rights Policy, 2002). Indeed, some companies maintained that their 
only responsibility was to respect national laws, even when those laws did not meet 
international human rights standards (Business and Human Rights Resources, n.d.).   
However, at the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration in 1998, Professor 
Louis Henkin (1999), a leading international legal scholar, re-emphasised the preamble 
to the Universal Declaration which calls on “every individual and every organ of 
society” to promote and respect human rights.  Hence, for Professor Henkin it is clear 
that “every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no company, no 
market, no cyberspace.  The Universal Declaration applies to them all.”  Professor 
Henkin’s statement is in line with those who interpret “organs of society” to mean 
institutions or a group of people that perform a function in society. Given that 
businesses are institutions with a clear economic function within society, it follows that 
from a theoretical standpoint, corporations can be said to have had human rights 
responsibilities for decades. Nonetheless, the first attempt to create a global norm that 
would formerly assign social and environmental responsibilities to transnational 
enterprises specifically was in 1970 with the Draft United Nations Code of Conduct for 
   
 
32 
 
Transnational Corporation (Hurtado, 2011). Because the negotiations turned out to be 
extremely contentious, the attempt ultimately failed.   
What followed was the era of corporate accountability movement led by civil 
society groups that built up immense pressure and demanded laws that would make 
businesses liable for their misdemeanours (Ochoa, 2009). Traditionally, states were the 
primary institutions to develop and enact laws but unfortunately, states were ignoring 
these demands. Instead, response to such organized civil society manifested in the form 
of increased corporate self-regulation and the initiation of global dialogues on BHR 
which were facilitated by international financial organisations and the United Nations 
(UN). For instance, in 1999, the UN Secretary-General launched the Global Compact with 
the aim of encouraging businesses to adhere to basic principles of human rights, labour, 
environmental protection and corruption. Corporate support and international 
acceptance of the Global Compact was an indication that businesses embraced this 
initiative. But according to Knox (2011), the effectiveness of the Global Compact was 
constrained by its voluntary nature and generality of its principles.   
Another such notable effort came from the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the 
UN in the form of the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights. Hillemanns (2003) explained that 
the report drafted by the UN Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights in 2003 was an attempt to make businesses amenable to international 
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law, that is, the report was calling for a radical rethinking of allocating responsibilities 
for protecting and promoting human rights to the state.  Naturally, the report was met 
with fierce resistance by members of the business community (Arnold, 2010). Although 
the Norms did not garner significant support, it gave reason to believe that the era of 
civil society and self-regulation could potentially lead to the formation of concrete legal 
instruments.  
More importantly, it led to the appointment of special representative John 
Ruggie in 2005, who produced one of the most significant works within the business 
and human rights discourse. This, according to Ochao (2009), marked the beginning of 
the era of law and legal institutions. Although this era has not produced concrete legal 
instruments yet, Ramasastry (2015) maintains that the discussion within the business 
and human rights domain is now concentrated on advocating for one binding law to 
hold corporations accountable.  In part, this era emerged out of the need for greater 
clarity and consensus on the substantive legal obligations directly applicable to business 
and/ or the state with jurisdiction over them (Ford, 2015). As Brenkert (2016) explained, 
understanding of what constitute human rights and what human rights responsibilities 
corporations have varies significantly among businesses and business ethicists.  For 
instance, McBeth and Joseph (2005) conducted a study with 17 multinational companies 
and discovered that even though human rights are regarded as relevant, many of these 
human rights-related issues were not necessarily classified as such but were rather seen 
as belonging to corporate social responsibility (CSR).  
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During the early days of business and human rights literature, legal scholars 
were fundamentally interested in determining whether the private sector, which has 
been enjoying the protection of certain human rights, should also be assigned concrete 
human responsibilities or duties. (Cragg, Arnold, Muchlinkski, 2012). There are some 
business ethics scholars who argued that multinationals have direct human rights 
responsibilities on contractualist grounds (Donaldson, 1991; Cragg, 1999) and on an 
agent-based conception of human rights (Arnold 2010). Similarly, some advocated for 
the use of human rights as potentially enforceable norms for business behaviour 
(Campbell, 2006, Kobrin, 2009). In contrast, Strudler, 2008 contends the notion of human 
rights obligations for businesses in non-Wester context.  While the business and human 
rights debate has to a large extent moved from asking theoretical and normative 
questions (i.e. why business should have human rights responsibilities?) to focusing more on 
practical issues (i.e. how businesses can contribute to the promotion and protection of human 
rights) (Obara, 2017), the nature and scope of business human rights responsibilities 
continues to be discussed (Brenkert, 2016).  
In an attempt to provide some answers to these pivotal questions, the UN 
Human Rights Council adopted John Ruggie’s “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
framework on June 2008 which has received both praises and critiques within the 
academic circle. According to this tripartite framework, companies have an obligation 
to obey the law even in circumstances where the formulation and enforcement of 
national laws are limited or nonexistent (Ruggie, 2008). Furthermore, multinationals are 
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called up to exercise due diligence by becoming aware, preventing and adequately 
handling human rights issues. In specific terms, companies are expected to adopt 
human rights policies, undertake human rights impact assessment, create an internal 
corporate culture that is based on a commitment to human rights as well as track and 
report on performance.  
 The corporate duty to respect human rights constitutes the baseline 
responsibility of companies in addition to complying with national laws (Ruggie, 2008). 
Because it is a minimum requirement, companies cannot compensate for human rights 
abuses by ‘doing good’ elsewhere. Beyond respecting human rights which is a negative 
moral duty to do no harm, companies are encouraged to proactively take steps towards 
the promotion of human rights (positive moral duty to do good). For instance, Wettstein, 
(2009) and Santoro, (2010) argue that businesses have positive duties to help in the 
protection and provision of remedies for victims of human rights violations by others  
The idea that business have both negative and positive moral duties is because 
companies can impact almost all internationally recognised rights (see Table 3). Thus, 
the concept of “sphere of influence” remains a helpful construct for companies in 
considering the impact their business activities may have on their employees, host 
communities, supply chain, consumers and other stakeholders.  
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Table 3: Human Rights Impacted by Businesses 
Type of Human 
Rights 
Rights Impacted by Business Activities  
Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights  
 
1. Right to social security  
2. Right to an adequate standard of living  
3. Right to education 
4. Right to work 
5. Right to a safe work environment 
6. Right to equality at work 
7. Right to equal pay for equal work 
8. Right to just and favourable remuneration  
9. Right to organise and participate in collective bargaining 
10. Abolition of child labour 
11. Abolition of slavery and forced labour 
12. Right to marry and form a family  
13. Right to rest and leisure  
14. Right to physical and mental health; access to medical services  
15. Right to participate in cultural life, the benefits of scientific progress, and 
protection of authorial interests  
Civil and Political 
Rights  
1. Rights to life, liberty and security of a person  
2. Right to self-determination 
3. Right to private and family life  
4. Equal recognition and protection under the law 
5. Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
6. Right to a fair trial  
7. Right to political life 
8. Right to privacy  
9. Right to freedom of opinion and expression 
10. Right to freedom of association/assembly   
11. Right to freedom of movement 
12. Right to non-discrimination 
13. Right to freedom of thought and religion  
14. Right to own and dispose of property  
15. Right to seek asylum 
 
Source:  This table is based on a study of 320 cases (from all regions and sectors) of alleged corporate-
related human rights abuse reported on the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre website from 
February 2005 to December 2007. 
 
The promotion of Ruggie’s framework seemed to have facilitated a shift from 
pursuing legally binding instruments to establishing norms and duties with emphasis 
on promoting national-level awareness.  Ruggie himself precluded the possibility of 
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drafting a multilateral treaty as a viable solution for effective and legitimate remedies 
for business-related human rights abuses (Ford, 2015). This, however, did not put an 
end to the debate about a treaty. In fact, by mid-2013 it became increasingly evident that 
treaty proponents never abandoned the idea and were willing to revive discussions 
about a legal document which would bind multinationals to their human rights 
obligations. For instance, from 23 to 27 October 2017, the Intergovernmental Working 
Group (WG) of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) met in Geneva to 
start negotiations on a potential binding treaty on global businesses. During these 
sessions, stakeholders discussed the human rights obligations of TNCs and States as 
well as on access to justice for victims. Hence, Ford (2015) noted that “from this 
perspective, GPs [Guiding Principles] were a parallel development and are not 
substitute for moving towards a treaty” (p. 3). In contrast, opponents of the treaty path 
argued that a legally binding agreement will not necessarily result in greater protection 
of human rights. While consensus between the two camps, that is, voluntary industry 
schemes versus international legal instruments, is not insight, it appears that ‘soft 
norms’ are presently being privileged (Ford, 2015).  
Nonetheless, the current ‘era of law and legal institutions’ (Ochoa, 2009) 
represents a considerable leap forward in that global norms, or international “soft” 
laws, have been established which lay the foundation for the possible transition to hard 
laws. While the responsibilities ascribed to businesses remain non-binding under 
international law at the moment, Ruggie’s work significantly contributed to altering the 
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conventional perspective on the allocation of human rights responsibilities between the 
public and private sector. More importantly, it initiated a discussion on the human 
rights responsibilities of transnational corporations operating in areas of limited 
statehood where conflicts, weak institutions and governance gap are prevalent (Cragg, 
Arnold & Muchlinski, 2012). 
Lately, attempts have been made to integrate human rights issues into bilateral, 
regional and multilateral trade agreements and investment instruments (Ford, 2015). At 
the December 2014 UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, the head of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) suggested the integration of ILO labour rights convention 
into WTO agreements (Lamy, 2014). Within the World Bank Group, the International 
Finance Corporation is using the UN Guiding Principles as a benchmark for its 
performance standard (Ford, 2015). It remains to be seen how the trajectory of “soft 
norm” and integration of human rights commitments in international trade and 
investments will unfold in the future.  
 
2.6 Business and Human Rights in Developing Countries: Gaps in the Literature  
Possibly, due to the relatively recent history of the BHR scholarship (i.e. mid- late 
1990s), studies offering insights into corporations’ approach to human rights duties and 
their capacity to fulfil these duties in an African context are not very common. For 
instance, Obara (2017) pointed out that while writers have been articulating their 
various opinions on why corporations should observe human rights, far less has been 
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written about what companies do in practice. Indeed, van der Ploeg and Vanclay 
(2017a) have also noticed the paucity of research on how companies actually avoid, 
mitigate and remedy their adverse human rights impacts caused by or related to their 
operations.    
Some scholarly work within the literature theorises the feasibility of the UN 
business and human rights framework and explores possible mechanisms for 
implementation (e.g. Muchlinksi,2012) however, with little reference to specific case 
studies. At the same time, Brenkert (2016) noted that one of the major obstacles in the 
field of BHR is that a number of corporations have not explicitly recognized or made a 
firm commitment to human rights yet.  Consequently, there is a need for empirical 
research that investigates whether the GPs has significantly motivated multinationals to 
publically acknowledge their commitment to human rights as well as made concrete 
efforts to improve their on the ground human rights practices.  Moreover, empirical 
data is needed to better understand the challenges companies operating in areas of 
limited statehood encounter in designing and implementing human rights policies and 
tracking their performance.   
 
Secondly, we also know little about how contextually relevant the UN 
framework is for countries in the Global South that contain areas of limited statehood.  
For instance, the framework assumes that all states possess the capacity and/or 
willingness to protect the human rights of its citizens. Yet,  there is a large body of 
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literature on the rentier state and resource curse theories that explain that governments 
with an overdependence on natural resources tend to lag behind economically, exhibit 
high level of corruption, are prone to conflicts and tend to be politically unstable (e.g., 
Sachs & Warner, 2001; Wheeler, 1987; Ross, 1999).  Indeed, a number of resource-rich 
African countries have been “diagnosed” with the resource curse and it is not 
uncommon for these governments to prioritise foreign direct investments over the 
enjoyment of their citizens’ human rights. Multinational corporations operating in such 
context are often faced with the reality of a nearly absent government, and host 
communities who expect them to fulfil a quasi-governmental role in order to obtain a 
social license to operate. 
 Considering the limited institutional capacity and governance gaps in these 
areas, should we restrict the responsibilities of businesses to the respect of human rights 
(i.e. negative moral duty to do no harm) or should their range of human rights 
responsibilities be extended to include the protection and promotion of human rights 
(i.e. positive moral duty to do good) in their respective host communities?  With 
exception of a few scholars like Wettstein (2012) and Bradford (2012) who have 
advocated for a stronger role of companies in the promotion and realization of human 
rights, the nascent literature offers limited insight into these intricacies.  
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2.7 How does the Corporate Duty to respect Human Rights relate to CSR?  
The subject of business ethics (also known as Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) or corporate citizenship) is by far not a new debate as it dates back to the advent 
of Western modern economics with the publication of Adam Smith's ground-breaking 
work The Wealth of Nations in 1776.  Since then, different writers have discussed the 
interaction between ethics, market and the state with various arguments being put 
forward in favour and against the social duty of business (Hamann et al., 2008). These 
ethically charged discussions premised on the notion that businesses do not only have 
an economic function (i.e. making profits) but, they equally have a responsibility in 
contributing to solving social and environmental problems (e.g., Frederick, 1960; 
McGuire, 1963; Lodge, 1970; Idemudia, 2008).  
Generally, CSR lacks a consensual definition but Scherer and Palazzo (2007) have 
characterised CSR as an umbrella term for the “responsibilities of business and its role 
in society, including categories such as business and society, business ethics or 
stakeholder theory” (p.1096). At the very core, the notion of CSR is concerned with 
what it means to do and be a business in contemporary society (Jonker, 2005). In many 
instances, Harold Bowen (1959), author of Social Responsibilities of the Businessmen, is 
viewed by some as the father of CSR because his book examines the notion of 
businessmen and their responsibilities in pursuing goals desirable for society. 
Notably, the literature on CSR has grown significantly and now encompasses 
diverse school of thoughts. For instance, the managerial literature is concerned with 
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instrumental theories of what is often referred to as “the business case for CSR” 
(Blowfield, 2005). Scholars within this camp theorise and analyse whether and how CSR 
activities can benefit a company’s reputation, brand value, employees, consumer loyalty 
etc. (see Margolis & Walsh, 2003 and Kurucz et al., 2008).  In contrast, the literature on 
business ethics and stakeholder theory centres on the “normative case for CSR” 
(Morsing et al., 2007) and discusses the moral obligations and duties of corporations 
(Freeman, 1987). Another rising school of thought focuses on the relationship between 
business and development. This group of scholars examine the financial and non-
financial activities of businesses and how their corporate practices hinder and/or 
contribute to sustainable development in Global South countries (e.g. African countries) 
Whilst CSR in Africa has a long history rooted in colonialism, the business, and 
sustainable development linkage, as a unit of analysis, is a more recent evolvement.  
Originally, the notion of sustainable development was restricted to the territories of 
development agencies and actors (Utting, 2000). This was because historically a number 
of multinational corporations (MNCs) conducted business in ways that resulted in 
extensive waste and environmental degradation evidenced by the destruction of 
tropical forests, marine and coastal resources, freshwater sources, agricultural land as 
well as global warming (Utting, 2000). He reasons that a number of economic, political 
and structural factors are likely to be the drivers behind firms' interest in CSR. These 
factors include "win-win" outcomes, reputation management, the enhancement of 
competitive advantage, pressure from civil society groups, regulations or the threat of 
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regulation, and changes to production and marketing globally. Hence, many analysts 
regard CSR as a new form of corporate colonialism (Malan, 2005; Fougere & 
Solintander, 2009; Vertigans, 2011). In fact, different writers have voiced their concerns 
about prompting business to assume the role of development agent (e.g., Cash, 2012; 
Friedman, 1970; Henderson; 2001; Levitt, 1958).  Yet as Idemudia (2011) informs us, as 
of late the debate has moved from conceiving business as the problem and shifted 
towards viewing them as part of the solution to underdevelopment in Africa.  
Given the long history of CSR and the large body of knowledge, it is rather 
surprising that legal scholars within the BHR literature seemingly “discovered” CSR in 
the past decade (Buhmann, 2009; McCorquodale, 2009). According to Santora (2015), 
this “discovery” is partly due to the expansion of the BHR debate which began to 
incorporate concerns such as environment rights (Joseph, 2012; Bauer, 2011; Hiskes et 
al., 2009), economic, social and cultural rights (Nolan & Taylor, 2009), debt relief 
(Ondersma, 2015) and access to affordable medicines (Joseph, 2003; Leisinger, 2005; 
Santoro, 2006). In contrast, Ramasastry (2015) believes that the emergence of BHR as a 
distinct debate is partly a response to the perceived failure of CSR to deliver on its 
promises.    
Indeed, Wettstein (2012) observed that human rights issues have not significantly 
informed our understanding of CSR principally because management scholars have yet 
to extensively engage with the notion of human rights. He further highlighted the lack 
of integration of human rights into the concept of CSR and refers to this as "human 
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rights minimalism" (p. 740). To be sure, this is not to say that CSR does not encompass 
some aspect of human rights. In fact, the CSR debate has included discussions about 
labour and social rights, in particular during the 1970s and 1980s when a discourse 
about the role of global business in development and investment was forming.  
 From Wettstein’s (2012) perspective, many of the debates within CSR are 
fundamentally about human rights but rarely are these issues couched within the 
language of justice. Rather, CSR scholars often address human rights-related concerns 
as virtue and beneficence or even as philanthropy or charity (Wettstein, 2012).  
Nevertheless, overall, the CSR movement has not explicitly focused on human rights as 
an end goal (Detomasi, 2008).   
Although Ramasastry (2015) acknowledges the interwoven nature of CSR and 
BHR as two concepts centred on the socio-environmental responsibilities of the 
corporation, she argues that their contextual and conceptual differences have created a 
gap that is facilitating divergence rather than convergence. For Ramasastry (2015), CSR 
underscores responsible behaviour via corporate-driven voluntary initiatives or other 
self-guided decision-making activities by the corporation. By contrast, BHR focusses on 
legally binding requirements, state-sponsored regulations and voluntary corporate 
measures grounded in a specific core set of human rights obligations. Human rights, by 
definition, imply legal or quasi-legal obligations enacted by the state or other 
international institutions involved in the global governance system (Smith, 2013).  In 
many ways, BHR is driven by a mission to instigate corporate accountability and a 
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pursuit to ensure access to remedies for individuals and communities adversely 
impacted by business activities. It is for this reason that the BHR debate should not be 
misinterpreted as a mere subset of CSR (i.e. as part of the social responsibilities of the 
firm).   
Bilchitz (2009) observed how BHR has tended to concentrate on corporate human 
rights harm rather than on the role that business could potentially play in protecting 
and promoting human rights.  As Ramasastry(2015) sees it, this emphasis on legal 
rather than on ethical and moral considerations within the BHR literature should not 
come as a surprise. Essentially, the BHR movement emerged due to negative impacts 
and the needs for remedies for violations already caused by businesses as opposed to a 
debate about the role of corporations as protectors and promoters of human rights 
alongside states. This narrow focus on business’ duty to do no harm is even more 
pronounced when it comes to their global operations in so-called “host” state countries 
(Sornorajah, 2010). Ratner (2001) alluded to the governance gaps in these “host” state 
countries which often arise as a result of a government’s unwillingness or inability to 
provide its citizens with access to remedies for corporate-related human right harm. It is 
not uncommon for these states to lack regulation or as Risse (2013) would put it contain 
areas of limited statehood that would avert incidences of human rights violations in the 
first place. Oftentimes, commercial enterprises operating is such contexts are not always 
perpetrators of human rights violations but rather tend to be accomplices (Ramasastry, 
2015). Accordingly, the term corporate complicity was coined in the late 1990s and 
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companies were directed to avoid being complicit in human rights abuses of their 
business partners and others (Ramasastry, 2002; Clapham and Jerbi, 2000).  
Beyond these reasons, Wettstein (2012) principally attributes the gap between 
CSR and BHR to “a perceived conceptual mismatch between conventional 
understandings of CSR and the nature of human rights.” (p. 748) and provides two 
explanations. The first explanation relates to the interpretation of CSR as purely 
discretionary responsibilities that a company can adopt on a voluntary basis. Yet 
Wilburn and Wilburn (2001) alluded to a growing political support for CRS and the 
corresponding shift in which CSR is increasingly viewed less and less as belonging to 
the realm of volunteerism.  In spite of this transformation that is occurring on a political 
level, CSR as voluntary corporate initiatives continues to dominate the conventional 
CSR discourse (Waddock & Smith, 2000). Arguable, this understanding of CSR as 
primarily voluntary collide with the legalistic and moral underpinnings of human 
rights claims (Wettstein, 2012).  
The second reason for the CSR-BHR divide pertains to the tendency to 
conceptualise CSR as something apolitical and restricted to the private domain; 
compared to human rights which are perceived as apparatuses to restrain political 
power, thus falling within the political realm. Wettstein (2012) problematizes this 
narrow view of companies as a private institution by pointing out that the boundaries 
between public and private are increasingly becoming more and more blurry. Recently 
a new branch called “political CSR” has evolved within the CSR literature, calling this 
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supposed divide between private and public sphere into question. A number of 
intellectuals have started seeing the various ways in which global enterprises are 
involved or are increasingly expected to get involved in the construction and 
implementation of international standards for the global market place (Scherer, Palazzo 
& Baumann, 2006; Scherer & Palazoo, 2007).  
For Ramasastry (2015) and Wettstein (2012), the distinction between corporate 
behaviour in CSR and corporate accountability in BHR has put the two movements on 
slightly different paths. Nonetheless, they are both convinced that there is room for the 
two movements to connect and borrow from each other’s strengths.  To that effect, a 
combination and integration of the two fields would require the BHR debate to go 
beyond non-violation of human rights to consider positive human rights responsibilities 
for private entities while the CSR debate would have to move from allocating a 
peripheral role to human rights to making human rights the very core (Wettstein, 2012).  
In this regard, a merging of the CSR and BHR could be a way to configure corporations’ 
pro-active role in contributing to the realisation of the right to development.  
 
2.8 Theoretical Framework 
 
The study adopts Risse’s (2013) idea of ‘areas of limited statehood’ as an 
analytical framework to understand the political context within which corporate-
community engagements take place in Ghana and the nature of the business 
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environment within which mining companies are expected to meet their human rights 
obligations.  
Additionally, the study draws on stakeholder theory and the notion of social 
license to operate (SLO) as a useful lens through which we can comprehend the role of 
local communities as key arbiter possessing the ability to negatively or positively affect 
the process and outcomes of mining projects in Ghana.    
Whereas Risse’s framework permits me to analyse business and human rights 
issues from an institutional context perspective, stakeholder theory and the concept of 
SLO can be utilised to offer a company and community perspective respectively.  
 
2.8.1 Areas of limited statehood: What does it mean to govern with(out) the 
state?  
What does the concept of limited statehood mean and what is its analytical value? To 
answer the first part of the question, Risse (2017) commences by drawing on Max 
Weber’s (1922) definition of statehood, namely, an institutionalized authority structure 
with the ability to steer hierarchically and to legitimately hold the means of violence. 
For Risse (2017) statehood, (i.e. an institutional structure of authority) must clearly be 
distinguished from governance which refers to the services the state provides. As he sees 
it, a state’s enforcement capacity pertains to “the quality of governance” (p.140) as 
opposed to a definition of statehood.  
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Taking Max Weber’s understanding of statehood as a point of departure, Börzel 
and Risse (2010) then define areas of limited statehood as territories, policy areas and/or 
parts of the population where the government does not hold the monopoly over the 
instrument of force and possess limited political and administrative capacity to 
undertake authoritative decisions or enforce collectively binding rules and policies. In 
contrast, those areas within a country where the state commends “domestic 
sovereignty” (Krasner, 1999), possess full control over the means of violence and is able 
to make and enforce central decision are called “consolidated” statehood.  
Areas of limited statehood are not ungoverned or ungovernable spaces that lack 
complete social coordination and/or provision of collective goods (Krasner & Risse, 
2014). In these contexts, governance processes are not directed by state actors through a 
traditional top-down command-and-control approach of hierarchical steering, instead, 
governance gaps create an opportunity for non-state actors to engage in non-
hierarchical modes of coordination (Risse, 2011). What this means is that non-state 
actors on their own and in collaboration with other non-state actors and/or the state 
contribute to the provision of much-needed collective goods and services (Azizi & 
Jamali, 2016).  
As Risse (2013) noted, the inability to enforce rules or exercise full control over 
the means of violence can be along several dimensions: (1) territorial, which refers to a 
geographic space within a country; (2) sectorial which refers to specific policy field like 
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security; (3) social which refers to a segment of the population that is excluded from 
service provision by the state (4) temporal (e.g. during time of natural human disaster).  
In view of that, we must speak of degrees of limited statehood within an 
otherwise functioning state and acknowledge that limited statehood is not synonymous 
with the absence of governance or provision of basic services. Here, governance is 
understood as both structure (i.e. institutions and actor constellations) and process (i.e. 
modes of social coordination for rulemaking, implementation and provision of 
collective goods) (Börzel and Risse, 2010). Importantly, governance as a process is not 
restricted to government actors alone. This is because non-state actors such as civil 
society organisations, businesses and international organisations can and often act as 
functional equivalents to states that have insufficient political and administrative 
capacity to provide social coordination and collective goods. 
It is important to highlight that limited statehood conceptually differs from 
“fragile, failing or failed statehoods” which are commonly used in the mainstream 
governance literature. Risse (2013) problematizes the use of these concepts on analytical 
and normative grounds.  First, the notion of “fragile states” or “states at risk” often set 
the Western democratic and capitalist state as a benchmark and in so doing implicitly 
equates statehood with Western liberal statehood and market economy.  
 Risse (2013) argues that writers in the failed, failing and fragile states debate 
conceptualise statehood within a Western paradigm and consequently tend to conflate 
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definitional issues with research questions. Yet, if we are to understand states as 
political entities that provide services and public goods like security, the rule of law, 
welfare and clean environment, then a number of states in the world could not be 
classified as such. Thus, Risse (2013) points out that the idea of “limited statehood” is 
not only applicable to countries in the Global South but also to the so-called Western 
and modernized nations. Historically speaking, fully functional Weberian states are an 
ideal that hardly existed and cannot be said to represent contemporary global systems 
either (Risse, 2017).  Despite this strength of the concept, areas of limited statehood is 
often used to describe political institutions and governance challenges of non-Western 
countries (see e.g. Börzel, 2013; Azizi & Jamali, 2016; Awortwi & Walter-Drop, 2017 
etc.); thereby creating the false impression that the concept predominantly applies to 
countries in the Global South.   
Nonetheless, the analytical value of this conceptual framework lies in its ability 
to not deny states in the Global South of their agency. Within the context of this 
research, the notion of areas of limited statehood permits me to understand the post-
colonial African state on its own terms as opposed to forcing it to fit into a Western 
reality or construct.  This is because the concept allows for the discussion of specific 
policy, social or territorial areas within Ghana where political institutions are too weak 
to hierarchically adopt and enforce collective binding rules. Hence, I avoid having to be 
simplistic by characterising the state as fragile in its entirety and not capture the 
nuances in its capacities and incapacities.   
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Secondly, the concept presents itself as a valuable tool to interrogate GSR as a 
functional equivalent to the shadow of hierarchy and the opportunities and challenges 
that may arise from private actors assuming roles that have traditionally been 
associated with the state. For instance, Azizi and Jamali (2016) assert that non-state 
actors have significant space to navigate and influence the national setting of where 
they operate through governance. The implication here is that non-state actors are also 
able to significantly shape their terms of engagement as well as the nature and scope of 
their responsibilities.  
Thirdly, Risse (2017) finds variations of human rights performance in areas of 
limited statehood but nonetheless concludes that degrees of statehood do not correlate 
with the level of human rights (non)compliance.  Rather, he uses two scope conditions, 
that is (1) regime type as well as (2) the material and social vulnerability of local rulers 
to explain the various levels of human rights (non)compliance in areas of limited 
statehood. For Risse (2017) human rights violations in areas of limited statehood are 
primarily linked to weak central government and lack of enforcement capacity. Hence, 
drawing on Risse’s (2017) work, this thesis seeks to understand the extent to which the 
degree of area of limited statehood plays a role in the human rights conduct of 
extractive sector companies in Ghana.   
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2.8.2 Social license to operate (SLO) and stakeholder theory.   
 
Originally coined by the Canadian mining executive, Jim Cooney, the concept of Social 
License to Operate (SLO) was first introduced in the vocabulary of the minerals 
industry around the late 1990s (Prno, 2013).  However, scholarly interest in the use and 
practice of SLO within the mining sector came much later. In 2002, the International 
Institute for Environment and Development published a milestone industry study 
entitled Breaking New Ground: Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development in which the 
authors described a sector that is facing challenges to maintain viability. Previously, 
companies were principally expected to fulfil legal compliance with state environmental 
regulations (Prno, 2013). But more and more local communities across the globe 
demanded greater public participation in the decision-making process of minerals-led 
projects and expected to be direct beneficiaries of resource extraction activities 
happening on their indigenous land or close to their residential area (Bridge, 2004).  
Confronted with the issue of distrust among their stakeholders and growing 
societal expectations, the concept of SLO emerged as a means for minerals companies to 
“earn accountability, credibility, flexibility and capacity for both stakeholders and 
industry” (Nelson, 2006, p.161). Wilburn and Wilburn (2011) see the evolution of SLO as 
a response to the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), outlined in the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  FPIC recognises the 
inherit rights of indigenous people to their land and resources and asks third parties 
like private entities to seek the prior consent from indigenous people by fully disclosing 
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potential harms (e.g. loss of fish or farmland, erosion of soil, pollution of water etc.) and 
benefits of the proposed project. Owen and Kemp (2012) pointed out that the realisation 
for the need and ultimate acceptance of a ‘social license to operate’ transpired against 
the background of intense debate about the industry’s social and environmental 
responsibilities. SLO evolved within the contexts of growing popularity and spread of a 
global sustainable development agenda (Prno, 2013).  
From a business standpoint, mineral developers are increasingly recognising the 
importance of obtaining SLO to prevent potentially costly conflicts and the upsurge of 
risks. For example, Davis and Franks (2011) mentioned that protests, violence, global 
activism, media campaigns, heightened shareholder, government scrutiny, project shut 
downs and delays are some of the ways in which communities have expressed their 
disapproval of minerals projects and generated unwanted and unexpected costs for 
extractive sector companies.  Unlike environmental permits that are state-driven and 
tangible, the existence of a SLO can be presumed when a mining project gains and 
maintains its “social” approval and acceptance by the community or the public to 
conduct its business activities in a safe and responsible manner (Joyce & Thomson, 2000; 
Thomson & Boutilier, 2011). 
 Generally, for a company to be “issued” an SLO by society, it must incorporate 
sustainability issues into the mine planning, development and operation and mine 
closure phase. What this means in practical terms is that mineral development projects 
must be done in a safe, socially and environmentally responsible fashion without 
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generating negative externalities that would immensely impact communities (Canel et 
al., 2010; MacDonald & Gibson, 2006; Prno & Slocombe, 2012; Veiga et al., 2001). Some 
scholars acknowledge the challenges in integrating sustainability issues into mining on 
an operational level (McAllister and Fitzpatrick, 2010) but according to Wilburn and 
Wilburn (2011) and Prno (2013), in the context of SLO, what matters is the community’s 
vision of social, economic and environmental sustainability. Ultimately, if the company 
manages to meet local community’s expectations around sustainable development, the 
company may then be reward with the issuance of a SLO.  
It should be noted, however, that SLO is not a formal license or contract granted 
by the community but rather it is an intangible agreement which minerals developers 
have to obtain via negotiations with their local stakeholders. Through the analysis of 
four case studies, Prno (2013) concluded that the social, environmental and economic 
contexts of mineral development play an instrumental role in shaping SLO outcomes. 
This is because contexts dictate which issues will become a priority and what strategies 
will likely be the most suitable for their resolution.  He also stressed the need to 
understand SLO as a relationship building and engagement process in which 
companies must make purposeful efforts to form a part of the fabric of the community 
and garner the necessary local support for mining projects.  In this regard, firms would 
need to exhibit characteristics such as trustworthiness, respect, being community-
oriented and transparency for their stakeholders to build confidence/faith in them.   
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Furthermore, the extent to which a mining project produces local benefits in the 
form of jobs, procurement opportunities, donations, tax payment, royalty payments to 
name a few should be considered another influencing factor in earning widespread 
community support.  Whether a SLO will be granted or not hinges on several 
determinants. In cases where the value differences of the local community and the 
mining company seem irreconcilable, the SLO outcome is likely going to be 
unfavourable for the minerals developer.  Accordingly, there is no guarantee a 
company will succeed in securing and maintaining a SLO. 
Central to the idea of SLO is an implicit understanding and recognition of local 
communities as stakeholders. Stakeholder theory was first introduced by Dr. Edward 
Freeman in 1984 in his landmark book “Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach”  
where he maintains that shareholders should be regarded as one of the various 
stakeholder of a corporation.  
Donaldson and Preston (1995) describe stakeholders as persons or groups with 
legitimate interest in procedural and/or substantive aspects of a firm’s commercial 
activities, regardless of whether the firm has any corresponding interest in them. 
Generally, the interests of stakeholders are of intrinsic value. That said, stakeholder 
theory does not suggest that every stakeholder group should be involved in all 
processes and decisions of an organisation in an equal manner. Prior to the 
establishment of stakeholder theory in management literature and practice, the 
dominant paradigm was the conventional input-output perspective where investors, 
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employees and suppliers were understood as contributing inputs which the business 
then converts into outputs for customers. Unlike the input-output model of the firm, the 
stakeholder model of the corporation asserts that all stakeholders with a legitimate 
interest in the commercial entity participate in that entity to gain benefits.  
Phillips et al. (2003) define stakeholder theory as a theory of organisation 
management and ethics which explicitly promotes morals and values as a key 
characteristic of managing organisations. Indeed, a number of authors have examined 
the moral underpinnings of stakeholder theory using different normative cores such as 
common good (see Argandona, 1998), feminist ethics (see Burton & Dun, 1996; Wicks, 
Gilbert & Freeman, 1994) and integrative social contracts theory (see Donaldson and 
Dunfee, 1999) to name a few. In this sense, stakeholder theory does not only consider 
shareholder wealth maximisation as alleged by notorious economists Milton Friedman 
(see The social responsibility of business is to increase its profit) but more so, it takes the 
interest and wellbeing of other groups or actors who are able to promote or impede the 
achievement of corporate objectives, seriously.  
While Phillips et al. (2003) introduce us to the conceptual breadth of stakeholder 
theory, Donaldson and Preston (1995) point to the descriptive, instrumental, normative 
and managerial dimension of the theory. They argue that stakeholder theory is 
descriptive as it depicts the corporation as a collection of cooperative and competitive 
interests holding inherent value. At the same time, the theory can be said to be 
instrumental given that is offers a frame to look at the relationship between the practice 
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of stakeholder management and the accomplishment of various business performance 
goals (e.g. profitability, stability, growth etc.). For instance, Freeman’s (1984) was 
convinced that a more appropriate measure or indicator of a company’s success is 
whether it has sufficiently met the expectations of all its stakeholders and not merely 
those of its stockholders.  
Even though the descriptive and instrumental elements of stakeholder theory are 
imperative, fundamentally the theory has a strong normative basis which includes the 
recognition of the following ideas: (a) stakeholders are identified based on their interest 
in the corporation and (b) each stakeholder group deserve consideration for its own 
sake. Lastly, stakeholder theory is considered managerial because it advocates 
approaches, structures and practices, which combined, form stakeholder management.    
In some respects, stakeholder theory can be seen as an alternative way of 
understanding the corporation and doing business, especially because it encourages 
private sector entities to look beyond the conventional shareholder profit maximization 
doctrine. In a similar vein, SLO offers minerals company an avenue to rethink their 
approach to stakeholder management, social investment and community development.  
For example, Louche et al. (2010) suggest the need for a paradigm shift from a 
risk management orientation to a collaborative long-term development agenda. 
Certainly, if mining multinationals embrace a stakeholder theory framework and fully 
grasp the ways in which host communities as legitimate stakeholder can affect or be 
affected by the business operation, then stakeholder engagement will not be perceived 
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as an obstacle to overcome by the company but rather an opportunity to involve 
communities as partners in both project and sustainable community development.   
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Justification for selected Methodology 
This study seeks to address the limited empirical studies on how the GPs have 
impacted business human rights conduct on the ground. Hence, given the 
interdisciplinary and exploratory nature of the study as well as the specific research 
questions, a mixed method approach was used in a complementary fashion for primary 
and secondary data collection (see Table 4 & Table 5). Greene et al. (1989) explicated 
that “in a complementary mixed method study, qualitative and quantitative methods 
are used to measure overlapping but also different facets of a phenomenon, yielding an 
enriched, elaborated understanding of that phenomenon” (p. 258). As they further 
noted, by capitalizing on the strengths and offsetting biases in methods, complementary 
mixed method design is beneficial in increasing the interpretability, meaningfulness 
and validity of the findings.  In line with Greene et al. (1989) delineation, my study 
integrated both quantitative and qualitative data to create a more holistic picture of the 
situation in Dumasi. For instance, the themes covered in the qualitative interviews and 
focus group discussions resembled the ones in the survey questionnaire, however, the 
specific questions varied. While the data from the survey questionnaire was used to 
quantify respondent’s expectations and experiences with the mining company, the 
qualitative data was valuable in offering a deeper comprehension of these expectations 
and experiences which are often shaped by community members’ cultural paradigms.  
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Table 4:  Overview of institutions that were interviewed 
 
Corporate Entities Government Agencies Civil Society Organisations 
Golden Star Resources 
Bogoso/Prestea (GSR) 
Minerals Commission (MC) World University Service of 
Canada (WUSC) 
Ghana Chambers of Mines  Prestea Huni-Valley District Assembly 
(Assembly men/woman & traditional 
authorities)  
Wassa Association of 
Communities Affected by 
Mining (WACAM) 
 Office of  the Administrator of Stool 
Land  
 
 Commission on Human Rights & 
Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) 
 
 Ministry of Land & Natural Resources  
 
Guided by the philosophical tradition of pragmatism, the underlying goal is to 
mix research methods in a manner that provide the best opportunities for answering 
relevant research questions while compensating for the weakness of each method 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Pragmatism as a philosophic position has an extensive 
history. In fact, American philosophers and writers like Peirce, James, Dewey, and 
George Herbert Mead developed the essential ideas and features of pragmatism. 
However, at its core, the philosophy of pragmatism advocates for the “combining of 
methods in a way that achieves complementary strengths and non-overlapping 
weaknesses” and this is seen as the fundamental principle of mixed method research (Punch, 
2013). 
 It should be noted that researchers who believe in the philosophy of pragmatism 
reject the either/or choices and the metaphysical concepts associated with the 
quantitative-qualitative divide that is principally based on epistemological and 
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ontological questions (Punch, 2013). This is because pragmatism is mainly concerned 
with the practical consequences of the object of conception (Peirce, 1878; James, 1975).   
 Punch (2013) stressed that there are two important implications worth 
highlighting at this point: The first being that research questions are more important 
than the method used or the paradigm underlying the method. Secondly, the selection 
of qualitative or quantitative research methods fundamentally depends on the research 
question(s) being asked (Hammersley, 1991). 
Among the numerous advantages that Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) listed 
for mixed method research was the prospect of producing “more complete knowledge 
necessary to inform theory and practice” (p.21).  Indeed, Elwood (2009) pointed out that 
mixed method can be used in a complementary fashion “as different methods […] may 
be used together to enhance the explanatory power of our research” (p.96). For instance, 
a qualitative analysis of interviews can provide insights into meanings, relationships 
and interactions which quantitative analysis of survey data might miss. At the same 
time, quantitative analysis of survey data can uncover patterns of structural 
relationships that can be further examined through qualitative analysis of interviews 
(Elwood, 2009). Similarly, Punch (2013) noted that on one hand, quantitative research 
has the advantage of being able to conceptualise variables, profile dimensions, trace 
trends and relationships, formulise comparison and utilise large or representative 
samples. On the other hand, qualitative research has the strength of sensitivity to 
meaning and context, the in-depth study of  smaller samples and remarkable  
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 methodological flexibility which allow researchers to study process and 
transformation. What is more, qualitative research allows the researcher to get insight 
into the lived experiences of participants based on their own words and their 
perspective. 
Table 5: Field Activities & Methodological Tool 
 
3.2 Justification for selected Study Area 
 My fieldwork took place in Dumasi located in Wassa West District of Ghana 
where most of my key informants reside. This village was selected for four primary 
reasons. In choosing a study area, the criteria of recognition as a host community and 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEYS QUALITATIVE IN-DEPTH 
INTERVIEWS 
FOCUS GROUPS/ 
COMMUNITY 
DISCUSSIONS 
DOCUMENTS 
Unit of analysis: households 19 semi-structured individual 
interviews 
2 all-female group 
discussions 
Relationship & Sustainable 
Livelihood Agreement – btw 
GSR & Bogoso community 
 
 
Sample frame: 552 houses 
(with 676 households) 
Semi-structured group 
interview with staff from 
GSR Community Relations 
department 
2 all youth group 
discussions 
Country Implementation Plan 
for Voluntary Principles and 
Human Rights – Work Plan for 
Ghana 
Sample size:  every fifth house  
Estimated: 110 
Actual: 119 
 
Semi-structured group 
interview with staff from 
Minerals Commission 
 
 
 
 
TOTAL: 4 focus group 
discussions 
Mineral’s Commission CSR 
Guidelines & the Minerals & 
Mining Policy of Ghana 
TOTAL: 119 respondents  TOTAL: 21 in-depth 
interviews 
GSR 2015, 2016 & 2017 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report 
Ghana’s Minerals & Mining 
Act, 2006, 703 
CSR Agreement  -  btw GSR & 
Bogoso community 
Local Employment Agreement 
btw GSR & Bogoso community 
Dumasi Resettlement 
Agreement 
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the relatively close geographic proximity to the mining site were used to establish the 
existence of a company-community relationship.  
Secondly, Dumasi is one of the oldest mining areas in Western Ghana (nearly 20 
years) where a Canadian mining multinational, that has publicly accepted the GPs, 
conducts business. Thus, the long interaction between GSR and its host community in 
Bogoso (including the village of Dumasi) allowed me to (1) explore how the company-
community relationship has evolved over time as well as (2) examine how mining 
activities have altered the lives of community members both positively and negatively.  
Thirdly, Dumasi was selected because of the media attention it received in 
relation to alleged corporate human rights abuses and the level of community activism 
that seemed to be taking place there (see for example Anane, 2006; Tetteh, 2012; Ghana 
Web, 2012; Ghana News Agency, 2013a; Ghana News Agency, 2013b etc.).  
Lastly, based on Geenen’s (2016) report, members of the Dumasi community 
anticipated to undergo project-induced displacement as a result of the planned 
expansion of the Dumasi open-pit. Consequently, residents of Dumasi had expectations 
with regard to the developmental outcome of the displacement and resettlement.   
Given the interrelations between resettlement, human rights and development as 
discussed in the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based 
Eviction and Displacement, the Dumasi resettlement project constituted another 
compelling ground to potentially study the nature of this relationship.  
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Combined, these four reasons were a strong indication that the village of Dumasi 
constitutes a befitting area for a case study that seeks to investigate the various factors 
that shape the human rights conduct of ESCs and the effectiveness of community-based 
accountability strategies.    
 
3.3 Collection of Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data was gathered from June 2017 to August 2017. The collection of 
qualitative was done through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions 
as they allowed for flexibility and the emergence of new ideas (Parr, 2015).  In order to 
establish the trustworthiness of the study, the collection and analysis of qualitative data 
were guided by the principles of credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Credibility was confirmed through the purposeful 
sampling of interviewees. This sampling strategy allowed for the recruitment of 
knowledgeable participants who provided “information-rich cases” (Patton, 2002, p. 
242). Specifically, I conducted in-depth interviews with (1) three Community Relations 
Officer(s) of Golden Star Resources; (2) a representative from the community 
organisation WACAM; (3) a representative from the community organisation WUSC; 
(4) local chiefs; (5) representatives of the Ghana Minerals Commission; (6) a 
representative of the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, (7) a 
representative from Ghana Chambers of Mines as well as facilitated (8) four focus 
group discussions with community members. Participants for the focus group 
   
 
66 
 
discussions were identified and recruited during the survey questionnaire 
administration. The qualitative interviews and focus group discussions were semi-
structured and done using an interview guide. The use of the interview guide meant 
that all participants were asked a set of common questions about the institutional 
context in Ghana, the GPs, as well as expectations and experiences of mining 
communities with regard to the human rights responsibilities of businesses. However, 
because the questions were open-ended, some interviewees also discussed issues they 
felt were relevant to them or issues they wanted to draw my attention to. Where there 
seemed to be inconsistency and/or ambiguity, different participants were approached to 
provide clarifications and confirmation of major claims. For instance, following a group 
interview, individual interviews were scheduled to obtain more insight and elaboration 
on a topic. Moreover, the detailed descriptive field notes contributed to ensuring 
transferability and confirmability. Finally, credibility was further established through 
participants’ feedback on the transcribed interviews as the feedback helped in 
eliminating personal bias.   
 In addition to primary data, relevant secondary data on minerals and mining 
laws, policies, as well as socio-demographic characteristics on Bogoso/Dumasi mining 
community were obtained through the various national and local government 
institutions.  Other secondary data include official reports produced by the Government 
of Ghana and Golden Star Resources which were used for document analysis.   
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Since documents can be seen as “social facts” which are created, proliferated and 
used in socially organised fashion (Atkinson & Coffey, 1997), the intention is to “elicit 
meaning, gain understanding and develop empirical understanding” (Bowen, 2009, p. 
27). The critical analysis of the documents was meant to ascertain the language that the 
mining company and the various government institutions use to engage with and give 
meaning to corporate human rights responsibilities.  
3.4 Qualitative Data Analysis 
A total of nineteen (19) semi-structured individual interviews, two (2) semi-
structured group interviews and four (4) focus group discussions were analysed. On 
average, these interviews and focus group discussions lasted between 30 to 60 minutes 
and were conducted in English and/or Twi (Ghanaian local language). Interview 
locations varied based on participants’ preferences. Field notes, containing reflective 
information, further enriched the analysis. The semi-structured interviews and focus 
group discussions were tape-recorded with participants’ permission and transcribed 
afterwards. For the interviews that were not allowed to be recorded, notes were taken 
instead.  In terms of the analysis process, the transcripts and notes were prudently read 
from beginning to end so as to become familiar with the data (Wolcott, 1994). 
Subsequently, the transcripts were read a second time for open coding and first-order 
analysis (see Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2013).   
The qualitative data analysis process involved identification and coding of 
themes in the data, followed by the grouping of codes into related themes or concepts 
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(Bazeley & Richards, 2000). Throughout this process, the relationship between the 
different emerging themes was established and corresponding quotes were matched 
with the identified categories.  By using the process of arranging quotes in accordance 
with identified themes (i.e. axial coding), other themes were able to emerge, especially 
when some data did not fit into current categories. To ensure internal consistence, the 
data in each themes were carefully read again. Given the importance of anonymity, 
participants were allocated a code (i.e. R1, R2 etc.). 
 
3.5 Collection of Quantitative Data 
Like most quantitative research, the worth of the research project was assessed 
by the reliability and validity of the work (Payton, 1979). Hence, specific efforts were 
made to ensure internal and external validity, objectivity and reliability. 
 To procure quantitative data on community members’ expectations of and 
experience with mining companies’ human rights activities and contribution to 
sustainable community development in the region, a survey questionnaire was 
administered face-to-face to the head of the households in Dumasi using a systematic 
random sampling technique.  Household formed the unit of analysis in this study 
largely because the household is often considered the principal or perhaps the most 
significant context of human behaviour (Netting et.al. 1984, Netting 1993, Varley 
1994).  Nonetheless, formulating a universally applicable definition has been a 
challenge.  For the purpose of this research, the household is understood as a person or 
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group of related or unrelated persons who share a housing unit(s) and acknowledge 
one adult as their head and have a common housekeeping arrangement (Idemudia, 
2007). Household as a unit of analysis permits an exploration of how household 
dynamics (i.e. gender, income, hierarchy etc.)  impact the community’s ability to hold 
mining companies accountable. Furthermore, paying attention to household dynamics 
is important as Arku and Arku (2009) have suggested that socio-cultural factors, like 
religious beliefs and gender roles, can promote or impede well-being in rural 
households in Wassa West District of Ghana. In a similar vein, these socio-cultural 
factors may also affect the capacity of individual households to engage in community-
based corporate accountability strategies.  
The survey included close and open-ended questions on respondents’ (1) socio-
demographic background (e.g. sex, age, marital status, ethnicity, education, occupation 
etc.); (2) community expectations of mining company; (3) community experience with 
the mining company.  The sample for the household questionnaire was selected based 
on systematic sampling to reduce threats to internal and external validity.  
According to Krefting (1991), threats to internal validity are minimized when 
changes in the dependent variable are attributable to changes in the independent 
variable, or put differently when the design minimizes the impact of competing 
confounding variables by control or randomization. Furthermore, Payton (1979) 
explained that to establish external validity, the study sample should be generalizable 
to the larger population as such the sampling technique is crucial. Considering the 
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sample size of this study, generalisation can only be made to the Dumasi community 
specifically.  
The sample frame from which the sample was drawn was based on statistics 
from the Prestea-Huni-Valley District (2010). A total of 552 houses with 676 households 
in Dumasi were identified.   In doing the questionnaires, every fifth house was 
approached, and the head of the household was asked to complete the questionnaire 
when available. In cases where the head of the household was not available, the next 
adult figure was asked to participate in the household questionnaire. While some 
houses had a more traditional multigenerational household composition (i.e. father as 
the head of the household with a wife, children and grandparents), other households 
were made up of all-females or all-youth.  Overall, 119 household questionnaires were 
personally administered to head of the households in the village of Dumasi (see Table 
8). The design of the quantitative portion of the study was done in a way that it would 
pass a possible replication test.  Sandelowski (1986) discussed the importance of 
reliability in quantitative studies and classify it as the criterion concerned with the 
stability, consistency and equivalence in the study. Reliability can be confirmed via 
replication test, that is, the extent to which repeated administration will not alter the 
findings.   
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3.6 Quantitative Data Analysis 
For quantitative data analysis, I used SPSS to input data and obtain descriptive 
statistics such as simple frequency tables and basic cross-tabulations. Simple frequency 
tables display how the values of nominal variables are distributed across the data set. 
Each variable within the table has values with differing frequencies. The tables provide 
me with the frequency (i.e., the number of observations of a specific value within a 
variable), percent (i.e., the relative frequency expressed in a percentage value), valid 
percent (the percentage of missing data that were excluded from the calculation) and 
cumulative percent (Punch, 2013). Some of the simple frequency tables that were 
created include socio-demographic background of respondents (see Table 8), reasons 
for corporate-community conflicts (see Table 10) and community-based corporate 
accountability strategies (see Table 17) which are discussed in the subsequent chapters.   
Cross-tabulations are helpful in testing a research hypothesis and in examining 
how two variables covariate. Differently put, these tabulations allow the researcher to 
look at the association among two variables and measure the strength of that 
relationship. The bivariate cross-tabulation organises observation of the dependent 
variable and independent variable and allow for simple comparison across categories.  
For this study, I used a basic cross tabulation to show how mining activities 
impact respondents along gender dimension as it has often been argued that men and 
women are affected differently by mining (see for example Sharma, 2010; Hill & Newell, 
2009; Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001 etc.). 
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3.7 Critical Reflection on Fieldwork 
 
 3.7.1 The limits to language.  
Like other African countries, Ghana is ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse. It 
is estimated that there are over 48 languages and dialects spoken in Ghana (Dakubu, 
1988; Hall, 1983), however, English is the official language. Originally introduced 
during British colonial rule, English has become the standard language for government 
affairs, business activities and educational instructions. While all my questionnaires and 
interview guides were designed in English, community members in Dumasi/Bogoso 
generally expected me to communicate with them in Twi (i.e. the language spoken 
among the various subgroups of the Akan ethnic group).  As one of the dominant local 
languages in Ghana, community members seemed to feel much more comfortable in 
expressing their ideas in Twi as opposed to in English.  
Older research participants sometimes used Akan proverbs in answering my 
questions during face-to-face interviews, focus group discussions and household 
questionnaires. Among the Akan ethnic groups, the use of proverbs and 
metaphors/analogies is meant to summarise the core idea of what is being said. 
Furthermore, using ancient proverbs is supposed to establish the validity of one’s 
statements because the words of the ancestors are conceived as words of wisdom and 
truth.   
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In translating the Twi language, Akan proverbs and metaphors/analogies into 
English, some of the meanings and nuance may have gotten lost in the process. This is 
because some Twi words and certain cultural expressions do not have a direct/one-to-
one English equivalent. However, concerted efforts were made to provide the best 
possible translation that captured the meaning of the responses given during the 
interviews and focus group discussions. 
 In doing research, it is important to keep in mind that the process of gathering 
data is not mediated by epistemology and ontology concerns only as practical questions 
must also be taken into consideration. Thus, from a practical point of view, hiring a 
professional translator was not a viable option due to financial constraint. Besides, as a 
member of the Ghanaian diaspora who understands and speaks Twi, it was important 
for me to personally interact with participants in order to grasp their lived experiences 
as best as possible, capture their stories by using their own words and translate them 
into academic writing while retaining the core message of their narrations. The use of a 
professional translator could have altered my interaction with participants as well as 
impacted the dynamics and flow of the interview. While I acknowledge the challenges 
that may arise from doing the translation myself, for the reasons mentioned above, the 
decision not to involve a professional translator appeared to be the most appropriate 
approach.   
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 3.7.2 Meeting the community gatekeepers. 
Reeves (2010) stated that gatekeepers are essential to negotiating access and gaining 
entry to a fieldwork site or research participants. This is because gatekeepers can either 
advance or impede the research progress depending on their perspective on the validity 
and value of the research as well as their attitude towards the wellbeing of the 
community they are in charge of.  
For my research, I had to negotiate access to the Bogoso/Dumasi community 
with both formal and informal gatekeepers (Reeves, 2010) or as Ortiz (2004) call them 
internal and external gatekeepers. Upon my arrival in the small village of Dumasi, I 
visited the Assembly woman to introduce myself, and explain the research and its 
purpose. Given the size of the population, it was necessary for me to seek approval 
from a formal gatekeeper prior to embarking on data collection. After reading my 
fieldwork confirmation letter and questioning me about my intentions, she granted me 
permission to proceed and suggested two young people who could assist me in 
navigating the village. Ordinarily, I would have visited the local / traditional chief as 
part of the process of negotiating community access and entry. However due to the 
obscurities and controversies relating to the chieftaincy in Dumasi, it was best not to 
approach the chief of Dumasi in order to not get entangled in village politics.  
In contrast to Dumasi, informal gatekeepers were essential in attaining access to 
participants in the town of Bogoso. For instance, I attended a religious service at the 
main Catholic Church in Bogoso and requested an appointment with the priest 
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following the service. During my meeting with the priest, I was asked to state my 
intentions with the research and show some sample interview questions. At the end of 
the meeting, the priest gave his go-ahead and offered to support my undertaking by 
making an announcement in the church to encourage members to participate.  While I 
interviewed formal gatekeepers like the three assembly men and the traditional / local 
chief of Bogoso, it was informal gatekeepers like church leaders that were instrumental 
in helping me gain the trust of research participants. As I learnt from some participants 
during focus group discussion in Bogoso, formal gatekeepers such as the assembly men 
or the traditional /local chief of Bogoso are viewed as authorities with whom they have 
little to no direct communication and interaction. Rather, church leaders are seen as the 
ones who are easily approachable, accessible and available.  
All in all, my positionality as a member of the Ghanaian Diaspora 
(insider/outsider) proved valuable in building rapport with the various gatekeepers of 
Dumasi/Bogoso and securing entry into the community. 
   
 
 3.7.3 ‘So, how does your research benefit us?’: Over-researching a community.  
One of the reoccurring question and theme among community members was the 
possible benefit of the research to them. There were expectations that I should go 
beyond conducting interviews and surveys for my graduate studies. Most of the time, a 
respondent or participant would remind me that I was a Ghanaian and needed to 
contribute to building our country by helping the Dumasi community. These remarks 
   
 
76 
 
may have been made due to the perception that I am in a more powerful position and 
have access to resources as a Ghanaian from abroad. Quite often I was given the 
following instruction: “Make sure you tell the company and the government what we 
are telling you oo.”    
Based on my observations and comments from some of the interview 
participants and survey respondents, some segments of the Dumasi village appeared to 
be over-researched. In those parts of the village, community members, in particular 
adult men, rejected my request for an interview or the completion of a household 
questionnaire. Clark (2008) explains that research fatigue and over-researching occur in 
context where participants feel that their engagement in research has not led to any 
form of change. For instance, while interviewing one of the Chief linguists, he showed 
signs of disinterest. He later admitted that a number of researchers have approached 
him over the years.  Hence, he is getting fed up of giving interviews as he does not see 
the how the numerous research have directly benefitted the community.  
In trying to balance the tension between recognizing my social privilege as a 
Ghanaian from abroad and not wanting to exhibit a “saviour” complex, I explained 
some of the potential benefits that can come out of the research. Specifically, I 
mentioned how publications in journals that emphasise their voices can increase 
awareness of their situation. Overtime, a collection of empirical work on the lived 
experience of mining communities can affect a shift in thinking and practice among 
various stakeholders in the mining industry. For instance, in the past, several extractive 
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sector companies tended to apply a top-down approach to community relations. In 
recent year, however, most mid-tier to large resource extraction companies have created 
a separate department for community relations where they support and fund projects 
that are led by members of their host communities. I provided these examples to 
reinforce the idea that their participation in research matters and can make a difference, 
but change often occur in a slow pace.  
 
3.8 Research Limitations 
 
There are a few of limitations to this study pointing to promising areas for future 
research. While the sample (119 household questionnaires) approximates the relative 
number of households in Dumasi village, the arrangement of the houses presented a 
challenge (see Figure 1). Hence, due to the lack of proper randomization, the resulting 
data from the household questionnaire are not necessarily representative of the entire 
village.  
 Since the case study is restricted to the specific views and lived experience of the 
Dumasi mining community, the qualitative data cannot be used to make generalisations 
to the population. The inherent limitation of qualitative data means that participants 
cannot be taken as representative of all mining communities in Ghana.  However, 
because the interview questions were developed based on the BHR literature, the data 
is generalizable to theory. Accordingly, findings from the study may prove useful in 
offering theoretical, practical and policy recommendations that could aid in mitigating 
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corporate-community conflicts in other mining communities in developing countries 
with a similar economic, political, social and cultural context as Ghana. Hence, an 
interesting extension of this study could be a nationwide or a cross-country 
comparative study to strengthen its generalizability and discover other nuances.  
 Another limitation of the study relates to the absence of an all-male focus group 
discussion. Several factors may have contributed to the difficulty in recruiting men in 
Dumasi for a focus group discussion. One reason may have been in relation to my 
positionality as a female young adult of Ghanaian background who is considered an 
outsider of this particular community. In a Ghanaian context, gender, ethnicity and age 
are used as important markers of social identity to determine social hierarchy and 
negotiate power relations. From this perspective, as a female Ghanaian youth, my social 
status among elderly men in the Dumasi community was relatively low and did not 
permit me to assemble them to lead a focus group discussion. Notably, while there was 
resistance to participate in a focus group, some men were comfortable and willing to 
complete the questionnaire as the head of the household.   
Although this challenge may have presented itself as a disadvantage initially, the 
emphasis on all-female and all-youth focus group discussions allowed for these 
traditionally marginalised voices to be highlighted.  Within the mining industry, it is 
not uncommon for men to dominate through the decision-making power they possess 
as a result of their positions within mining companies and public institutions. In a 
similar vein, men tend to dominate the political arena in Ghana (Bawa & Sanyare, 2013). 
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For instance, within the local government of the mining town, the Dumasi 
assemblywoman is the only female community representative. The other (3) three 
community representatives of Bogoso are men. As such, facilitating all-female and all-
youth focus group discussions can be seen as a way of giving voices to social groups 
whose views and perspectives are usually not emphasised. To this effect, future studies 
could examine the socio-cultural dynamics within mining communities and how these 
factors affect the ability of the community to secure corporate accountability.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONTEXTS AND STUDY AREA 
 
4.1. A Historical and Contemporary Account of Ghana’s Mining Industry 
 
Gold mining in Ghana has a long history that dates back to the fifteenth century 
(Ghana’s Minerals Commission, 2014). In fact, the country’s former colonial name was 
Gold Coast. That is because Ghana is richly endowed with resources such as gold, 
diamonds, manganese, oil, and bauxite, with gold as the largest contributor to the 
national economy (Garvin et al., 2009). Aryee (2001) estimated that gold accounts for 
38% of total merchandise and 95% of total mineral export. According to Ghana’s 
Minerals Commission (2014), gold has made up 90% of all mineral revenue over the 
past two decades.  
There are two types of gold mining in Ghana: small-scale and large-scale.  Within 
the small-scale mining sector is a practice known as galamsey, which refers to 
individuals who make a living through illegal mining activities, i.e. gathering and 
selling minerals at or just below the soil surface without possessing the necessary 
license (Aubynn, 2009). Despite being illegal, galamsey is said to dominate the small-
scale gold mining sector, with an estimated 60,000 people involved in these practices 
(Aubynn, 2009). On the other hand, large-scale mining operations are predominantly 
undertaken by foreign multinationals with access to more resources, greater capacity, 
heavier equipment, and up-to-date technology and this sector employ approximately 
20,000 Ghanaians. While fewer people are employed in the large-scale mining sector, it 
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contributes about 45% of the country’s foreign currency, making the sector crucial to the 
Ghanaian economy. Generally, the distribution of mining benefits is disproportionate. 
Due to their low level of education and skills, the labour of residents from the smaller 
towns and rural areas, where mines tend to be located, are not particularly sought after 
(Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001). Consequently, Aubynn (2009) has argued that large-scale 
mining does not significantly contribute to promoting local economies. 
 As part of the nationalization process after its independence in 1957, the majority 
of the mines came to be state-owned and eventually globally uncompetitive. During 
this period (i.e. 1960 to 1985), the mining industry faced production, technological and 
financial challenges, resulting in decreasing output (Akabzaa and Darimani, 2001; 
Aryee, 2001; and Dumett, 1998).  Budget deficit, expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies as well as excessive borrowing meant that there were clear indicators of 
deteriorating economic conditions by the early 1980s (Government of Ghana, 1984). 
Consequently, Ghana turned to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund for 
financial assistance. During the 1980s and 1990s, Ghana adopted the Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP) to supposedly promote socio-economic development. Like 
other countries in the global South, Ghana was expected to implement certain economic 
and social policies to qualify for funding and debt-relief from these lending agencies. 
Among others, Ghana was forced to devaluate its currency, adopt a flexible exchange 
rate, decrease inflation, reduce public services and government spending (especially on 
education, health, and welfare), eliminate trade barriers, privatise public enterprises, 
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and stimulate economic growth through export (Aubynn, 2009; Aryee, 2001; 
Government of Ghana, 1984; Brohman, 1996; Portes, 1997; Konadu-Agyemang, 2000). 
While the benefits and drawbacks of SAPs have been widely debated (see Osabu-Kle, 
2000; versus Prempeh, 2001), there is little doubt that the mining industry witnessed 
immense growth between 1983 and 1998, particularly with rising export earnings from 
gold and diamonds.  
 In 1986, the Government of Ghana created the Minerals Commission to provide a 
stable policy environment and further enacted its first mining-specific legislation called 
PNDC Law 153 (Rutherford & Ofori-Mensah, 2011). To further encourage foreign direct 
investment through the provision of financial incentives, the Ghanaian government 
revised the mining code to the Mining and Minerals Act (Act 703) in 2006 with technical 
assistance from the World Bank (Rutherford & Ofori-Mensah, 2011). The establishment 
of a regulatory institution and the introduction of a new legal framework created an 
enabling environment for large-scale mining as they offered foreign transnational 
corporations generous tax allowances, exemption from customs duties, a rebate on 
royalties, and fewer foreign ownership restrictions (Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001; Aryee, 
2001; Aubynn, 1997; Sweeting & Clark, 2000; Ghana’s Minerals Commission, 2001 also 
see Table 6). 
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Table 6: Mining fiscal regime in Ghana 2006-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ultimately, these factors made Ghana an attractive destination for many foreign 
mining companies seeking for lucrative business opportunities in a politically stable 
environment. Not surprisingly, the increase in foreign direct investment in Ghana’s 
mining sector had various implications for different stakeholders.  For mining 
communities, the increased presence of foreign multinationals has given rise to human 
rights violations, environmental degradation, and loss of traditional sources of 
livelihood, among others (Garvin et al., 2009). For the government, the conditions of 
global neoliberal restructuring transformed its role from being a regulator to becoming 
more of a facilitator of resource extraction (Idemudia, 2017). However, due to increased 
incidences of corporate misdemeanours in mining communities, the Ghanaian 
government designed various policies, guidelines and other non-enforceable forms of 
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regulations as a way of shaping the human rights conduct of mining multinationals (see 
Table 7).  
Table 7: Laws, policies & global standards governing human rights responsibilities 
of businesses in Ghana’s mining industry  
LAW / POLICY / GLOBAL STANDARD LAUNCHED 
IN 
INITIATED BY  
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana: 
Chapter Five, Article 12(1) 
1992 Government of Ghana 
Minerals & Mining Act, 2006 (703) –Section 
72 -75 (Surface right & compensation)  
2006 Government of Ghana 
Guidelines for Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Mining Communities 
2012 Minerals Commission 
Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights (Work Plan for Ghana) 
2014 Ministry of Land & Natural 
Resources 
Minerals and Mining Policy of Ghana 2016 Ministry of Land & Natural 
Resources 
National Corporate Social Responsibility 
Policy (NCSRP)  
2016 Ministry of Trade and 
Industry 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Of significance here (see Table 7) is the Mining and Minerals Act of 2006. This is 
because the valuation of land and crops has remained a source of tension and 
disagreement between mining companies and local communities. As such the Ghanaian 
government has sought to address this tension via Section 72 to 75 of the Minerals and 
Mining Act, 2006. In part, the valuation of land and crops is a complex matter because 
land ownership and tenure system in Ghana are based on the principles and practice of 
communal ownership. Land is predominately owned by clans, extended family and 
communities who entrust the land to traditional authorities for management (Yeboah, & 
Shaw, 2013). Hence, the Western notion of individual land ownership is not necessarily 
prevalent in the Ghanaian setting. Interestingly, in pre-colonial Akan society, the sale of 
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land was even forbidden since land belonged to the entire lineage, that is, the ancestors, 
the living members and those to be born (Wiredu, 1990). In contemporary post-colonial 
Ghana, landowners are entitled to exercise surface rights and must be compensated by 
the holder of minerals rights for the disturbance of their surface rights according to 
customary land law, (Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 (703).  
Even though Ghana’s mining law sets out how land disputes and compensation 
are to be handled, the issue of adequate compensation for the loss of land, earnings, 
expected income remains a major human rights concern for local communities. For 
instance, farmers, who are dislocated as a result of a mining project and consequently 
have to completely restart, expect to be compensated for the loss of income from 
foregone crops yields (Dashwood & Puplampu, 2010). One of the challenges is that 
negotiations relating to the “deprivation of use” compensation and compensation for 
matured, high-yielded trees initially occur without the government's involvement. 
However, when a farmer and a mining company cannot reach a mutually beneficial 
agreement and have exhausted all options, then the Land Valuation Board steps in as 
the last resort.  
 
4.2 Governing the Mining Industry through Global Standards: VPs & Ruggie’s 
Framework  
In 2014, the Government of Ghana joined the Voluntary Principles on Human 
Rights & Security (VPs) Initiatives to “affirm its commitment to protect, respect and 
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remedy human rights as outlined in the UN Guidelines on Business and Human Rights 
and in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana” (Government of 
Ghana, 2014, p.3). Notably, Ghana is the only African country to have signed on to the 
VPs. In addition, while Ghana has not officially drafted a National Action Plan on 
Business and Human Rights based on the GPs, the United Nations Human Rights 
Office of the High Commissioner (n.d.), noted that Ghana is one of the states in which 
either the National Human Rights Institution or civil society has commenced the 
process of developing a national plan. Consequently, the VPs and GPs are the two 
global norms that seem to be shaping how mining companies seek to meet their human 
rights obligations within local communities. 
 Developed in 2000, the Voluntary Principles (VPs) are industry-specific human 
rights principles for extractive sector companies (ESCs). Freeman et al (2000) and Pitts 
(2011) explain that companies’ determination to protect their assets (i.e. facility, 
equipment etc.) and the controversial interaction between security forces (i.e. police, 
military, private security personnel) and local communities were among the drivers for 
the drafting of the VPs. Similar to other global standards, the development of the VPs 
was in part sparked by various corporate scandals involving oil companies and their 
complicity in violent political and ethnic conflicts in regions like Nigeria, Columbia and 
Indonesia to name some (Wettstein, 2012). Given the economic power of these 
multinationals and their presence in these regions, it is not uncommon for protesters to 
target their employees or even vandalise their assets. Allegations about oil companies’ 
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use of security forces to stifle protests and the ensuing human rights abuses of local 
communities drew the attention of the home governments of these multinationals. 
Thus, starting in March 2000 the US and UK government initiated and presided months 
of discussions and negotiations between leading ESCs, human rights NGOs and 
corporate responsibility groups to find a common ground on security and human rights 
issues.   
Finally, 20 December 2000 saw the public announcement of the VPs by then US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Washington and UK Foreign Secretary Robin 
Cook in London (Freeman et al, 2000). As a multi-stakeholder initiative, the VPs involve 
the participation of governments, corporations and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). Its objective is to guide ESCs in respecting human rights while maintaining the 
safety and security of their business operations. Specifically, the VPs were designed to 
address the human rights concerns of local communities in the global South who have 
allegedly suffered deaths, kidnapping, torture, and physical harm in the hands of 
security personnel hired by ESCs (Pitts, 2011).  Thus, for companies, joining the VP 
Initiative is meant to create synergy between corporate policies and practices pertaining 
to the provision of security for operations in accordance with internationally recognized 
human rights principles.  
Civil society groups can also become member organisations of the VPs and 
interact with business and state actors to push for the design of corporate policies, 
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practices and procedures that are in line with the VPs. Governments that participate in 
the VPs can supposedly tackle some of the challenges relating to security and human 
rights concerns within the extractive industry. According to Freeman et al (2000), one of 
the strengths of this non-binding standard is that it has created a process of 
collaboration, information-sharing, and dialogue among home governments, ESCs and 
NGOs. However, Freeman (2004) also draws our attention to its implementation 
challenges as this voluntary initiative has yet to demonstrate its ability to spur concrete 
progress on the ground. This is partly because the VPs are said to lack monitoring 
mechanisms as no follow-ups by states are required (Freeman, 2004).   
 In spite of these criticisms, the Government of Ghana decided to subscribe to the 
VPs as a potential strategy to respond to the pressures from community leaders, and 
civil society campaigns about the environmental degradation and human rights issues 
(e.g. the brutalization of host communities by security forces etc.) within the extractive 
sector. For instance, in March 2008, Ghana’s national human rights institution, 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), published a 
national study that investigated the nature and cause of corporate human rights abuses 
in mining communities. This study prompted the government to respond to the 
allegations of human rights violations made by host communities to adopt a number of 
guidelines and global standards like the VPs (see Table 5) in managing business-related 
human rights concerns within the mining sector (CHRAJ, 2008).  
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That said, it is also important to keep in mind that local pressure is not 
necessarily the only impetus for the acceptance of Western- driven voluntary codes of 
conduct in Ghana. This is because unequal power relations between the Global South 
countries and Western institutions may be another important determinant in the 
diffusion of Western corporate standards.  For one, governments in Global South 
countries in pursuit of economic growth may lower their social and environmental 
standard as a way of attracting foreign investments (Börzel, 2013). Furthermore, 
Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) surveyed four main theories of policy diffusion 
(i.e. constructivist, coercion, competition and learning) and highlighted that diffusion 
theorists have come to acknowledge the ways in which “policy choices of one country 
are shaped by the choices of others” (p. 450).  For instance, soft coercion theorists posit 
that hegemonic ideas and policy leadership drive policy diffusion. These theorists point 
to coercion exercised by governments, global institutions, and non-state actors via 
physical force (Owen, 2002), the manipulation of economic costs and benefits, and the 
monopolisation of information and expertise. Decisions about policy adaptation in 
countries that depend on the United States, the European Union, the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund for aid, grants, trade, foreign direct investments, loans 
and securities are often influenced by these powerful nation-states and international 
financial institutions. This process is further reinforced by the fact that multinational 
corporations tend to favour global norms and industry initiatives over concrete legal 
instruments. Importantly, these global enterprises also enjoy the support of their home 
   
 
90 
 
governments that increasingly downplay the need for laws and accountability 
mechanism (Clapham, 2006).  
 Even though the Government of Ghana does not explicitly engage with the GPs, 
it nevertheless remains relevant as some non-state actors such as mining companies 
(e.g. Golden Star Resources) have adopted the framework. An authoritative global 
standard introduced in 2011, the GPs are a set of 31 principles designed for businesses 
to prevent and address the risk of causing or contributing to human rights violations 
relating to their activities or that of their business partners (United Nations, 2011).  
Led by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and 
Human Rights, the GPs are a product of six (6) years of research and multi-stakeholder 
consultation across the globe on the matter of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises. Generally, the framework is based on three 
core principles.  The first being the state’s existing duty to respect, protect and promote 
human rights and fundamental freedom of its citizens. States are required to protect 
against human rights violations within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third 
parties, including businesses by taking appropriate measures to prevent, investigate, 
penalise and redress such violations through policies, legislation, regulations and 
adjudication (United Nations, 2011). Failure to take such steps can be seen as a breach of 
the state’s international human rights obligations. By bestowing the state with the 
primary duty of protecting human rights, the GPs follow the traditional hierarchy 
established by public international law. According to the principle, home states are not 
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obligated to regulate the extraterritorial activities of corporations based in their territory 
and /or jurisdiction. Nevertheless, home states are also not forbidden from exercising 
the extraterritorial dimension of their duty to protect against corporate-related human 
rights harm overseas if a recognised jurisdictional basis exists (Ruggie, 2007).   
The second principle refers to the responsibilities of business enterprises. The 
framework asks all business irrespective of size, sector, location, ownership and 
structure to comply with applicable laws and prevent infringement of human rights. 
With regard to the range of human rights, businesses must respect internationally 
recognized civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights as specified in the 
International Bill of Human Rights and the International Labour Organisation’s 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Among others, companies 
must avoid or mitigate adverse human rights impacts directly connected to their 
business activities, even if they have not contributed to those impacts (United Nations, 
2011). Therefore, companies have an obligation to obey the law even in circumstances 
where the formulation and enforcement of national laws are limited or nonexistent 
(Ruggie, 2008).  
Furthermore, businesses are called to exercise due diligence by identifying, 
preventing, and adequately handling human rights issues. Graf and Iff (2017) argue that 
while the concept of human rights due diligence for businesses can potentially be 
reduced to operational, financial and reputational risks for the company; its main 
purpose is to reduce risks for those who could potentially be negatively affected by a 
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company’s operation. It is important to note that adverse human rights impacts can 
refer to actual or potential. As per the principle, actual impacts should be managed via 
engagement in remediation while potential impact requires a preventative and 
mitigation approach.  In line with this understanding of human rights impact, the 
principle encourages business to have a statement of policy, human rights due diligence 
processes and remediation processes (United Nations, 2011).  Likewise, Ruggie (2008) 
suggested that companies exercise due diligence by adopting human rights policies, 
undertaking human rights impact assessment, creating an internal corporate culture 
that is based on a commitment to human rights, and track and report on their 
performance.  
 The third principle within the framework puts the responsibility on the state to 
facilitate access to effective remedies for those affected by business-related human 
rights abuses through administrative, legislative or other appropriate means. Remedies 
can come in different forms including but not limited to apologies, restitution, 
rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation and punitive sanctions as well as 
the prevention of harm through injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition (United 
Nations, 2011).  Since businesses also have a responsibility to redress and remediate 
human rights violations, the third principle constitute a joint duty of states and 
businesses. However, the role of businesses is secondary. This is because, under 
international human rights law, states have three fundamental legal obligations (i.e. 
respect, protect and fulfil) and “access to remedy” is considered part of the state’s duty 
   
 
93 
 
to protect. There is a procedural and a substantive component to providing effective 
remedies to victims of corporate-related human rights violations. With regard to the 
procedural component of "access to remedy", the process must be impartial, protected 
from corruption, and free from political or other influences that could change the 
outcome of the remedial procedures. The substantive aspect relates to the various 
mechanisms that must be put in place to guarantee victims have access to appropriate 
remedies (i.e. grievance mechanisms). Within the GPs, grievance mechanism is 
understood as "routinized, State-based or non-State-based, judicial or non-judicial 
process through which grievances concerning business-related human rights abuse can 
be raised and remedy can be sought (GP 25 Commentary). 
 While some have highlighted the strengths of the GPs, others have heavily 
criticised it. For instance, Addo (2014) maintains that the GPs’ approach to BHR is 
distinct and adequately robust compared to other governance regimes. For him, some of 
the characteristics making GPs unique include its flexibility, its blend of processes and 
substantive standards as well as the support and acceptance by stakeholders from 
various industries (Addo, 2014). In contrast, Jägers (2011) noted that “from the very 
beginning Professor Ruggie has steered determinedly away from the concept of human 
rights obligations for corporations and instead placed exclusive emphasis on the State 
as the sole duty-bearer” (p. 160). Jägers (2011) attribute this weakness to Ruggie’s 
pragmatic approach to developing the GPs which ultimately led him to interpret 
corporate responsibility for human rights in a minimalist fashion. Similarly, Cragg 
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(2012) suggested that the corporate duty to respect human rights should be based on 
ethical rather than on pragmatic grounds (i.e. enlightened self-interest) as suggested by 
Ruggie. For Cragg (2012), the assumption that respecting human rights will always be 
in the economic interest of a corporation is not credible or not likely to be seen as 
credible. Therefore, Cragg views this as a serious weakness of Ruggie’s framework that 
could impede its implementation. While these debates continue, limited efforts have 
been directed at exploring the effects of PRR on the ground so far.  
 
4.3. Study Area  
 
4.3.1 Socio-demographic characteristics of Dumasi. 
Dumasi is a village with a population of approximately 2,776 people (Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2014), and located four kilometres north of the Bogoso processing plant 
complex in the Wassa West District of the Western region of Ghana (see  Figure 4 and5). 
The village is approximately four kilometres away from the town of Bogoso but 
considered part of Bogoso and the Prestea Huni-Valley District. It is estimated that 
there are 552 houses with about 676 households in the community (see Figure 1).  
Dumasi is divided into two by the main road that connects Tarkwa/Bogoso and Prestea. 
The leading ethnic groups are Wassa, Fantes, Ashantis and Nzemas with Ewes, Kusasis 
and Daagaba as the minorities with community members speaking Wassa, Fante and 
Twi (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). The village is located in the tropical evergreen 
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rainforest and possesses fertile soil for the cultivation of food crops and cash crops 
(Obiri, 2007). 
Figure 1: Dumasi village 
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork pictures 
 
 In terms of basic social amenities, the community has one school building (see 
Figure 6) and no clinic or hospital. Community members who require medical attention 
must visit a health facility in Bogoso, or Prestea or Takwa. There are six water streams 
in Dumasi (i.e. Apepre, Worawora, Henya, Eniaboa, Nana Anyeaboa and Atsesua) 
which used to be the sources of safe drinking water (Commission on Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), 2008). However, Geenen (2016) explained that 
following major cyanide spills in October 2003 and June 2006, these sources of water 
become contaminated and unsafe for daily use (see Figure 2). Similarly, according to a 
Community kitchen 
Houses & community shops A bird view of Dumasi 
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report by CHRAJ (2008), there was spillage into the river Apepre on October 23, 2004, 
and June 17, 2006. As a result, Golden Star Resources (GSR) supplies the community 
with water on a day-to-day basis through six large poly tanks that have been installed 
across the village (Geenen, 2016). Furthermore, based on a report by CHRAJ (2008), 
GSR’s tailing dam is supposedly also contributing to the pollution of water bodies. 
Although community members notified the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of 
these environmental discharges, no action was taken (CHRAJ, 2008). It may not come as 
a surprise that the inaction of the EPA and other governmental bodies has produced 
frustration and a trust deficit among members of the Dumasi community.  With regard 
to economic activities, most inhabitants earn their livelihood through agriculture, 
fishery and forestry (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014).  
Figure 2: Contaminated Water in Dumasi 
Source: Author’s fieldwork pictures 
 
In 1999, GSR acquired the Bogoso concessions which include several open-pit mines (i.e. 
Chejuh, Dumasi, Bogoso North, Buesichem, Opon and Ablifa) (see Figure 3). Therefore, 
the Dumasi village is in close proximity to mining activities. During the active operation 
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of the Dumasi pit, community members experienced blasting, and harmful mine gas 
frequently.  
 In accordance with the socio-demographic information provided by the Ghana 
Statistical Service (2014) on Prestea Huni-Valley District, the respondents who 
completed the survey questionnaire were predominantly farmers (37%), students 
(20.2%) and petty traders (16.8%) (see Table 8). Out of the 119 respondents, 59 were 
women while 60 were men. The majority of the respondents (%84.9) have lived in 
Dumasi for over 11 years. 
Table 8: Socio-Demographic Background of Respondents 
Variable / Question Residents of Dumasi (N=119) 
Sex: 
   %Female 
   %Male 
 
49.6 
50.4 
Age: 
   Below 19 years 
   20 – 29 years 
   30 – 39 years 
   40 - 49 years  
   50 - 59 years 
   60 years and above 
   No response 
 
1.7 
41.2 
30.3 
14.3 
6.7 
5.0 
0.8 
Marital Status: 
   Single, never married 
   Married 
   Divorced 
   Widowed 
   No Response  
 
35.3 
55.5 
4.2 
4.2 
0.8 
Education: 
No formal education 
Junior Secondary School 
Senior Secondary School 
Bachelor's degree 
Master's degree 
Other (diploma etc.) 
 
14.3 
31.9 
37.8 
3.4 
0.8 
11.8 
Ethnicity: 
Ahanta 
Nzema 
Sefwi 
Wassa Fiase/Mpohor 
 
0.8 
4.2 
2.5 
58.8 
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Source: Author’s fieldwork data 
 
4.3.2 Background on project-induced resettlement in Dumasi. 
On January 30, 2013, a resettlement agreement was signed between Golden Star 
Resources (GSR) and the Dumasi Negotiation Team which consisted of 33 
representatives of elders, religious group, traders, farmers, artisans, civil servants, 
youth, unit committee and the Dumasi Oversight Committee. Initial discussions 
regarding relocation started in 2005 after the company “identified the need to re-open 
and expand the existing Dumasi pit, which is adjacent to the Dumasi community” 
(Dumasi Resettlement Agreement, 2013, p. 4).  However, the actual negotiations began 
in January 2011 (Thorpe & Gyamfi, 2013). A total of 25 working meetings were 
facilitated comprising of community forums (e.g. Dumasi Resettlement Negotiation 
Forum on March 2011), focus group discussions, a series of consultations and 
resettlement discussions.  
Wassa Amenfi 
Other (Ashanti, Northerner, Ewe, Fanti etc.) 
No Response 
15.1 
17.6 
0.8 
Occupation:  
Trader 
Farmer 
Student 
No employment 
Other (Teacher, Nurse, Driver, Security etc.) 
 
16.8 
37.0 
20.2 
14.3 
11.8 
How long have you lived in this area?  
Under 5 years 
5 - 10 years  
11- 20 years  
21 – 30 years  
Over 30 years  
Other 
 
5.9 
9.2 
34.5 
24.4 
24.4 
1.7 
Are you a native of this area? 
Yes 
No 
 
73.9 
26.1 
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As it is commonly done in the extractive sector industry, the agreement makes 
reference to the International Finance Corporation Performance Standard 5 (IFC PS 5) 
and promises to adhere to both relevant national laws and international best practices 
during the relocation process (Dumasi Resettlement Agreement, 2013, p. 4). 
Importantly, the negotiation process and planning activities were supposed to be in 
accordance with the local content agreement and “provide fair, high standard 
resettlement package supported by livelihood restoration and community development 
programme” (Dumasi Resettlement Agreement, 2013, p. 6). One of the key principles 
within IFC PS 5, relates to the quest for an improved living standard for affected 
individuals and communities. Recognising the importance of this principle, GSR made 
a commitment to strive for a general improvement of the living conditions for residents 
of Dumasi via the provision of replacement housing as well as appropriate communal 
structures and services for public use such as community centre, public school, 
marketplace, sacred sites, cemeteries, electricity, water systems and a public refuse 
waste system (Dumasi Resettlement Agreement, 2013, p. 6 & 12-13).   
According to the agreement, members of the Dumasi community were supposed 
to be relocated to a new site approximately five (5) kilometres from the village, near the 
main road that is leading from Bogoso to Kumasi. As part of the process, about 1,696 
structures from within 533 compounds would have been physically displaced. 
Compensation was to be done based on ‘buildings for buildings’ – only annexes and 
second or third houses of multiple house owners may be compensated in cash. It was 
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anticipated that production from the Dumasi deposit commences in early 2015 and that 
the deposit would provide both refractory and non-refractory ore sources for at least six 
(6) years from 2015 (Golden Star Resources, 2013). However, community leaders and 
the Assembly woman of Dumasi explained that GSR halted the resettlement process 
due to financial constraints and may or may not resume at a later (unspecified) time. 
Thus far, GSR has not issued an official public statement or press release to provide 
clarity about the resettlement status of Dumasi  
 
Figure 3: Golden Star Resources open-pit and underground mines 
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Figure 4: Map of district and study area 
 
4.4. Golden Star Resources and Community Relations in Dumasi 
Incorporated in May 1992, Golden Star Resources (GSR) is a global mid-tier gold 
mining and exploration company with its headquarters in Toronto, Canada. While the 
company has several subsidiaries (i.e. Golden Star (Bogoso/Prestea) Limited, Golden 
Star (Wassa) Limited, Caystar Holdings, Bogoso Holdings, Wasford Holdings and 
Golden Star Exploration Holdings etc.), its gold properties are situated in south-west 
Ghana. It owns 90% of two operating mines; (1) Wassa and (2) Prestea/Bogoso, located 
on the Ashanti Gold Belt in Ghana (Golden Star Resource, n.d.; also see Figure 3).  
 Having operated in Ghana for over 17 years, the company is now strategically 
concentrated on transitioning into a high grade, low cost, non-refractory gold producer. 
In 2017, GSR started expanding its operations through the development of two 
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underground mines below existing open pit operations. In light of fluctuating gold 
prices, GSR’s strategy for improving profitability includes the increase of gold 
production and reduction in operating expenses (see Golden Star Resources, n.d.). 
An integral element of its vision and mission is to be both a profitable gold 
producer and a responsible corporate citizen that creates value for shareholders, 
develops internal talents, adopts global standards and becomes a desirable partner for 
indigenous communities and the host government (Golden Star Resources, n.d.). 
Consequently, GSR facilitates a number of community development initiatives to 
establish good community relationships and maintain its social license to operate (see 
Thorpe & Gyamfi, 2013 and Table 9).  
Figure 5: Golden Star Resources Gold Mines 
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Source: http://www.gsr.com/about-us/photo-gallery/default.aspx 
 
Thus, GSR believes its CSR practices are in line with a human rights approach to 
sustainable community development (see chapter 2 for a discussion on rights to 
development/ human rights-based approach to development). This view might be due 
to the shift from top-down to bottom-up approach to CSR that occurred in 2005 after 
several allegations of human rights violations and environmental degradation arose 
against the company (Puplampu & Dashwood, 2011). Prior to that, GSR suffered from 
reputational damage and trust deficit within its host communities, partly because of its 
own actions or inactions. Consequently, in 2005, the senior management of GSR made 
concerted efforts to improve its social and environmental performance via internal 
changes and the initiation of community-led projects (Puplampu & Dashwood, 2011 
and Table 9).  
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Table 9:  List of selected CSR Projects by Golden Star Resources 
Name of community Type of community project Details  
Adamanso Education, School Building 3 unit classroom block and toilet facilities 
Akymepim A Education, School Building 3 unit classroom block and extension of electricity to 
the school 
Akymepim B Education, School Building 6 unit classroom block, library, and extension of 
electricity to the school 
Nsadweso Education, Preschool Building  renovation of community kindergarten 
Ningo and Subriso Education, School Building 6 unit primary school with teachers quarters and toilet 
facilities 
New Togbekrom Education, Preschool Building and 
Community Library  
kindergarten and community library (New 
Togbekrom resettlement) 
Mbease Nsuta Education, Preschool Building  Daycare centre 
Mamponso Education, School Building roofing of a three-unit classroom block 
Kwame Niampa Education, School Building classroom block 
Juabeng Education, School Building  6 unit classroom block, toilet facilities, and a school 
field 
Daboase Education, School Building student dormitories 
Ateiku Education, School Building 3 classroom blocks and teachers accommodation 
(New Togbekrom resettlement) 
Prestea Education, School Building 8 unit classroom block 
Old Subri Education, School Building classroom block and extension of electricity to the 
school 
Source: http://goldenstarinthecommunity.blogspot.ca/2017/05/star-pupils.html 
 
 
Figure 6:  School building in Dumasi sponsored by Golden Star Resources 
Source: Author’s fieldwork pictures 
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For instance, in 2006, the Golden Star Development Foundation in Prestea and 
the Golden Star Oil Palm Plantation (funded with US$1 per ounce of gold produced) 
were created to serve as long-term strategies for sharing the socio-economic benefits of 
mining with host communities (see Thorpe & Gyamfi, 2013). Similarly, a company 
representative explained that GSR has had a foundation for years. Community members are 
in the driving seat and make the decision so it is a very participatory process (R6). In spite of 
GSR’s efforts to remodel its CSR approach, the legacy of ‘bad’ corporate behaviour has 
left stains on its relationship with host communities (Puplampu & Dashwood, 2011). 
This means that GSR must continuously renegotiate its SLO and implement 
preventative and mitigating strategies to foster positive corporate-community relations 
(see Idemdudia, 2014). 
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CHAPTER 5: CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN 
DUMASI: EXPECTATIONS & EXPERIENCES 
 
5.1 Drivers of Conflict and Corporate Human Rights Abuses 
 
Underpinning many of the conflicts between TNCs and mining communities is 
the failure of the governance mechanisms in the mining sector due to the nature and the 
character of the Ghanaian state (Figure 7).  In essence, the Ghanaian state seems to show 
some characteristics of areas of limited statehood along sectoral and social dimensions.  
With regard to the sectoral dimension, the state appears to lack the political will 
and the capacity to implement and enforce mining-related laws. In fact, a respondent 
indicated, one of the major challenges we face relates to weak state institutions and weak 
enforcement of the law. It seems to me that there is little appreciation for democratic principles 
by some government officials. For instance, when citizens are breaking the law, they might turn 
a blind eye due to the fear of losing votes in the next election.  (R6). Another respondent 
expressed a similar concern about the regulatory environment by stating that “there are a 
lot of uncertainties with regard to regulations. Presently, there are too many regulators trying to 
pass conflicting laws. For instance, there is a regulator for air, one for diesel, another for a 
vehicle, and yet another for water and so on.”(R19). For the NGO WACAM, the inefficiency 
of regulatory bodies contributes to corporate-community conflicts: “One thing we have 
realized is that in most instances, most of the stakeholder, and I’m speaking from the community 
point of view and our experiences, we have realized that there is a very slow response from the 
regulators to these [human rights-related] reports from communities. This has led to several 
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Symtomp(s)/ 
Problem(s)
Intermediate 
Cause(s)
Root Cause(s)
•unmet community 
expectations
•environmental degradation
•human rights abuses
•External: 
•ineffective mining laws and policies
•governmental neglect of developmental duties
•Internal: 
•shifting roles between government & mining companies 
•risk management approach to community engagement
• External: (1)Areas of limited 
statehood along sectorial and social 
dimension (2) geopolitics of global 
soft norms for corporate regulations
• Internal: neoliberal business model
forms of riots between the community and the company and even the regulators” (R23).  Based 
on these accounts, the state appears to be unable to serve as an impartial arbitrator of 
conflicting and competing stakeholder claims. Consequently, while the Ghanaian 
government has enacted laws and policies (see Table 7) to regulate corporate behaviour, 
the extent to which these laws and policies are able to deliver on their objectives 
remains questionable.  
Figure 7: Root cause analysis of corporate-community conflicts in Ghana’s mining 
communities 
 
 
 The neglect of developmental responsibilities in mining communities by the 
Ghanaian government represents the manifestation of the social dimension of the areas 
of limited statehood. For example, a community member complained, “the government is 
not helping at all. I can’t remember the last time I even saw one of them in the community.” 
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(R16) This view was shared by a number of community members in Dumasi where the 
company was unsuccessful in relocating the community twice allegedly due to lack of 
funds to carry out the resettlement process. Because of this, the members of the Dumasi 
host community are living in a state of uncertainty and ambiguity with regard to their 
ability to secure their livelihood and build a stable sense of community. Moreover, 
based on the Minerals and Mining Act of 2006, 703 Article 73 and 74, issues 
surrounding resettlement and compensations are to be negotiated between the holder 
of the mineral rights (i.e. mining companies) and the owners or lawful occupiers (i.e. 
community members). Often this means that government oversight and involvement in 
these procedures is either minimal or absent. For example, a respondent asserted that 
"the government knows about our plight and has not shown any willingness to step in. For 
instance, when we approach the District Assembly with a request, they rather refer us to GSR as 
they believe it is an issue that falls within the responsibility of the company.” (R14) These 
quotes signify that governmental preference for self-regulation is indirectly allowing 
government not to meet its responsibility to protect host communities.  
Indeed, from the perspective of some government officials, companies should 
take more responsibilities when social and environmental problems are directly or 
indirectly related to their operations. For example, a respondent from the government 
noted that “If a mining company is taking the livelihood of community members, I expect more 
of them. For me, providing water when you have contaminated the water is not CSR. The 
company is simply providing an alternative as it should.” (R3) The implication is that 
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emphasis on self-regulation means the Ghanaian government is indirectly transferring 
governmental responsibilities to the mining companies. Furthermore, the contestations 
between government and mining companies that often result from this governmental 
transfer of regulation function allows for the human rights of communities to be 
violated and no adequate remedies are provided (see Idemudia, 2014).  
 Since the inception of commercial gold mine production in Ghana, conflicts 
between mining companies and local communities over land and natural resources 
have existed (Hilson & Nyame, 2006). Due to the near absence of government in these 
communities and the limited legal instruments to protect community rights, mining 
communities tend to expect companies to function as a surrogate to the government by 
contributing to sustainable development (Garvin et al., 2009). As an employee from 
Ghana’s Minerals Commission puts it, “companies say that they are not surrogate 
government, but the community believes that they represent the government” (R3). However, 
an employee from the community-based organisation WUSC noted that “communities 
have lots of expectations and want the company to do the work of the government due to their 
[community members] lack of understanding” (R4).  
Notably, the idea that local communities have high or unrealistic expectations 
were echoed by other research participants including staff from GSR, Ghana Chambers 
of Mines and local assembly men in Bogoso/Dumasi. One assumption underlying these 
assertions is that local communities see a clear demarcation between the state, the 
market and society. However, it is possible that community expectations are somewhat 
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mediated by their specific socio-cultural understanding of what they conceive as the 
responsibilities of post-colonial political, social and economic institutions. Looking back 
on traditional Akan society, members of the society were entangled in a network of 
reciprocal responsibilities based on kinship relations (Wiredu, 1990). The lineages 
formed the basic units for political organisation. Every Akan town, had a council made 
up of lineage heads that were tasked with the responsibility to maintain law, order and 
peace, ensure the safety and advance the welfare of members of the town (Wiredu, 
1990). Therefore, unlike contemporary democratic Ghana where governance and 
decision-making occur within an institutalized context on a national level, political life 
in pre-colonial Akan society was much more interwoven in everyday life and 
conducted on a micro level.  
Furthermore, Wiredu (1990) also highlighted the importance of Akan 
communalism by pointing to the Akan person’s strong sense of dependency of a human 
being and the need for “mutual aid for survival” as one is not sufficient by his/her own 
(p. 247). A human being is not a palm tree and onipa hyia mmoa (English translation: a 
human being needs help) are common sayings among the Akan ethnic group which 
attest to their worldview that a human being is entitled to help from others in order to 
achieve an adequate level of well-being (Wiredu, 1990). Drawing from this particular 
world paradigm, one could reasonably argue that the role of post-colonial institutions 
(i.e. the state and non-state actors) from an Akan perspective would involve functions 
and activities aimed at the promotion of community well-being.  
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Nonetheless, the expectation of host communities that mining companies should 
initiate sustainable development projects is partly because of the negative effect of 
mining on their lives. For example, one respondent pointed out, if we look at our 
environment, the blasting and vapour from the mining site always bring sickness and problems 
to the community. Some houses have cracks. Others have even collapsed completely. So there are 
always problems but the company doesn’t respond to our demands. There is no hospital in this 
community meanwhile blasting is going on.  (R17) (also see Figure 8). In a similar vein, 
another respondent said, […] sometimes the company cuts our crops and damages the land in 
order to do their mining activities, but they don’t compensate the farmers adequately (R26).  
Figure 8: Cracked and collapsed or unfinished houses in Dumasi 
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork photos 
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In the case of Dumasi, community members believe that the government is 
neglecting their demands partly due to the resettlement status they have been lableled 
with. The implication here is that by being marked for resettlement, the community is 
further marginalized as it creates uncertainty for governmental community 
interventions. According to one youth, “[…] it’s been ages since GSR promised to relocate us 
but every time they set a date, they fail us. Even if somebody wants to do something to better the 
community, they will end up not doing it because of the resettlement plan.” (R17). Similarly, 
host communities have expectations of mining companies’ developmental role because 
they believe they should also benefit from the business activities in their immediate 
vicinity (Idemudia, 2007). As two community members put it, “Mining is still going but 
we are not profiting from it. Only the foreigners do but we the youth of Dumasi are not reaping 
the benefits of mining” (R17). Another respondent noted that “You know, when someone 
asks me where I am from and I mention this place, the response will usually be “Wow, so you are 
from the gold town.” But the truth is I have never had the privilege of holding any of that gold in 
my hands” (R10).  
Unfortunately, host community’s expectation for mining companies to assume 
this quasi-governmental role (Crane, 2011) does not always align with mining 
companies’ strategic priorities of increasing production while minimising operational 
costs. According to a staff from Ghana’s Chambers of Mines, which is the national 
association that represents the interest of mining companies, “it is important to keep in 
mind that mining companies are not agents of development but rather facilitators of 
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development. Mining companies can contribute to sustainable community development through 
the Mineral Development Fund that goes to the District Assembly and by providing more 
procurement opportunities for members of their host communities.” (R19) The implication is 
that mining companies in Ghana see themselves as a tool of development rather than as 
an agent of development (Blowfield, 2015).  Whereas businesses simply contribute to 
development when they are tools of development, they consciously facilitate 
development and become accountable for their actions when they assume the role of 
agents of development (Blowfield, 2015). This is at the heart of the disagreement 
between mining companies and host communities. As community members expect the 
companies to assume the role of an agent of development, but mining companies see 
their role merely as tools of development. As such, it appears that the three 
stakeholders (i.e. government, companies and communities) share different views about 
the roles and responsibilities of both the government and companies. Consequently, 
Garvin et al. (2009) have explained that differences in expectations about the roles and 
responsibilities of companies and host communities contribute to misunderstanding, 
lack of trust, and disputes.  
Essentially, host communities demand increased community investments that 
will minimize the negative social and environmental externalities of mining activities 
and ensure they extract some developmental benefits from the presence of mining 
companies. When these community expectations are not met, then corporate–
community conflicts tend to become persistent with associated human rights violations. 
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In support of this, one respondent from Dumasi stated that “the conflicts are plenty. We 
have done countless protests about different issues in the past.” (R16).  In an attempt to better 
understand what Garvin et al. (2009) classify as misunderstandings, distrust, and 
disagreements, residents of Dumasi were asked to identify the different reasons for 
corporate-community conflicts. Table 10 shows that 73.1% of the respondents viewed 
the lack of community benefits as one of the primary factors contributing to company-
community conflicts in Dumasi.   
Table 10: Reasons for corporate-community conflicts in Dumasi (Ranked) 
Variable / Question Residents of Dumasi (N = 119) 
No Benefits to Community  87(73.1%) 
Company’s Disregard of Community Rights 55(46.2%) 
Lack of Transparency  49(42.1%) 
Environmental Impact 47(39.5%) 
Change in Company’s Management  44(37%) 
Government’s Disregard of Community Rights 7(5.9%) 
Weak Laws & Regulations 6(5.0%) 
Close Relationship between the Chiefs and the Company 1(0.8%) 
Source: Author’s fieldwork data 
Conversely, GSR points to high community expectations and emphasise the 
challenges it faces when trying to meet these expectations. For example, in an interview, 
a company representative stated that: Sometimes a community member might not be happy 
with the outcome of the grievance process. The issue might be resolved but because the outcome 
did not meet his or her expectation, it then becomes another issue. For instance, the government 
has a standard rate for land and crop valuation. And even though most of the time; we pay more 
than the set rate, community members are hardly ever satisfied (R6).  
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However, what is glossed over in the above statement is the fact that mining 
multinationals are primarily concerned with increasing cost efficiency and profitability 
which in turn sets constraints on how many resources is directed toward community 
development. For instance, during an interview with a Ghanaian business newspaper, 
Katherine Sutton, Director, Investor Relations and Corporate Affairs at GSR, stated that 
weak gold prices impact all areas of business including community investments.  As 
profit margin decrease, GSR will face pressure from shareholders to contain operational 
expenses (Dugbartey, 2016). Indeed, a government official captured the issue in the 
following manner: “There is competition between companies’ pursuit for profit maximization 
and community members’ livelihood and mining communities tend to be on the losing end” 
(R3).  Because ESCs operate within a neoliberal business model, where capital 
accumulation constitutes the ultimate measure of success, their approach to community 
engagement tends to be encapsulated within a risk management framework (Idemudia, 
2009).  This tension between community expectations and mining multinationals’ 
neoliberal business logic continue to form a source of conflict in Ghana’s mining sector 
and often create the context within which human rights abuses occur.  
 
5.2 Living in a Limbo: Resettlement, Development and Human Rights  
 
Over the years, different actors including the international community, national 
governments and local communities have lavished a wide range of expectations on 
companies as well as launched a number of international norms pertaining to how 
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companies ought to contribute to national and local sustainable socio-economic 
development (Van Alstine & Barkemeyer 2014; Harvey, 2014;  Vanclay, 2017). Globally, 
Southern and Northern human rights NGOs are advocating for more attention and 
efforts to combat the violation of economic, social and cultural rights by multinational 
corporations (Winston, 2002). Furthermore, the growing acceptance of global norms 
means that large-scale projects facilitated by multinationals (e.g. mining projects, 
infrastructure projects, resettlement and relocation projects etc.) in the extractive 
industry are expected to respect human rights and contribute to the realisation of 
human rights such as effective impact mitigation in relation to local communities and 
the natural environment, job creation for local communities, training programs for 
knowledge transfer to local communities and improving access to basic services. This is 
because companies must effectively address the social and environmental impacts of 
their projects in order to demonstrate their respect for the human rights of local 
communities. 
 In line with this thinking, some scholars have advised to avoid treating 
resettlement as a “rehousing project’ intended to improve the material quality of houses 
but rather consider, in a holistic manner, the ways in which resettlement can impact the 
life of affected individuals and the enjoyment of their human rights (Vanclay, 2017; 
Smyth & Vanclay 2017). Indeed, for van der Ploeg and Vanclay (2017a; 2017b) and 
Morel, 2014, project-induced displacement and resettlement (PDR) is a contested 
human rights issue which has attracted attention, particularly in relation to the 
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necessity for improved compensation and resettlement outcomes for affected people, 
that is individuals, families and communities who are economically and/ or physically 
displaced by a project (Smyth et al., 2015; Vanclay, 2017).  
By way of example, land acquisition by mining multinationals often times 
require the relocation of local communities and/or their assets (e.g. houses, farmland 
etc.). These relocation projects, however, can have several human rights implications 
since it can adversely impact the rights of local communities including their right to 
freedom of movement, work, food, water, health, development etc. (Esteves et al., 2017). 
Similarly, when a PDR is going to result in the loss of traditional source of livelihood 
that provided for food, water and /or general income and affected community members 
cannot secure access to similar resources, the company must ensure that there are 
appropriate mitigation measures in place such as new livelihood prospects and training 
opportunities (Cernea & Mathur, 2007; Vanclay, 2017). Within the context of this 
research, livelihood is understood as ‘the full range of means that individuals, families 
and communities utilize to make a living such as wage-based income, agriculture, 
fishing, foraging and other natural resource-based livelihoods, petty trade and 
bartering.’ (IFC PS5, 2012a, p.1). To put it in the words of a member of the NGO 
WACAM, in rural communities, everything is about farming. Farming is the primary 
occupation […]. So when we joke with issues concerning land, we are joking with their 
livelihood and that is one key issue of rights violation (R23).  
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Conceivably, this quote may be an indication of the contemporaneity of the Akan 
conception of human rights within post-colonial Ghanaian society. Similar to traditional 
agricultural Akan society, land constitutes an essential resource for the earning of 
livelihood in modern day Ghana. Thus, it is possible that the traditional notion of land 
as a human right continue to shape community members’ views about the possession 
and loss of land.  In other words, the clash between the Western commodification and 
commercialisation of land and the Akan cultural meaning of land may be a contributing 
factor as to why issues around fair compensation for the loss of income-generating land 
remain a significant discord among project stakeholders.  
In Dumasi, for instance, the process of agreeing on a resettlement package 
transpired to be a rather lengthy one. As a matter of fact, a community member 
explained that one of the main sources of conflict revolves around compensation for 
landowners. What a landowner or farmer might consider fair might be quite different from what 
GSR sees as adequate compensation.  Because of that, negotiating a decent resettlement package 
took as long as two years (R14). In support of this, an employee from the Ghana chambers 
of mines stressed that questions surrounding compensation are common problems 
within resettlement projects across the country and points to some of the grievance 
mechanisms available to affected mining communities. As he sees it, resettlement comes 
with a lot of challenges because the value of land and crops are not properly regulated. However, 
mining communities can take advantage of the petitioning mechanism that has been put in place. 
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For instance, they can file a petition to the Minister of Lands and Natural Resource. But 
generally, we do encourage mining companies to go above and beyond the law (R19).  
A look at Table 11 reveals that 85% of the respondent reported being negatively 
impacted by mining activities while only 3.3% associated positive outcomes with 
mining. Additionally, based on the available data, more women (44.6%) reported being 
negatively impacted by the mining operation than the men (40.4%).  
Table 11: Overall impact of mining activities by gender 
 
 Negatively Positively Mixed I don’t 
know 
Total (N=119) 
Female 53 (44.6%) 1 (0.8%) 3 (2.5%) 2 (1.7%) 59 (49.6%) 
Male 48 (40.4%) 3 (2.5%) 8 (6.7%) 1 (0.8%) 60 (50.4%) 
Total 101 (85%) 4 (3.3%) 11(9.2) 3 (2.5%) 119 (100%) 
Source: Author’s fieldwork data 
Furthermore when asked to identify in specific terms how mining affected them 
negatively (see Table 12), respondents named water/ air pollution (84%); loss of 
farmland (81.5%); loss of livelihood (57.1%); spills to the environment (50.4%), forceful 
resettlement (46.2%) and inadequate compensation (46.2%).  
There are two implications worth highlighting here: First, when it comes to 
resettlement, the process matters as much as the outcome, particularly, when there is a 
history of tensed company-community relations due to alleged corporate human rights 
abuses. In such situations, the minerals company should adopt unconventional business 
thinking and consider ways in which it can move from respecting to fulfilling the 
human rights of its host community including their rights to development. While 
companies cannot compensate for bad behaviour by doing good elsewhere, seeking 
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opportunities to assume a more proactive role in their human rights responsibilities 
(Wettstein, 2012) would go a long way in possibly restoring broken relationships.  
Secondly, companies can expose themselves to the risk of infringing on human 
rights by delaying, postponing or halting a planned resettlement project. Not only do 
delays or abrupt pause in resettlement project create multidimensional stress (Scudder, 
2012), but more importantly it forces affected individuals to live in a limbo. In 
particular, host communities find themselves undergoing an increased sense of 
insecurity and greater dependency on government and the company as their homes, 
social relations, and work and subsistence activities are disrupted. Ultimately, this can 
constitute a form of infringement of their right to self-determination (i.e. having the 
freedom to determine one’s own destiny) as well as their right to development.   
Table 12: Positive and negative contributions of mining activities (Ranked) 
Variable / Question Residents of Dumasi (N = 119) 
Positive Impacts 
Supply of Water 
School Building  
Employment 
Hospital / Health Care Services 
 
 
104(87.4%) 
12(10.1%) 
9(7.6%) 
5(4.2%) 
Negative Impacts  
Water / Air Pollution 
Loss of Farmland 
Loss of Livelihood 
Spills to the Environment 
Forceful Resettlement 
Inadequate Compensation  
 
100(84%) 
97(81.5%) 
68(57.1%) 
60(50.4%) 
55(46.2%) 
55(46.2%) 
 
Source: Author’s fieldwork data 
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Beyond income-producing activities, social, cultural and spiritual displacement 
constitutes a loss of place attachment and sense of place (Vanclay, 2002, 2008; Vanclay et 
al., 2015).  Failure by the project operator to devise and implement a suitable livelihood 
restoration plan would, therefore, mean that the private actor is contributing to the 
violation of fundamental human rights, specifically, the right to work, water, food, 
health and life (van der Ploeg & Vanclay, 2017a). Depending on the specific context and 
local dynamics, human rights risks and impacts will vary for each project site. But, in 
any event, the human rights of displaced people under international law must be fully 
respected and protected by project proponents and contractors even when the necessary 
licences have been secured (de Schutter, 2009). 
In an attempt to follow some of these recommendations within the GPs, several 
global extractive sector companies have adopted human rights policies and perform 
human rights impact assessments. Yet as Owen and Kemp, (2014) and Götzmann et al., 
(2016) pointed out, these efforts to prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impact at 
the project site level are not always adequately rigorous. Truly, responses to business-
related human rights harm have come in the form of protests (Hilson, 2002;  Hanna et 
al., 2016a, 2016b) and lawsuits that often have significant consequences for the accused 
companies (Drimmer, 2010). 
 From a legal and human rights standpoint, expropriation and involuntary 
resettlement are generally prohibited and can only be deemed permissible when these 
four conditions are satisfied: (1) the project must clearly be in the interest of the public 
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(2) the principles of proportionality and reasonableness must be fulfilled (i.e. when the 
expected harm is proportional to the potential project benefits) (3) due process has been 
observed (i.e. affected families and communities have adequate access to legal counsel and 
possess the ability to contest the decision) (4) affected persons have been given full and fair 
compensation (i.e. adequate alternative housing and compensation and/or replacement 
productive land) to the extent that they are not worse off (Hoops et al., 2015; United 
Nations, 2014)  
However, in the context of Ghana, mining projects are overwhelmingly 
interpreted as worthwhile undertakings that will benefit the general public. For 
instance, according to an employee from the Minerals Commission,   sometimes you will 
have farmers or community members who completely reject the idea of mining and show very 
little willingness to engage in dialogue. In most cases, when there is a dispute, the mining 
project wins because it is very difficult for farmers to make the case that their farming activity 
will create as many jobs and generate as much income for national development (R12). What 
this suggests is that the financial prospects of mining projects predominantly guide the 
decision of the Ghanaian government to justify projects and associated involuntary 
resettlement as being in the public interest. An employee from the community 
organisation WACAM alluded to the self-interest that government agencies may be 
pursuing (i.e. political elite interest) by stating that I’m not surprised [about the statement] 
because they are the Minerals Commission. […] One way or the other they have to find ways to 
exploit our minerals. Furthermore, the participants stressed that this argument that mining 
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is contributing to the countries development shouldn’t really be used […] because those involved 
in agriculture are contributing far more with less environmental impacts, and less human rights 
violations. Also, the fact that one has the right to property is a strong enough reason. So for me 
sometimes I’m saddened when I hear the Minerals Commission make such statement (R23). 
In addition to fulfilling the requirements for legitimizing project-induced 
displacement, the right to alternative land of equal or better quality and housing must 
fulfill the criteria of accessibility, affordability, habitability, security of tenure, cultural 
adequacy, suitability of location, and access to essential public services such as health 
and education (United Nations, 2007, p. 6).  To sum up, theoretically, legal evictions can 
only be enacted in very exceptional circumstances when all other alternatives have been 
completely exhausted. In such cases, adherence to the IFC Performance Standard 5 Land 
Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement (abbr. IFC PS5) and the United Nations Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Eviction and Displacement are expected 
given that they form international best practices.  
In 1980, the World Bank introduced a resettlement policy (World Bank, 2004), 
after allegations from vulnerable groups (e.g. indigenous peoples, minorities, informal 
settlers, people in extreme poverty) surfaced regarding impoverishment and trauma 
caused by project-induced resettlement (see Cernea, 1997; United Nations, 2014). 
Emulating the World Bank’s action, IFC and other development banks also produced 
resettlement policies and procedures that continue to be improved.  Due to the fact that 
the 2012 version of the IFC PS5 is embedded in the requirement for Equator Principles 
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Banks (Vanclay et al., 2015), the IFC resettlement policies and procedures, in particular, 
are well known among resettlement and social performance practitioners and extractive 
sector companies. As Vanclay (2017) expounded, within the private and social sectors, 
the IFC PS5 is widely recognised for delineating the general understanding of the 
concepts, objectives and requirements concerning dislocation, involuntary resettlement 
and livelihood restoration and improvement.  
According to IFC, the project must not only provide adequate compensation but 
they must also improve the well-being of the physically displaced people at the new 
location. Symth and Vanclay (2017), as well as the World Bank (2013), stress the 
importance for development projects to contribute to poverty alleviation and 
sustainability as outlined in the United Nation’s sustainable development goals (SDG). 
This is because aligning resettlement projects with United Nation’s SDG has the benefit 
of making the project more socially legitimate and helping companies obtain their social 
licence to operate (Jijelava & Vanclay, 2014a, 2014b). IFC’s requires project operators to 
draft a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) and a Livelihood Restoration Plan that will be 
used in undertaking the resettlement. The two documents must outline the relevant 
national laws and regulations, the characteristics of the affected population, the 
anticipated losses and the proposed mitigation strategies.  In the case of Dumasi, these 
documents were created to ensure community’s right to work and an adequate 
standard of living was not being harmed via the resettlement process. Unfortunately, 
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though, the existence of the documents turned out to be insufficient in protecting the 
community from business-related human rights violations.  
Reddy et al. (2015) noted that governments have the primary duty to respect, 
protect and fulfil the human rights of its citizens under international, however, when it 
comes to project-induced displacement most human rights responsibilities tend to fall 
under the purview of the company. Besides, the GPs instruct businesses to respect 
human rights notwithstanding the government's human rights obligations. This is 
particularly relevant in areas of limited statehood where businesses may be called upon 
to help fill some governance gap by complementing the work of governmental 
institutions via CSR programmes and positive corporate human rights activities. As 
part of their corporate duty to respect human rights, businesses must apply due 
diligence and avoid adverse human rights impact relating to their operation or the 
activities of their business partners (United Nations, 2011). 
Ultimately, what this means is that in the context of resettlement project, a 
company's scope of human rights obligation may be wider than in other circumstances. 
In fact, according to Ruggie, social expectation or SLO should form the basis for 
outlining the exact scope of corporate human rights responsibility (Ruggie, 2008). In 
light of the severity and range of human rights risks in project-induced resettlement, 
van der Ploag et al. (2017) believe that project operators should take pro-active steps in 
helping realise human rights of affected people so as to facilitate sustainable 
development outcomes via their projects.  
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5.3 “We don’t always know what happens behind closed doors”:  Intra-Community 
Dynamics & Representation in Dumasi 
  
While a company’s lack of human rights-based approach to resettlement can 
tremendously impact the well-being of communities and their enjoyment of human 
rights; it is also important to keep in mind that communities are not always a 
homogenous social unit whose interests constantly align.  This is particularly true in the 
context of resource extraction where inter and intra-community conflicts over resources, 
development benefits or distributional issues can occur (see for example Banks, 2008; 
Muthuri et al., 2012).  
To be sure, findings from interviews and focus groups discussions indicate that 
Dumasi faces its own challenges in relations to community cohesion and good 
leadership for community representation. For example, one youth lamented that 
everything is dependent on our community leaders and elders. But the issue is that our leaders 
wear their entoma (cloth), attend their meetings and return home after the company gives them 
something small. They don’t think about the community members and the future. As young 
people, how can we open our mouth and say something? (R28) Interestingly, a similar 
sentiment regarding the lack of inclusion in decision-making processes seemed to be 
prevalent among the women in the community.  During an all-female focus group 
discussion, a participant explained, when we have concerns, we cannot go and talk to the 
chief. Only people who have a personal relationship with him can approach him. And most of the 
time, GSR Community Relations Officers do not communicate with us directly. They tend to 
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talk to the chief so we are left out of the conversation (R10). At the same time, another female 
participant also noted that we depend on our elders to negotiate with them [GSR] and 
represent our interests. Whatever they agree upon, we do. But we don’t always know what 
happens behind closed doors (R16). Standling and Hilson (2013) alluded to the ambiguity 
surrounding the use of disbursed mineral funds within the Ghanaian context. While 
chiefs / traditional authorities are entrusted with funds which presumably will be 
utilized for community development (see Table 13), it has been alleged that this is not 
always the case. They refer to this as “elite capture” of mining wealth. Findings from 
fieldwork, seem to confirm Standling and Hilson’s (2013) report.  
 For instance, when asked about existing accountability mechanism for 
traditional authorities, a representative from the NGO WUSC noted that we are not at the 
point that there is a tool or there is a way of monitoring what the chiefs use their money for. They 
determine what they want to use the money for and some of them try to use it to support their 
communities like providing scholarships and all of that. But generally, accountability of chiefs is 
a dicey issue which you don’t want to push (R24).  
Table 13: Disbursement of Minerals Development Fund in Ghana 
SOURCE OF FUNDS BENEFICIARIES SHARE (%) OF 
FUNDS 
 
1. Twenty (20%) from 
mineral royalty payments  
2. Money from Parliament 
3. Grants, donations, gifts 
and other voluntary 
contributions 
4. Investments made by the 
Board 
5. Other  
Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands 
(OASL) 
• 10% administrative expenses of OASL 
• 25% given to the stool through the traditional 
authority for the maintenance of the stool in 
keeping with its status 
• 20% traditional authorities  
• 50% District Assembly  
50% 
 
Mining Community Development Scheme 
Local Management Committee consisting of:  
20% 
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• Chief Executive of District Assembly  
• Traditional Rulers 
• Mining company representative 
• Minerals Commission representative 
• A representative of the District Office of 
Minerals Commission  
• A representative of a woman’s group 
• A representative of a youth group 
Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources 4% 
Minerals Commission 13% 
Geological Survey Department 8% 
Research Training  & Sustainable Development 
Projects 
• 40% Geological Survey Department 
• 60% other research training  
5% 
Source: Minerals Development Funds Act, 2016, Act 912 and Ghanaian Constitution Section 267 (6) 
 
Undoubtedly, the lack of accountability mechanism within the chieftaincy 
system on its own poses a tremendous challenge to different stakeholder within the 
Ghanaian mining industry.  But, in the case of Dumasi, the situation is further 
exacerbated by major confusion about the traditional authority. While some 
participants insisted that Dumasi has its own regnant chief, others believe the village 
was suffering from a leadership vacuum. For instance, when asked about the current 
chief in Dumasi, a youth asserted that, for Dumasi, no one has crowned that man as a chief 
but it is due to his self and stomach interest that Golden Star Resource regard him as the chief 
(R27). [emphasis added] 
According to another participant, however, the traditional leader of Bogoso is 
trying to de-enthrone the Dumasi chief in order to stake a claim to the resources in 
Dumasi. As he narrated, at some point in time, the Dumasi chief started fighting among 
themselves and the family split into two.  So the Bogoso chief was asked to take charge of Dumasi 
until the issue is resolved. But the Bogoso chief himself is facing legitimacy crises. In fact, he has 
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been challenged by another family and taken to court in 1992/1993 and has lost the court cases. 
So we don’t have a strong leader who can advocate on behalf of the community.  
At a national level, the matter of chieftaincy disputes largely driven by the quest 
for power and access to land and resource wealth is also becoming more and more 
noticeable. Indeed, a representative from the Minerals Commission highlighted that the 
Dumasi case was not necessarily unique:  Generally speaking, Dumasi community can be 
difficult to deal with. […] But of course, a town can get dividend when chiefs are fighting over 
the stool. In fact, this is increasingly becoming a problem in resource-rich areas in Ghana (R18). 
While government officials seemed to be aware of these growing local governance 
problems within mining communities across Ghana, there also appear to be a 
preference for taking an avoidance strategy by ignoring the issue.   
To make matters worse, the behaviour and strong company alliance of appointed 
community liaisons are contributing to mistrust among community members.  
Originally, community liaisons were instituted by GSR as a mechanism via which the 
company manages complaints from members of its host communities.  Host 
communities would select a trusted member of the community to provide a voice and 
relate pertinent issues to the company for effective conflict prevention and resolution. 
However, if we are to believe the chief linguist, this initiative appears to have 
transformed into a curse rather than a blessing. As he expounded, GSR has community 
liaisons within Dumasi but they are not very useful. If anything, they are counterproductive. 
Rather than being a mouthpiece through which the community can express their grievances, 
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these community liaisons have become company informants who notify GSR of community 
activities that could negatively impact GSR’s operations or reputation (R15) [Emphasis 
added]. A similar concern was also raised by the assemble women who alleged that 
some of the community liaisons transmit sensitive information about community 
organizing to GSR Community Relations department in return for rewards.   
In essence, participants are pointing to the existence of competing and conflicting 
agendas among different groups in the village who are in pursuit of individual rather 
than communal benefits. In lieu of this, Muthuri et al. (2012) caution us not to fall into 
the trap of homogenizing communities and pay close attention to how and who we 
classify as the community stakeholder.  
 
Overall, the case of Dumasi mining village suggests that when community-
related, company-related and institutional challenges converge, they immensely 
undermine the prospects of sustainable community development and the realisation of 
human rights.  Indeed, owing to the complex interplay of delayed/ paused resettlement, 
a leadership vacuum and the absence of cohesive community interests, members of the 
Dumasi community are potentially experiencing the burden of a lack of representation 
and shared community vision as well as an uncertain future.  
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CHAPTER 6: FROM GLOBAL TO LOCAL: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, COMMUNITY-BASED 
ACCOUNTABILITY STRATEGIES AND GP’S ON THE GROUND 
 
6.1 Golden Star Resources and Community Relations in Dumasi: (Re)negotiating a 
Social License to Operate (SLO) 
In discussing the concept of SLO, Wilburn and Wilburn (2011) elucidate some of 
the challenges mining companies could potentially face. For instance, when attempting 
to secure its SLO, a company may sometimes discover the various community power 
dynamics emanating from the multiple stakeholder groups and their respective leaders 
and interests.  As a result of this, mineral developers could find themselves in a 
circumstance where they obtain a SLO from a fragment of the community while a 
different segment of the community may completely oppose the project.  
Such situations are not surprising given that minerals development project can 
impact various stakeholder groups within the community differently (e.g. create 
business opportunities for local sub-contracts while destroying the livelihood of 
farmers) who also possess varying degrees of power. Wilburn and Wilburn (2011) refer 
to this as vested and non-vested stakeholders with vested stakeholders being those who 
have the power to grant a SLO and non-vested stakeholder being those who are 
restricted to simply voicing their concerns. Oftentimes, companies concentrate their 
time and energy on wooing vested stakeholders such as local leaders and authorities. In 
fact, the assemblywoman at Dumasi made the following observation: Chiefs pursue their 
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self-interest as opposed that of the community. They are more concerned with securing contracts 
and GSR is more than happy to award these contracts in order to silence them. We all know that 
in Ghana here if someone wants to stop you from making noise, the person buys you a gift (R25). 
One way of interpreting the company’s behaviour is that from an operational point of 
view, minerals companies may perceive a focus on vested stakeholder as the most 
practical, cost-efficient and effective strategy in securing a SLO.   
Having said that, non-vested stakeholders are not completely powerless as their 
perception and response to a mining project can pose a threat and determine a 
company’s ability to access land, water and other resources. It is, therefore, imperative 
that companies first identify the different groups who stake a claim in what is 
acceptable to the community and understand the variety of stakeholder expectations. 
By way of example, GSR had to approach the Dumasi community twice to garner 
support for the proposed resettlement project. A community member recalled that, in 
1991, GSR started working in this area. I remember former President Rawlings attending the 
opening ceremony to cut the rope. Discussion about resettlement started during that time but 
the community did not agree to it. In 2006, GSR started the dialogue regarding resettlement 
again and this time about 80% of the community agreed to it (R14). 
 Considering that no internally coherent definition for SLO exists, Owen and 
Kemp (2012) view the attainment of stakeholder acceptance in the form of overt support 
or by way of reducing opposition a somewhat appropriate indicator of a company’s 
SLO. Notably, the existence or absence of public or community consent can manifest 
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itself in diverse ways and may range from a reluctant acceptance to a relationship based 
on high levels of trust (Thomas & Boutilier, 2011; Boutillier, 2007; Joyce & Thomas, 
2000).  Despite their scepticism and criticism of the industry’s superficial use of SLO, 
Owen and Kemp (2012) still recognise that SLO forces minerals companies to at least 
engage with the social and community dimension of mining and demonstrates some 
level of openness to identifying what they call “expectation gap” between a company 
and its stakeholders. A stakeholder expectation gap might present itself when what a 
company presumes to constitute a SLO is in stark misalignment with what stakeholders 
actually require and/or desire.  
Within the context of the case study, findings from the community survey 
questionnaire signify the presence of a stakeholder expectation gap.  Strikingly, close to 
90% of the respondents believe GSR is not meeting their expectations (see Table 14). 
Meanwhile, employees from GSR Community Relations Department are convinced that 
all stakeholders are our allies in spite of the challenges we face with them. Our job is to maintain 
communication channels with stakeholders and sustain the good relationship we have built over 
the years (R6). 
Table 14: Meeting community expectations (Ranked) 
Variable /Question Residents of Dumasi (N=119) 
No 107 (89.9%) 
Yes 8(6.7%) 
I don’t know 4(3.4%) 
Total 119(100%) 
Source: Author’s fieldwork data 
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Consequently, Owen and Kemp (2012) stress the importance of taking a more nuanced 
approach to SLO and going beyond the simple notion that a social and community 
dimension in mining is relevant. Truly, the mere use of the construct is not necessarily 
an indication that stakeholder expectations have been adequately met.  
At the same time, they also warn of not adopting SLO as a strategy to mask 
stakeholder expectation gaps. For instance, GSR gives an account of their community 
investment through their annual sustainability report. Underlying many of these 
reports is an assumption that these corporate sponsored community initiatives (see 
Table 9) implicitly confirm their SLO.  Yet, community perception and interpretation of 
these CSR programmes could significantly differ from a company’s presumptions as the 
statement below shows: “When GSR notice how blasting and smoke was negatively affecting 
community members, it then engage in community projects, and claim that they have helped us. 
But how can you make such a claim when you are the cause of the problem in the first place? 
(R25). In addition to this, an analysis of survey questionnaire also reveals that 57.1 % of 
the respondents classify the community’s relationship with GSR as very poor and 
another 29.4% rated the relationship as poor. Only, 4.2% of the respondent perceives the 
company-community relationship as good (see Table 15).  
Table 15: Rating the relationship between GSR and the community 
Very Poor Poor Average Good Total (N=119) 
68(57.1%) 35(29.4%) 11(9.2%) 5(4.2%) 119(100%) 
Source: Author’s fieldwork data 
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Some participants, who have witnessed the evolution of corporate-community 
relations in Dumasi also confirm the findings from the quantitative data. As one person 
puts it, the relationship between the community and GSR is […] like a man and a woman who 
live together simply because they cannot divorce each other (R25). Another elderly 
community member depicted the relationship in a similar way:  Allow me to use this 
analogy to describe the relationship between GSR and the community: Imagine a young man 
pursuing a young lady for marriage but all the young man does is offer lip service as opposed to 
concrete actions. Obviously, after a while, the young lady will lose interest and will try to find 
other alternatives (R14). Conversely, during the one-on-one interview, the staff of GSR’s 
Community Relations department laid emphasis on their community-centric approach 
to sustainable development by referencing the Golden Star Oil Palm Plantation and the 
numerous ways in which the company’s CSR programs help in the enjoyment of human 
rights. As they explained, our catchment communities are an active sphere of influence and 
accordingly must be the direct beneficiary (R6). This perspective is also echoed in GSR’s 
2016 sustainability report where it states:  
As a responsible corporate citizen, we act to respect and uphold human rights in our 
sphere of influence. This responsibility is embedded in our Policy on Community 
Relations and Human Rights. […] Our investments in local schools help provide access 
to education, in support of the right to education. Our investments in health 
stewardship initiatives help enable stakeholders to enjoy the right to health. These are 
but a few examples of the countless ways in which we can help promote the enjoyment 
of human rights. (p. 18). 
There are two ways to interpret these contradictory accounts by Dumasi 
community members and GSR Community Relations department.  For one, GSR could 
be oblivious to the community’s strong negative perception of their community 
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engagement strategies and their subsequent loss of their SLO in Dumasi.  Alternatively, 
GSR may be very aware of its standing within the community and taking an avoidance 
strategy. When a company is deeply committed to its business “risk”, “returns” and 
“reputation” framework, it inevitably pushes them to take a pragmatic approach to 
SLO, thus limiting the value of SLO as a potential vehicle to achieving sustainable 
community development.  When asked about how GSR can close the existing 
stakeholder expectation gaps and re-negotiate a SLO in Dumasi, the assemblywoman 
puts it in the following manner: Right now, the ball is at GSR’s court. It’s the company’s 
responsibility to do something that will improve the relationship (R25). 
 
6.2 Accountability Strategies from Below: What works and what doesn’t?  
Scholars widely agree that the process of globalization has considerably altered 
the influence of global corporations (Strange, 1996; Scholte 2000). With revenues that 
sometimes surpass the GDP of many developing countries and the mobility to establish 
businesses in favourable regulatory environments, transnational corporations are said 
to wield power on a par with governments (Newell, 2000a). Yet, there is also the 
perception that far less accountability mechanism exists to oversee the activities of these 
multinational companies (Newell, 2000b).  
Over the years, a number of buzzwords like corporate governance, corporate 
social responsibility and corporate accountability have been invoked to describe the 
rights and responsibilities that corporations have towards the people they work with 
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and work for. While corporate governance is concerned with the policies and practices 
for regulating internal company relationships as well as shareholder and stakeholder 
relationships, corporate social responsibility is used to express a wide range of ethical, 
social and environmental responsibilities of business within a society (Newell, 2002).  
 The notion of corporate accountability is another term often used to refer to the 
disclosure, auditing and monitoring activities of corporations and other actors (Zadeck 
et al., 1997).  According to Utting (2008), corporate accountability focuses on issues of 
power and advocates for the need to countervail the interests of big businesses. As he 
further elucidates, corporate accountability emphasizes questions of corporate 
obligations, the role of public policy and law, the enforcement of penalties in cases of 
corporate misdemeanours, the right of victims to seek redress and imbalances in power 
relations. Similarly, Garvey and Newell (2005) and Newell (2008) link accountability to 
the concepts of answerability, that is, an obligation to provide an account of one ’s 
action and inaction, and enforceability, which refers to a mechanism for ensuring 
obligations are met and sanctions are imposed in the case of non-compliance.  To put it 
in the words of Schedler (1999), accountability is about ‘how to keep power under 
control […] how to prevent its abuse, how to subject it to certain procedures and rules 
of conduct’ (p. 13).  
This particular conceptualisation of corporate accountability is useful in better 
understanding the community-based strategies that host communities in Dumasi utilize 
to hold Golden Star Resources accountable regarding human rights and examine how, 
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why, and when these corporate accountability strategies are effective in regulating 
business human rights violations and practices.  Effectiveness in this context signifies 1) 
improving the responsiveness of businesses to community demands (e.g. changes in 
business practices) and 2) enhancing the representation of community members 
through increasing their accessibility to or inclusion in decision-making pertaining 
matters relevant to their lives (e.g. changes in the structure of representation) (Newell, 
2005).  
A look at community-based corporate accountability strategies, or as Garvey and 
Newell (2005) call it “rights from below”, is also important to shift attention from 
corporate-driven voluntarism from above within the mainstream CSR literature to the 
activities communities themselves engage in to demand corporate accountability. In this 
regard, we must keep in mind that the extent to which a company responds to pressure 
from below may vary based on sectoral, political and cultural context as well as the 
broader web of accountability relationship involving global institutions, NGOs and 
governments (Garvey & Newell, 2005).  
To begin with, states have the formal power and can accordingly influence the 
effectiveness of accountability strategies from below via the provision and enforcement 
of policies and legal framework.  Still, whether sanctions for “bad” corporate behaviour 
are implemented is also largely dependent on the state’s ability and willingness to put 
these regulations into practice (Garvey & Newell, 2005). As mentioned in chapter 4 (see 
section 4.2), institutional restructuring mandated by IMF and World Banks’ SAPs 
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transmogrified the role of the Ghanaian government from a regulator to an active 
facilitator of resource extraction. Table 6 shows that the government owns a 10% share 
in each operating extractive sector company, both national and transnational 
corporations. As a business partner of minerals companies, the Ghanaian government is 
more likely to support the business agenda of the corporation to secure its portion of 
the financial benefits.  
One of the drivers of human rights abuse in the mining sector across the globe 
has been the use of security forces to suffocate community organised public campaigns. 
The situation in Ghana is a similar story. In actual fact, staff from the GSR Community 
Relations Department explained how they work closely with state institutions to 
manage conflicts from escalating: Usually, when an incidence occurs, we call the District 
Assembly. Depending on the situation, they might involve the police and security. It is 
government bodies that are responsible for civil unrest, not GSR. If the District Assembly does 
not respond, we call the next level of government. And in order to de-escalate the conflict, we 
disengage (R6).  
Notwithstanding how problematic the employment of security force is, mining 
companies and governments alike are convinced of the necessity of it, especially within 
the context of galamsey (illegal miners from the community, oftentimes unemployed 
youth). For instance, a government official explained at length: Illegal miners from 
communities encroach on mining concession and destroy their property. To resolve this issue, we 
use both the carrot and stick approach. We try our best to educate them and engage in 
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sensitization. This is the carrot approach. Occasionally, we have to resort to the stick approach 
by involving police officers and the military who might use minor force (R18). Likewise, 
employees from GSR Community Relations Department view the usage of force as 
justifiable under certain circumstances. In particular, they expressed concerns about 
some of the vandalism arising from community protests:  During one of their protest, the 
youth from Dumasi blocked the public road that GSR vehicles were using and threw stones at 
company vehicles. This causes direct damage to company assets (R6).  Because state and 
corporate interest are in perfect alignment, the efforts of the Ghanaian government are 
geared towards the promotion of resources extraction rather than the application of 
different devices to mandate greater transparency and answerability from corporations.  
Naturally, some of the business-driven choices the Ghanaian government makes 
will be at the expense of the community’s rights considering the ways in which these 
choices can undermine community-based accountability strategies (e.g. protesting).  
Indeed, based on the survey that was conducted, 50.4% of the respondents believed that 
the government was not making enough efforts to protect their rights while 40.3 % 
shared the opposite viewpoint (see Table 16).   
Table 16: State protection of community rights 
Is the government protecting the 
rights of the community? 
Residents of Dumasi 
(N=119) 
Yes 48(40.3%) 
No 60(50.4%) 
I don’t know 11(9.2%) 
Total 119(100%) 
Source: Author’s fieldwork data 
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Stakeholder groups within a community seeking ways to achieve greater corporate 
accountability are often faced with the challenge of overcoming various forms of 
powerlessness. Not only are these groups marginalized by the lack of governmental 
support, they are also limited by their resources when compared to large-scale 
transnational corporations that often possess money for legal advice and PR campaigns.  
Besides, Garvey and Newell (2005) believe, the distinctive culture within a 
corporate entity equally informs the company’s attitude towards the relevance of 
community relations for long-term commercial viability. Thus, they argue that 
community-based strategies are “necessarily diverse, multi-pronged and contingent 
upon the particular, context-specific balance between political, economic and social 
factor.” (p. 401) In line with Garvey and Newell’s assertion, data from survey 
questionnaire point to a variety of strategies members of the Dumasi village utilize. 
When asked about the tools they adopt to resolve corporate-community conflict, 54.6% 
of the respondent mentioned dialogue with the company and another 36.1% stressed 
the importance of filing complaints with government bodies (see Table 17).  
Table 17: Community-based accountability strategies (Ranked) 
Variable / Question Residents of Dumasi (N = 119) 
Direct communication with the company 65(54.6%) 
File complaints with government bodies 43(36.1%) 
Delay / Interrupt mining operation 11(9.2%) 
Public Campaigns (e.g. protests) 8(6.7%) 
Shut Down mining operation  3(2.5%) 
Lawsuit/Litigation  1(0.8%) 
Worked with NGOs 1(0.8%) 
Source: Author’s fieldwork data 
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Although only 6.7% made reference to public campaign like protests as a viable 
mechanism to demand corporate accountability, interviews with participants offer more 
insights. For example, the chief linguist observed that: The only way to force the hands of 
GSR is through protest so the community has organized several demonstrations in the past.  In 
1998, we had a protest regarding the supply of electricity. In 1992, we organized a protest so that 
they will build a school. And 16 years ago, the demonstration was about getting access to water 
on a consistent basis (R14). Similarly, another participant maintains that demonstrations are 
a very effective way of forcing GSR to respond to our demands. So far, that is the strategy that 
has produced tangible results (R15). The differences in the survey data and the interviews 
are not necessarily contradictory but rather a distinction between which strategies are 
used frequently and which strategies yield favourable outcomes. Whereas direct 
communication seems to the most frequently used strategy, interviews with community 
leaders suggest that protests are much more effective in getting GSR to respond to their 
demands.   
Increasingly, however, community leaders seem to be shifting towards the use of 
legal strategies to pressure companies to become more responsive to community 
demands.  For instance, a member of the Dumasi Resettlement Committee revealed that 
the committee is trying to take GSR to court. We sent a letter of warning to them and GSR 
responded by stating that their lawyers are currently unavailable and will respond soon. (R25) 
This was confirmed by another member of the committee who explained: As we speak, 
our lawyer and the resettlement committee are in the process of deciding whether to take the 
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company to court or not. They have sent GSR a letter with a deadline for response. Following 
GSR’s response, the community will then decide on how to move forward. (R15) According to 
a representative of the NGO WACAM, litigations are becoming and more and more 
necessary in managing company-community conflicts.  [….] we just had a case where a 
community very close to a mine dump site was requesting for the company to relocate them. So 
the community asked us to support them. We asked the company to come and sit with us to talk. 
The company didn’t come to the meeting so we had no other choice but to take them to court 
(R23).  
Notwithstanding the challenges that communities encounter, it is worth 
underscoring the ways in which community-based corporate accountability strategies 
in Dumasi and perhaps other nearby host communities appear to have been effective in 
influencing corporate behaviour. For instance, prior to 2005, GSR did not have a 
Community Relations Department. Possibly, the increased incidences of protests, 
complaints and media publications may have pushed GSR to rethink its approach to 
community engagement. What is more, in October 2015, GSR entered into a (1) 
Relationship and Sustainable Livelihood Agreement (2) Corporate Social Responsibility 
Agreement and (3) Local Employment Agreement with its host communities located on the 
Bogoso and Prestea Mining Leases? With regard to changes in the structure of 
representation, the formation of Community Mine Consultative Committees entails the 
inclusion of women, youth and other stakeholder groups within the community who 
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are now able to voice their needs and concerns at meetings involving company 
representatives.    
 
6.3 Ruggie’s Framework in Practice: Empirical Insights from Ghana  
Under international law, it is generally assumed that sovereign nation-states 
command "effective authority over their territories" and consequently have the capacity 
to govern their own domestic affairs (Schuppert, 2011; Ladwig & Rudolf, 2011). Over 
the last years, states have been prompted to sign on to multi-stakeholder initiatives and 
international binding instruments in numerous policy areas (Zangl and Zuern, 2004; 
Ladwig & Rudolf, 2011). At the same time, a number of global institutions and political 
driven programs are underpinned by the idea that the modern Western nation-state 
embodies “good governance” (Magen et al, 2009). To an extent, the Protect, Respect and 
Remedy (PRR) framework is grounded on these assumptions. States are given the 
responsibility to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of its citizens and ensure 
that victims of corporate human rights abuse have access to effective remedies.  
Questions about the nature of the state and its actual capacity to satisfy these 
duties are not sufficiently taken into consideration. Yet, these are pivotal questions that 
have implications for the implementation of the PRR framework.   For example, 
according to one respondent, generally, it is the responsibility of the government [to protect 
and promote human rights].  But given the existing governance gap, all stakeholders must 
contribute.  It is not helpful to simply fold your arms if the government is not doing its job” 
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(R2). In line with this view, another respondent stated, “we all [government, business & 
civil society] need to do more to protect and promote the human rights of mining communities 
(R2). These quotes indicate that while countries like Ghana might embrace their human 
rights obligations, they can either lack the institutional capacity or the political will to 
protect human rights. Hence, there is the expectation that non-state actors like 
businesses complement their efforts. In fact, Dagbanja (2012) pointed out that the 
corporate duty to respect and uphold human rights is provided for in Chapter Five of 
the Ghanaian Constitution, 1992. Specifically, he refers to Article 12(1) where it is stated 
that human rights and freedoms are to be respected and upheld by all natural and legal 
person in Ghana which includes mining companies and other business enterprises 
(Dagbanja, 2012). However, as he explained, the instruments that will ensure businesses 
fulfil this constitutional duty are presently missing. There are two implications 
emanating from Dagbanja’s analysis. First, there appears to be an unrecognized tension 
between global norms adopted by mining companies and the national laws of the host 
country where mining multinationals operate. Second, government capacity that is 
seriously lacking in the context of limited statehood is key for transforming PRR into 
concrete benefits for local communities.  
 While the VPs and GPs seem to inform the BHR policy environment in Ghana, 
the VPs appear to be more pervasive in the public sphere. This is because, in a bid to 
address the growing concerns about alleged business-related human rights violations 
within the extractive industry, the government of Ghana supposedly opted for a more 
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context-appropriate and industry-specific international soft law (i.e. VPs) as a strategy 
to potentially generate compliance from extractive sector companies. This is consistent 
with Abbott & Snidal (2000) who argued that states tend to prefer softer forms of 
legalized arrangements over hard legalization as soft laws provide strategies for 
handling uncertainty, infringes less on domestic sovereignty, and facilitates 
compromise among various actors. As one public servant elucidated, signing on to the 
VPs was to ensure that corporate entities get to uphold human rights as well, particularly in the 
extractive sector where it is deemed that a lot of abuses take place.  So we had companies sign on 
to it, not because they had a choice, but once a country signs to it, it becomes mandatory for 
private entities to sign on to it as well(R21).  
From the perspective of the Ghanaian state, the VPs is a useful tool through 
which it could ascribe human rights responsibility to mining companies. This is because 
actors within the Ghanaian political sphere seem to view the business practices of 
mining companies as the root cause of corporate human rights abuse (see Government 
of Ghana, 2014, p. 3) and disregard how the state’s inability to enforce national laws 
contributes to the problem. Perhaps not surprisingly, some participants emphasized 
that the government has and continues to take its human rights obligations seriously 
and made mention of the human rights provision in the Ghanaian constitution. For 
instance, one public servant maintains“[…] the government on its own, without the VPs, has 
an agenda to protect human rights because it is enshrined in the constitution. We set up the 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice to ensure that this is done. Most 
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countries don’t have a body to protect human rights so that’s at least a step in the right direction 
(R21). This is further affirmed in the VP Country Implementation Plan where it says: 
“Before signing unto the VPs, Ghana had in place legal provisions and institutions 
aimed at upholding, promoting and protecting the rights of its citizenry. […] Ghana has 
in line with the provisions in the 1992 Constitution established a Commission on 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and given it a broad mandate to 
protect universal human rights and freedoms, […]”(Government of Ghana, 2014, p. 4) 
Given that the state was already signed up to the VP, the value of the Ruggie’s 
framework may have diminished. For instance, when asked about the GPs, a public 
servant responded: “I’m wondering how this [GPs] is different from the VPs” (R21). Hence, 
the decision not to produce a separate Action Plan on Business & Human Rights may 
partly be because the VPs are seen as serving a similar purpose as the GPs.  However, in 
choosing the VPs over the GPs, two issues might have played a role. First, while ESCs 
are positioned as the central actor within the VPs, the PRR framework is predominantly 
state-centric and assigns more responsibilities to the state than businesses. Yet, the 
Ghanaian government sees the practices of mining companies as mainly responsible for 
human rights violation and as such a norm that focuses on their behaviour might be 
more appealing.  
The second is the issue of contextual relevance of the norm and the perception 
that the GP's overemphasis on state responsibility might indirectly be interfering with 
state sovereignty and exposing its limited capacity. For example, a respondent stated 
that “[…] international guidelines like the Ruggie’s framework can de-incentivise a country 
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from developing its own human rights guidelines, laws and systems that fit the specific context 
(R2). Another respondent argued that the responsibility to protect and promote human rights 
must rest on the government first and foremost. In fact, the Ghanaian constitution provides for 
the fundamental human rights of every citizen. When an incidence occurs, we involve police 
officers to resolve the issue.  In protecting citizens’ human rights, the government tries to use 
context-specific approach and institutions. For instance, the Commission of Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice was set up to ensure that human rights of citizens are guaranteed (R18). 
The implication here is that the Ghanaian case may provide some insight into why a 
number of African states might be reluctant to adopt Ruggie’s framework on a national 
level.  
Furthermore, there is also the issue of the extent to which Ruggie’s framework is 
able to effect change in corporate behaviour on the ground. The lack of accountability 
instruments makes the GPs attractive for companies as it allows them to facilitate 
corporate greenwashing while “doing business as usual”. Remarkably, Golden Star 
Resources (GSR) is among one of the few foreign mining multinationals in Ghana that 
has publically acknowledged its commitment to human rights through its annual 
sustainability reports (see GSR’s 2015 & 2016 CSR report). In line with Ruggie’s 
framework, GSR developed a policy on community relations and human rights in 2015 
which stipulates the company’s commitment to sustainable development and respect 
for human rights within its host communities. When asked about the reason and 
motivation behind the adoption of GPs, the company answered, we adopted the UN 
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Guiding Principles to be proactive. In 2005, GSR became a member of the UN Global Compact 
and since then we have been making constant efforts to improve. For instance, we have zero 
tolerance for child labour and compulsory labour. Employees are free to form labour unions and 
create a bargaining agreement. In fact, management attends union meetings (R6).  
In theory, making policy commitment and publically expressing acceptance to 
the GPs is supposed to improve a company’s human rights conduct, however, in 
practice; this might not always be the case. In fact, narrations from members of GSR’s 
host community in Dumasi suggest that the relationship between the company and the 
community has not improved and that human rights concerns remain prevalent.    In 
particular, community members complained about the lack of transparency with regard 
to the resettlement process and environmental issues:    
 […] since the last 4 years or so, the resettlement has been halted due to the lack of funds. As far 
as I am concerned, GSR people are liars. If they come for negotiation, we can take them to court. 
Community members had lands but stop building houses because of resettlement. Now the 
houses are not built and we are still living here (R14). At the same time, another respondent 
stated that we have a very bad relationship. GSR has seriously disturbed us. We used to have 
clean water but they have polluted all our water streams so we have fought and fought with them 
(R15).   
Thus, community members' report on GSR's engagement with them, indicate 
that despite the company’s public commitment to the PRR framework, it has not 
substantially altered its business practices. This is consistent with scholars who argue 
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that multinationals might seek to align with international standard as a way of 
mitigating the credibility and legitimacy deficit arising from their operation within a 
context of institutional void (Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 2011; Lu & Abeysekera, 
2015).  
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CHAPTER 7: EMERGING ISSUES AND CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis adds to the emerging knowledge on the public regulation of 
transnational enterprises in a globalised world. Specifically, it provides an empirical 
analysis of business and human rights in Ghana and accordingly makes an important 
contribution to the debate pertaining to the relevance and implementation of GPs 
(Cragg, 2012; Muchlinski, 2012; Addo, 2014). There are a few emerging issues worth 
highlighting.  
The first important contribution of the study is in unearthing some of the 
underlying assumptions underpinning Ruggie’s framework and how these 
assumptions may undermine the effectiveness of the framework. Using areas of limited 
statehood as a frame, I draw attention to the importance of taking the nature and 
character of the state seriously. Indeed, the findings offer some empirical evidence that 
the allocation of human rights responsibility between the state and business may not be 
adequate in countries where state actors cannot effectively set and enforce collective 
binding rules.  Implicitly, the PRR framework rest on the assumption that all 
governments possess the institutional capacity to protect and promote human rights as 
well as ensure access to remedies for victims of corporate human rights abuse. 
However, the findings suggest that this premise does not necessarily hold true in 
countries with weak governance structures and consequently constitute a fundamental 
flaw of the framework.  In fact, the case study reveals that the Ghanaian government 
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already instituted different measures to guarantee the enjoyment of human rights for its 
citizens but the problem seems to be the inability to enforce them.  
The second implication this thesis highlights relates to the insight provided on 
the contextual relevance of the GPs framework for countries in the Global South 
confronted with business-related human rights violations by powerful foreign ESCs. 
Presently, the vast majority of governments that have produced a national action plan 
are Western nations (with exception of two Latin American countries: Columbia and 
Chile) (see United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner website). 
Based on the findings, the PRR framework appears to be somewhat limited by its state-
centric emphasis and inattentiveness to the Global South context. Given the limited 
nature of the state in Ghana, GPs are perceived as an indirect attack on the state’s 
sovereignty. Such concerns might partly explain reluctance by the state to adopt global 
norms like the PRR framework.    
Although the PRR framework is meant to make sure businesses do not adversely 
impact the human rights of their stakeholders through their operations, the focus 
remains on governments whose power to exercise social control over international 
businesses has been restricted as a result of globalization. Charney (1983) argued that 
the spread of international codes is partly due to the quest of governments in the Global 
South to increase their control over MNCs. Hence, international standards like the VPs 
that can potentially shift the unequal power relationship to the advantage of 
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governments could be seen as more desirable, especially when the standards 
correspond more closely with their local realities.  
Furthermore, by joining the VPs, the Ghanaian government ensured that mining 
multinationals deal with mining communities’ social, economic, cultural and political 
rights on a practical level. More importantly, the findings presented here indicate that 
Brenkert (2016) assertion about how the lack of businesses public recognition and 
commitment to human rights represent a major obstacle may be too simplistic. This is 
because the case study demonstrates that public acknowledgement of corporate human 
rights duties through sustainability reporting does not automatically yield better 
human rights outcome for affected stakeholders such as mining communities. In fact, 
companies may simply be adopting it for symbolic purposes as opposed to using the 
framework as a guide to align business activities with the human rights concerns of its 
stakeholders. Thus, this study offers analytical nuance to the debates in the business 
and human rights literature.  
The third emerging issue is that there remain gaps between the rhetorical 
commitment of business to human rights via the adoption of global norms like GPs and 
community experiences on the ground in areas of limited statehood. This is partly 
because of weak government capacity as suggested by Risse (2017), and the 
unwillingness of government to enforce laws due to the tendency to privilege the 
pursuit of economic development over human development. However, in contrast to 
Thaur (2014) suggestion that market competition can be a driver of business 
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engagement with social responsibility in areas of limited statehood, this study showed 
that market competition can also undermine business willingness to respect or protect 
human rights. The explicit acknowledgment by GSR that profitability of a mine 
determines the extent and nature of their social investment makes this point quite clear. 
Hence, this study contributes to highlighting the limits of the business case argument 
for business to respect human rights of people in poor communities. 
Fourth, the theoretical debate on business and human rights has largely 
neglected the voices of poor and marginalised communities in areas of limited 
statehood in the Global South. As a result, the tendency to conceptualise what is or is 
not business human rights obligations and what form it should take based on 
assumptions rooted in Western context is problematic for at least two reasons. First, 
local communities in this kind of setting use a different socio-cultural logic to 
understand and delimit the human rights obligation of a firm and the form it should 
take. In this case, the Akan worldview that is based on group solidarity and collective 
responsibility puts a different kind and a much higher threshold on the responsibility a 
firm is expected to assume compared to what they might assume in a Western context. 
As a result, claims that communities in this areas have an undue high expectation or 
that firms are taking on governmental responsibility tell us more about Western context 
than the social-cultural context within which corporate-community relations actually 
unfolds. Second, the neglect of community voices also inadvertently accentuate the 
disjuncture that exits between the worldview of local communities and the neoliberal 
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worldview that shapes MNCs behaviour in areas of limited. Unfortunately, the 
disjuncture tends to provide a fertile ground for corporate-community conflicts 
(Idemudia, 2017).  
Finally, the study makes a strong case for the rethinking of a businesses’ role in 
the promotion and realisation of human rights. In line with Ramasastry’s(2015) and 
Wettstein’s (2012) call for a closer integration of BHR and CSR, the case study shows 
that mining companies like GSR are already appropriating the language of human 
rights and using a human rights framework to describe their CSR efforts. In many ways, 
these CSR programs are phrased as pro-active corporate human rights activities 
intended to help the host community enjoy their various economic, social and cultural 
rights. As a result, efforts to respect human rights suffer from the same kind of 
shortcomings that have plagued other mining companies CSR initiatives. This, in turn, 
raises the question of whether BHR objective can be realised via stand-alone corporate 
initiatives or via integration into existing corporate CSR platforms.  While our study 
highlights the problem that can arise from an integrated CSR perspective, there is a 
need for future studies to examine the effectiveness of stand-alone corporate BHR 
initiatives (e.g. Beyond Zero Harm Framework). 
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APPENDICES   
Appendix A: Survey questionnaire 
 
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
1.  Sex  
(1) Female  [  ] 
(2) Male  [  ] 
 
2. What is your age?  
(1) Below 19  [  ] 
(2) 20-29  [  ] 
(3) 30-39  [  ] 
(4) 40-49  [  ] 
(5) 50-59  [  ] 
(6) 60 and above  [  ] 
 
3. What is your occupation? 
(1) Trader  [  ] 
(2) Farmer  [  ] 
(3) Fishery  [  ] 
(4) Student  [  ] 
(5) No employment  [  ]  
(6) Other, Specify 
 
4. What is your marital status?  
(1) Single, never married [  ] 
(2) Married  [  ] 
(3) Divorced  [  ]  
(4) Widowed  [  ] 
(5) Other, specify 
 
5. What is your educational background?  
(1) No formal education  [  ]  
(2) Junior Secondary School  [  ]  
(3) Senior Secondary School  [  ] 
(4) Bachelor’s degree  [  ] 
(5) Master’s degree  [  ] 
(6) Doctoral degree  [  ]  
(7) Other, please specify           
 
6. What is your ethnic background?  
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(1) Ahanta  [  ] 
(2) Nzema  [  ] 
(3) Sefwi  [  ] 
(4) Aowin  [  ] 
(5) Wassa Fiase/Mpohor  [  ] 
(6) Wassa Amenfi   [  ] 
(7) Pepesa  [  ] 
(8) Other, please specify           
 
7. How long have you lived in this area?  
(1) Under 5 years  [  ] 
(2) 5-10 years  [  ] 
(3) 11- 20 years  [  ] 
(4) 21-30  [  ] 
(5) Over 30 years [  ] 
(6) Other, please specify          
 
8. Are you a native of this area (i.e. Are your parents or any of your parents from this 
area)?  
(1) Yes  [  ] 
(2) No  [  ] 
 
COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS OF MINING COMPANY 
9. Do you know about Golden Star Resources?  
(1) Yes  [  ] 
(2) No  [  ] 
 
10. What do you see as the expectations of the community of GSR? 
 
11. Is Golden Star Resources meeting the expectations of the community?  
(1) Yes  [  ] 
(2) No  [  ] 
(3) I do not know [  ] 
 
12. On a scale from 1 to 5, how would you rate the relationship between the community 
and the mining company? 
1 2 3 4 5 
  Very Poor Poor Average Good Very Good 
  
13. On the whole, how would you say large-scale mining has impacted your life: 
(1) Negatively 
(2) Positively 
(3) Mixed 
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(4) I don’t know 
 
Please elaborate 
 
 
14. What human rights concerns are most important to you? Please choose the ones that 
apply.   
(1) Education  [  ] 
(2) Employment  [  ] 
(3) Housing  [  ] 
(4) Health  [  ]  
(5) Food  [  ]  
(6) Community development  [  ]  
(7) Being able to vote  [  ] 
(8) Being able to protest  [  ]  
(9) Being able to practice my religion   [  ] 
(10) Being able to marry and have a family  [  ]  
(11) Being able to move freely  [  ] 
(12) Other, please specify          
 
15. What do you see as the negative impacts of mining here? 
(1) Loss of livelihood  [  ] 
(2) Loss of farmland  [  ] 
(3) Water and air pollution  [  ] 
(4) Inadequate compensation 
(5) Forceful resettlement 
(6) Spills to the environment 
(7) Loss of sacred and cultural sites 
(8) Other, please specify           
 
16. Is the government protecting communities from the negative impacts of mining?  
(9) Yes  [  ] 
(10) No  [  ] 
(11) I do not know  [  ] 
 
17.  If no, why?   
             
   
18. What do you see as the positive impacts of the mining industry here? 
(1) Employment  [  ] 
(2) Schools buildings [  ] 
(3) hospital [  ] 
(4) water supply 
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COMMUNITY EXPERIENCES WITH MINING COMPANY 
19. Have there been any conflicts between the mining company and the community?  
(1) Yes  [  ] 
(2) No  [  ] 
(3) I do not know [  ] 
 
20. If yes, what were the reasons for the conflict(s)?  
(1) The environmental impact of mining activities  [  ]   
(2) Community does not benefit from mining  [  ] 
(3) Changes in the company’s management  [  ]  
(4) Lack of corporate transparency and accountability  [  ]  
(5) The company’s disregard of community rights and demands  [  ] 
(6) The government’s disregard of community rights and demands  [  ] 
(7) Current laws and regulations do not sufficiently protect community rights  [  ] 
(8) The close relationship between the government and the mining company  [  ] 
(9) The close relationship between local chiefs and the mining company  [  ]  
(10) Other           
 
21. If yes, were there any arrests, beatings or intimidations when the conflict happened? 
(1) Yes [  ] 
(2) No [  ] 
(3) I do not know [  ] 
 
22. Was the conflict resolved? 
(1) Yes [  ] 
(2) No [  ] 
(3) I do not know [  ] 
 
23. How was the conflict resolved? 
(1) the community shut down the activities of the mining company [  ] 
(2) the community interrupted the activities of the mining company [  ] 
(3) the community took the mining company to court [  ] 
(4) the community talked to mining company [  ] 
(5) the community complained to the government [  ] 
(6) the community organized public campaigns (e.g. protests) [  ] 
(7) the community worked with NGOs [  ] 
(8) Other           
 
24. Is there an association or committee that manages relationship with the mining 
company? 
(1) Yes [  ] 
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(2) No [  ] 
(3) I do not know [  ] 
 
25. Are you satisfied with the association or committee? 
(1) Yes [  ] 
(2) No [  ] 
(3) I do not know [  ] 
 
26. If yes, why?            
27. If no, why?            
28. Is there a NGO that manages relationship with the mining company? 
(4) Yes [  ] 
(5) No [  ] 
(6) I do not know [  ] 
 
29. Are you satisfied with the work of the NGO? 
(4) Yes [  ] 
(5) No [  ] 
(6) I do not know [  ] 
 
30. If yes, why?            
31. If no, why?            
32. If it is within your power, would you like the mining company to continue operating 
in the area, based on what you know about their operations so far? 
(1) Yes [  ] 
(2) No [  ] 
(3) I do not know [  ] 
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Appendix B: Interview guide for company 
 
A: COMPANY INTERNAL PRACTICES  
1. What is the function of the Community Relations & Social Responsibility Department? 
2. How do you manage conflicts with and complaints from community?  
3. Have there been any incidences of conflict with your host communities? 
4. What was the cause of the conflict?  
5. When an incidence/conflict occurs in your host communities, what process do you 
undertake to resolve the issue? Please walk me through the steps and how you arrive at 
a satisfactory response.  
6. Do you have a formal protocol that you follow when a conflict arises?  
7. Which staff and/ or department(s) are involved in the process of formulating a 
resolution?  
8. Why did you adopt the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights? 
9. How do you implement the principles in a country like Ghana?   
10. Does GSR offer human rights training for its staff in the community relations 
department? 
B: COMPANY EXTERNAL PRACTICES   
1. What are some of the sources of corporate-community conflicts in your areas of 
operation?  
2. Since you adopted the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights has your 
relationship with your host communities changed?  
3. In your 2015 & 2016 CSR report, you mentioned that your operations and CSR initiatives 
can help promote the enjoyment of human rights and made reference to the right to 
education and the right of health. Would you say that GSR has adopted a rights 
approach to sustainable community development? If yes, elaborate, with examples, how 
your adopted approach has worked or would likely work to enhance sustainable 
community development? ,In your CSR report, you used the term “sphere of influence” 
What is your understanding of the term and how do you set the boundaries for your 
“sphere of influence”? 
C: PROBLEMS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 
1. What are some of the challenges that Golden Star Resources face when trying to meet its 
human rights obligations?  
a. Company-related / internal challenges  
b. State/ government- related challenges    
c. Community-related challenges 
2. Which community groups or individuals, if any, have posed the greatest challenge or 
opposition to your CSR operations? 
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3. Which groups or individuals, if any, have been your main allies in your CSR operations 
here? 
4. What are some of the strategies you have adopted to deal with the challenges you have 
identified? 
5. How do you see the future prospects of your CSR operations here? 
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Appendix C: Interview guide for NGOs 
 
A: EXPECTATIONS OF THE MINING COMMUNITIES   
1. In your view, what human rights concerns are most important to the mining 
community and why?  
2. Which entities, agencies or individuals should be responsible for protecting the 
human rights of the community, and why? 
3. What do you think are the main development concerns of the mining community 
and why?  
4. Which entities, agencies, groups or individuals should be responsible for facilitating 
sustainable community development? Please elaborate on your answer 
5. Do you think sustainable community development is a human right?  
6. What are some of the expectations mining communities have of GSR?  
7. In your opinion, is GSR meeting these expectations? Please elaborate your answer 
with specific examples  
8. Who should be responsible for penalising GSR when it violates the rights of 
community members?  
 
B: EXPERIENCES OF MINING COMMUNITIES  
1. Has the relationship between GSR and the community gotten better or worse over 
time? Please elaborate 
2. What are some of the things that create conflicts between the mining community and 
the company?  
3. Tell me about a time, if any, when the community had a conflict with GSR. What 
was the conflict about?  
4. When GSR violates the right of community members, what do you do? 
5. What are some of the strategies you use to ensure GSR does not violate the human 
rights of community members? 
6. Which strategies are most effective and why? (Please provide concrete examples, if 
possible) 
7. Why do you think these strategies are effective? 
 
C: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS  
1. What are some of the challenges that the community faces in making sure GSR 
responds to community demands (e.g. community-related, government-related and 
company-related challenges)? 
2. What things does the community need to make sure GSR answers to community 
demands?   
3. What can be done to improve the relationship between GSR and the community?  
4. As we speak now, what are some of the benefits you think the community has 
derived from GRS’s operations here? 
5. Can you describe your specific activities in helping to bring these benefits to the 
community? 
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Appendix D: Interview guide for government officials  
 
A: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT  
1. What are some of the barriers that make it difficult to implement your mandate?  
2. The Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (703) centres on minerals ownership, royalties, 
mining lease and dispute resolution. In your opinion, does the act sufficiently address 
community rights?  
3. Has the government enforced other policies to guarantee the rights of mining 
communities in Ghana?   
 
C: UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS  
11. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights was introduced in 2011. 
Since then the UN Human Rights Commission has been encouraging countries to 
implement the principles on a national level.  Has the Government of Ghana drafted a 
national action plan yet?   
12. The Respect, Protect & Remedy Framework, assign state with the responsibility to 
protect against human rights abuses by third parties whiles businesses are expected to 
respect human rights through due diligence. What are your thoughts about this 
allocation of responsibilities?  
13. Does the Government of Ghana have a system in place that allows mining communities 
to file a complaint?  
14. What are some of the challenges that the government faces when trying to promote and 
protect the human rights of mining communities?   
a. Government- related / internal challenges  
b. Company-related challenges    
c. Community-related challenges 
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Appendix E: Written informed consent  
 
Date: February 25th, 2017 
Study Name:  
Doing Just Business: An Empirical Analysis of Mining Multinationals, Human Rights and 
Sustainable Community Development in Western Ghana 
 
Researcher:  
Masters Candidate 
Graduate Program in Interdisciplinary Studies 
 
Purpose of the Research: The purpose of the research is to (1) examine the extent to which the 
Canadian mining company, Golden Star Resources,  is able to fulfill its human rights and social 
responsibilities and (2) investigate how host communities are able to hold Golden Star 
Resources accountable with respect to human rights and sustainable community development. 
What You Will Be Asked to Do in the Research: As a participant, you will be asked to partake 
in a semi-structure in-depth interview/ questionnaire / focus group that will last thirty-minutes 
to an hour. During the interview/ questionnaire / focus group, you will be asked to share your 
experience and knowledge on the topic. You will be able to agree or decline the use of audio 
recording equipment. 
Risks and Discomforts: Participants will be informed of their rights to decline participation and 
questions. In this regard, the researcher will inform the participants of his/her suitability and 
comfort about the interview process. At any instance, if a participant feels discomfort, the 
interviewing process will discontinue.  
Benefits of the Research and Benefits to You: By participating in the interview / questionnaire 
/ focus group you will be assisting the researcher in making important theoretical contribution 
to the academic literature on business, human rights and sustainable development. Insight 
gained from the interviews / questionnaire / focus group can be utilized to offer 
recommendations for improving corporate-community relations in Western Ghana where 
mining activities take place.  
Voluntary Participation: I understand my participation in this project is strictly voluntary and 
involves less than two hours of my time. I have the right not to participate, not to answer any 
questions and my decisions to not participate in the research will not influence the treatment I 
may have with the researcher, or affect my relationship with York University either now, or in 
the future. 
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Withdrawal from the Study: You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any 
reason, if you so decide. I want to iterate that your decision to stop participating, or refusing to 
answer particular questions will not affect your relationship with the researcher, York 
University, or any other group associated with this project. In the event you withdraw from the 
study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed wherever possible and your 
anonymity and confidentiality will not be jeopardized. 
Confidentiality: I understand that any information I provide during my participation in this 
project will remain anonymous, and confidential to the extent allowed by law. Projects, 
company employees, government officials, and community members will not be identified by 
name. Only the researcher and the supervisors will have access to the data for the duration of 
the study.  I understand that my responses will be recorded for the purposes of data precision 
and accuracy, but that this recording will remain confidential and stored in a secured locked 
location on the primary researcher premises in Canada, for the duration of the study. I have the 
right to refuse to be recorded and or to request a copy of the transcript to check for accuracy. 
Recordings will be destroyed latest by April 30, 2018 once the data analysis is complete. Should 
I choose to withdrawal from the project, any and all data pertaining to me will be destroyed 
immediately; all participant data arising from the fieldwork will be destroyed on the conclusion 
of any publications from the fieldwork, including not limited to the researcher’s thesis. I have 
had the project explained to me and I understand, and recognize that confidentiality will be 
provided to the fullest extent possible by law. 
Questions About the Research?  If you have questions about the research in general or about 
your role in the study, please feel free to contact my supervisor xxx either by telephone at xxx or 
by e-mail xxx. You can also contact my Program Assistant xxx at the Graduate Program of 
Interdisciplinary Studies by phone at xxx or via email xxx.  
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-
Committee, York University’s Ethics Review Board and conforms to the standards of the 
Canadian Tri-Council Research Ethics guidelines. If you have any questions about this process, 
or about your rights as a participant in the study, you may contact the Senior Manager and 
Policy Advisor for the Office of Research Ethics, 5th Floor, York Research Tower, York 
University, telephone xxx or e-mail xxx. 
Legal Rights and Signatures: 
 
I____________________    consent to participate in Doing Just Business: An 
empirical analysis of mining multinationals, human rights and sustainable community 
development in Western Ghana, conducted by Cynthia Kwakyewah.  I have understood the 
nature of this project and wish to participate.  I am not waiving any of my legal rights by 
signing this form.  My signature below indicates my consent. 
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Signature        Date     _____   
Participant 
 
 
Signature        Date     ____   
Principal Investigator 
 
 
 
 
